Induced emotions and economic behavior: An experimental approach by Vogt, Anna Sophia
Induced emotions and economic behavior:  
An experimental approach 
 
DOCTORAL THESIS 
to acquire the academic degree of 
doctor rerum politicarum 
(Doctor of Economics and Management Science) 
submitted to the 
School of Business and Economics of 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
by 
M.Sc. Anna Sophia Vogt (geb. Abratis) 
 
President of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: 
 Prof. Dr.-Ing. Dr. Sabine Kunst 
Dean of the School of Business and Economics: 
 Prof. Dr. Christian D. Schade 
Reviewers: 1. Prof. Dr. Christian D. Schade  
2. Prof. Dr. Dirk Engelmann 
 
Date of Colloquium: 21.12.2017
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Experimentalist: If I understand the opening question correctly, we are here to 
discuss human economic behavior, not the behavior of a mythical hero called ‘rational 
man’, a mythical hero whose powers of computation and cogitation are unlimited. For 
this mythical hero it is easy to form consistent probability and preference judgments, 
but not for ordinary people like you and me.” 
 
Reinhard Selten, talk delivered at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of 
Management, Northwestern University in 1989  
(printed version Selten, R., 1991. Games and  
Economic Behavior, 3, 3-24, p. 4) 
 I 
Abstract 
Do specific emotions influence economic decisions? Can emotions be of strategic 
value in market entry decisions? This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary and 
experimentalist’s approach to address these questions. Relevant literature and models 
from standard psychology, neuroscience, and economics are synthesized and 
discussed. Two incentive compatible experiments conducted with entrepreneurs and 
students examine whether induced happiness and fear (i) influence risk taking behavior 
and (ii) market entry decisions. Happiness and fear are induced with film clips 
validated in an extensive laboratory test. We can conclude that although risk 
preferences are not systematically influenced by induced emotions; there is strategic 
value of emotions. Specifically, the findings indicate that people use the information 
about others’ emotional states to coordinate. Limitations and implications are 
discussed.  
  
 II 
Zusammenfassung 
Beeinflussen Emotionen ökonomische Entscheidungen? Können Emotionen einen 
strategischen Wert in Markteintrittsentscheidungen haben? Die vorliegende 
Doktorarbeit verfolgt einen interdisziplinären und experimentellen Ansatz um diese 
Fragen zu adressieren. Relevante Literatur und theoretische Modelle aus den 
Bereichen der Psychologie, den Neurowissenschaften und der Ökonomie werden 
dargestellt und diskutiert. Zwei anreizkompatible Experimente mit Unternehmern und 
Studenten wurden durchgeführt mit dem Ziel zu untersuchen, inwiefern induzierte 
Freude sowie Angst (i) individuelle Risikopräferenzen und (ii) 
Markteintrittsentscheidungen beeinflussen. Freude und Angst wurden mit Hilfe von 
ausführlich validierten Videoclips im Labor induziert. Während kein systematischer 
Einfluss von induzierten Emotionen auf Risikopräferenzen festgestellt werden kann, 
wird ein strategischer Wert von Emotionen sichtbar. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass 
Menschen Informationen über die Emotionen von anderen Personen zur Koordination 
nutzen. Schließlich werden Implikationen und Limitationen diskutiert.   
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I Emotions in management and economics 
  
2 
I.1 Introduction 
Behavioral economics is often described as a mixture of economics and psychology, 
insights about human decision making from psychology and other social sciences are 
applied to explain economic decision making (Thaler 2016). Central themes within the 
discussion between behavioral economists and neoclassical economic theorists are the 
boundedly rational agent and heuristics (Savage 1954, Simon 1957, Kahneman and 
Tversky 1974, Gigerenzer and Selten 1991). Researchers came to question the 
dominant model of the idealized homo oeconomicus as normative and descriptive 
model. The homo oeconomicus is defined by having well defined preferences, 
unbiased expectations, and self-interests. This person optimizes his decisions based on 
these premises. Hence, he must be “a mythical hero whose powers of computation and 
cogitation are unlimited” as Nobel Laureate Reinhard Selten (1991) puts it in a speech 
at the University of Chicago:  
“Experimentalist: If I understand the opening question correctly, we are here to 
discuss human economic behavior, not the behavior of a mythical hero called 
‘rational man’, a mythical hero whose powers of computation and cogitation are 
unlimited. For this mythical hero it is easy to form consistent probability and 
preference judgments, but not for ordinary people like you and me.” (Selten 1991, 
p. 4) 
Here, the German Nobel Laureate in economics Reinhard Selten stresses the 
importance of better understanding how ‘ordinary’ people like him actually come to 
decisions, as compared to the model of the homo oeconomicus.  
 Over the past decades, a range of ‘cognitive biases’ has been identified that 
systematically violates rational behavior. In a series of smart experiments Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979, 1992) show that peoples’ judgments (or expectations) 
systematically deviate from normative benchmark models, which led to the 
establishment of prospect theory as dominant descriptive decision theory. On the other 
hand, Gigerenzer and colleagues (1991, 2008) study cognitive heuristics in their 
research program and show that using heuristics rather than maximizing, i.e., using 
less time, information, and computation, can actually improve accuracy – depending 
on the environment.  
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 Interestingly, for decades decision researchers and economists have modeled and 
experimentally tested normative and descriptive decision theories mostly without 
considering the influence of emotions. On the other hand, (social) psychologists have 
a long tradition in studying emotions and their importance for human behavior (James 
1888, Watson 1919). Only over the past two decades, the role of emotions on judgment 
and decision making has received substantial attention not only by decision scientists 
but also economists (e.g., Loewenstein 2000, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch 
2001, Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001, 2004, Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, Koszegi 
2006, Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011, Schade, Koellinger, and Kunreuther 2012). 
 Research has shown that (even incidental) emotions (or mild affective states) can 
have a significant influence on for instance work effort, creativity, and helpfulness 
(Isen 2008), time preferences (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011), willingness to pay 
(Schade et al. 2012, Lerner et al. 2003), likelihood judgments (Lerner and Keltner 
2000, 2001), or ambiguity attitudes (Baillon, Koellinger, and Treffers 2016). Research 
on the influence of discrete emotions on economic decisions and preferences is still 
rather fragmented. For instance, Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein (2004) investigate 
how inducing sadness and disgust in a laboratory experiment affect the famous 
‘endowment effect’ and find that the phenomenon reverses (sad condition) or even 
disappears (disgust) compared to a control group. Schade, Koellinger and Kunreuther 
(2012) find that in a large-scale incentive compatible economic experiment on the 
decision to buy insurance protecting against fire or theft, worry drives peoples’ 
willingness to pay and not probabilities. Ifcher and Zaghamee (2011) find that in a 
laboratory setting positive affect systematically influences time preferences. 
Surprisingly, only a handful of (empirical) papers have so far looked at the influence 
of emotions on entrepreneurial decision making. 
 In real life, economic decisions are mostly made within social context, i.e., they 
include one or more partners. Herbert Simon (1967) highlights: “In human behavior, 
situations involving interaction with other human beings are characteristically more 
heavily laden with emotions than are other situations.” (p.37). Hence, in order to fully 
understand the role emotions play in economic decision making we need to include 
interactive scenarios to account for the reciprocal influence of emotions (Liu, Chai, 
and Yu 2016, Winter 2014). Research on strategic emotions is still fragmented but 
received growing attention recently. One stream of research investigates the influence 
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of induced emotions in the laboratory in strategic games such as ultimatum or dictator 
games (e.g., Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2006, Harlé and Sanfey 2007, 
Andrade and Ariely 2009, Kugler, Neeman, and Vulkan 2014). Here, scholars find 
systematic influences of emotions on behavior of agents such as altered offers and 
acceptance rates. This stream of research is very exciting since understanding 
emotions in interactive decisions is especially relevant for the field. Winter (2014) 
argues and shows that especially in such types of decisions emotions can be very 
rational and serve us.  
 In this thesis, I take an experimentalists’ approach to studying emotions and 
behavioral decision making. Economic experiments provide an excellent tool to 
establish causal relationships and allow testing normative theories of decision making 
– such as the homo oeconomicus. Especially for emotion research using experiments 
is well established, simply because field experiments are not only methodologically 
but also practically and ethically problematic to implement. Moreover, laboratory 
experiments allow for studying induced emotions and economic behavior.   
 The present dissertation consists of five parts. Part I introduces the topic of 
emotions in economics and management. It further provides important definitions and 
clarifies what type of emotions are covered and discussed. Part II discusses relevant 
models and provides an overview of the relevant literature in an interdisciplinary 
fashion. Starting with traditional authors from emotion psychology, more modern 
approaches to emotions are covered, such as dual-process models and studies from 
neuroscience. Building up on this, I present specific models for emotions from 
economics, psychology, and decision sciences as base for the empirical part. Chapter 
II.5 presents important work from the field of strategic games. The second part finishes 
with an overview of emotions in the literature on entrepreneurial decision making as 
important application.  
 Part III provides methodological foundations. I will discuss experiments as 
research method and discuss advantages and disadvantages. The second sub-chapter 
discusses the important question of how to induce emotions in the laboratory. For this 
purpose, our own pretest is conducted. We identify four film clips for each of the target 
emotions happiness and fear as well as four neutral clips to reliably induce these 
emotional states.   
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 In part IV, two experimental studies are presented. The first study analyses the 
direct effect of emotions on risk preferences. A thorough understanding of emotions 
and risk preferences is crucial for decision making in an uncertain world. This is 
especially relevant regarding communication and presentation of information about 
risky choices for instance in medical and financial decision making. We conduct a 
laboratory experiment investigating the effect of happiness and fear on two tasks 
eliciting risk preferences, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al. 2002) and a 
simple lottery choice task by Eckel and Grossman (2008). We do not find treatment 
effects of happiness and fear on risk preferences. Potential reasons for this are 
discussed. 
 The second experiment is a coordination game and allows determining the 
strategic value of emotions. Coordination has been studied extensively in the economic 
and psychological literature and has important real world applications in all kind of 
markets and business decisions. We hypothesized that emotions such as happiness and 
fear could help people to coordinate in market entry decisions. We conduct a large 
experiment with students and entrepreneurs and find that people indeed use emotions 
for coordination. Part V discusses, gives limitations, and theoretical as well as 
managerial implications. The dissertation closes with concluding remarks.  
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I.2 What are emotions? 
“There is a large degree of consensus in the scholarly literature on what emotions 
there are, and quite good agreement on what emotions are.” (Jon Elster 1998, p.48) 
“Defining ‘‘emotion’’ is a notorious problem.”  
(Scherer 2005, p. 695). 
 
Scherer (2005) starts his comprehensive essay aiming to clarify the definition of 
emotions with the sentence: “Defining ‘emotion’ is a notorious problem.” (Scherer 
2005, p. 695). I absolutely agree. The field of emotion research does not benefit from 
the non-existence of a unique definition of emotions. Research and folk concepts of 
emotions oftentimes vary; the concepts of emotions, feelings, mood, and affect are 
used interchangeably; measuring emotions is rather difficult; across cultures and 
languages people have a different understanding of specific emotions.1 However, as 
Jon Elster notes, there is also a “quite good agreement on what emotions are.” (Elster 
1998, p. 48). In the following I will provide a working definition.  
 Elster (1998) defines emotions by six features: cognitive antecedents, intentional 
objects, physiological arousal, physiological expressions, valence, and action 
tendencies. For Elster, the difference of emotions compared to for instance addiction 
or visceral factors is that they are triggered by beliefs and that they have an intentional 
object (e.g., someone is angry about a certain person). Further, emotions are 
characterized by physiological arousal (e.g., hormonal change) and physiological 
expressions (e.g., tears, blushing). Emotions have a negative or positive valence but 
Elster additionally explicitly mentions the importance of action tendencies in this 
respect (e.g., the action tendency of love is to approach, of anger to hurt, etc.). These 
in turn interact with social norms. For instance, social norms could either intensify or 
inhibit the tendency to hurt in the case of anger depending on the social norm. For 
Ekman (1994) emotions are products of our evolution and every emotion has at least 
                                                 
1 For instance in Chinese, several different terms for ‘happiness’ exist and each term has a 
different meaning: xingfu means a good life, you yiyi stands for meaning and kuaile for a good 
mood. For fascinating research on how this influencing happiness research in general, please 
see the current work of Becky Hsu and Levisen (2016). 
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seven characteristics whereas some of them are similar to Elster’s approach: distinctive 
physiology, automatic appraisal, commonalities in antecedent events, presence in 
other primates, quick onset, brief duration, and unbidden occurrence. These seven 
features can be found in the following emotions and are the basis of many scales 
measuring emotions such as the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark 1994): amusement, 
anger, awe, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, 
interest, pride, relief, sadness, satisfaction, pleasure, shame. However, only some of 
these emotions share the characteristic of having a distinct universal signal. 
Interestingly, Ekman (1994) stresses that each emotion is different from each other 
leading him to the proposal it may not be reasonable or possible to establish a 
comprehensive theory of emotions. Rather one should aim for separate theories of each 
emotion (p.19). Shweder (1994) adds another layer to the discussion by questioning 
the existence of basic emotions at all in the sense that each culture and society 
experiences different emotions.  
 In general, there are certain aspects on which I would say almost all emotion 
researchers agree. First, it is important to distinguish between state emotions and trait 
emotions (e.g., Lazarus 1994, Isen 1999, Baron 2008). State emotions are immediate, 
current changes in feelings mostly caused by external events (Baron 2008). Trait 
emotions on the other hand are rather stable personality tendencies (Isen 2008). In this 
work, I will focus on state emotions. Moreover, I follow Ekman’s approach (1992) 
and focus on discrete emotions. Those are anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and 
surprise. Further, I will not pursue a valence-based approach, i.e., distinguishing only 
according to negative or positive emotions but rather also build up on the appraisal 
tendency framework (Ellsworth and Smith 1988, Lerner and Keltner 2000). 
Economists mostly follow a valence-based approach, i.e., contrasting the influence of 
positive and negative emotional states when analyzing the influence of emotions on 
economic decisions. Recent studies however have shown that this approach can be 
problematic (Lerner and Keltner 2000, Tiedens and Linton 2001). For instance, two 
emotions of the same valence such as anger and fear can have opposite effects on an 
outcome such as risk taking behavior.  
 Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) (amongst others) develop models differentiating 
between different kind of emotions in the decision making process: expected and 
immediate emotions. In this thesis, I will discuss and experimentally investigate 
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immediate emotions. Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) entangle immediate emotions in 
having direct and indirect influences. By their understanding, indirect immediate 
emotions are mediated by peoples’ expectations of the emotions they will feel in the 
future and by their information processing. Direct emotions on the other hand are not 
mediated by cognitive processes or expected emotions. Finally, incidental emotions 
are encompassing emotions that affect decisions unrelated to that emotion (Lerner et 
al. 2015).  
 Often, the words emotions and mood are used interchangeably. Both concepts can 
be distinguished by endurance, i.e., while emotions are rather brief and last at most 
several minutes, moods can last for hours or days (Davidson 1994, Ekman 1992). 
Moreover, moods are more diffuse than emotions (Gross 1998). Further, common 
distinctions between emotions and moods include distinctive facial expressions of 
emotions as compared to moods and emotions evolving from recognizable antecedent 
events. Davidson (1994) further proposes the difference between mood and emotion 
lies in their primary functions: emotions influence action whereas moods influence 
cognition. Further, the word affect is oftentimes used in emotion research as term 
including both emotions and mood (Baron 2008). 
 Something closely related to emotions are visceral factors. One could describe 
visceral factors as an extreme form of emotions. According to Loewenstein (1996) 
visceral factors always have a ”direct hedonic impact (which is usually negative), and 
second, an effect on the relative desirability of different goods and actions” (p. 272). 
Visceral factors include drive states (e.g., hunger, thirst, or sexual desire), physical 
pain (e.g., craving for a drug), and emotions (predominantly fear and anger). For 
instance, hunger increases the desirability to eat, up to a point where it becomes 
impossible for someone to concentrate on anything else but the feeling of hunger. Note 
that changes in visceral factors are typically not permanent and change rapidly as 
compared to for instance taste. Visceral factors have been examined theoretically 
(Loewenstein 1996) and also empirically (e.g., Ariely and Loewenstein 2006, 
Loewenstein et al. 1994) and provide important insights as in how these extreme 
feelings influence behavior. I will discuss relevant studies in part II.4.  
 Further, one exciting field of research regarding the influence of expected 
emotions on decision behavior is regret theory (Loomes and Sudgen 1982, Bell 1982, 
Fishburn 1982). Regret theory integrates the phenomenon that people experience 
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negative emotions (regret) when having made bad decisions (i.e., learning that an 
alternative action would have generated a more desirable outcome) or positive 
emotions (rejoice) when observing they made a good choice. Loomes and Sudgen 
(1982) argue that individuals’ anticipation of such experiences of regret or pleasure 
influence their choices. They integrate the effect of regret in a theory of decision 
making under uncertainty. Related, Mellers (2000) amongst others, models both 
pleasure and pain in a utility framework. One very interesting approach including 
strategic components of emotions is Koszegi (2006) who models interaction of agents’ 
where information has emotional implications. This stream of research is very 
important, however, outside the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
 Oftentimes used interchangeably are the terms positive emotions and wellbeing. 
Studies aiming to better understand individual’s wellbeing are usually classified within 
the field of emotion research. In this thesis, I will briefly talk about studies examining 
wellbeing in the entrepreneurship domain. However, my understanding and definition 
of emotions as studied in this thesis does not include the broad and complex concept 
of wellbeing. This is also related to Bentham’s (1789) utility concept and experienced 
utility (Kahneman et al. 1997). I will refer to those concepts in chapter II.4.2. 
 Finally, there is an ongoing discussion about whether emotions might be positive 
or negative in their nature of influencing choices, i.e., whether they bias or rather guide 
choices. Emotions have been shown to be essential for making good decisions (e.g., 
Damasio 1994, Isen 1993). On the other hand, emotions have been considered a source 
for biased judgments (e.g., Averill 1983). I do not aim or claim to answer this question, 
but will discuss this further in the following chapters and primarily in the concluding 
discussion.  
 In the present thesis, I focus on two discrete state emotions, fear and happiness, 
for the following reasons. First, these two emotions have been shown to influence 
relevant economic variables such as risk preferences or time preferences according to 
previous literature (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011, Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). 
Second, a better understanding of these two emotions is especially relevant in 
economic decision making and for policy implications. Happiness and fear are 
emotions we encounter regularly in our everyday decision making so that they 
potentially influence our daily choices. But also many important life decisions such as 
retirement savings or choosing to move may be driven by happiness or fear. On a 
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macro level, understanding whether fear or happiness systematically influence 
individuals’ choices can have consequences for policy implications, see for instance 
the recent discussion about fear from terrorism and consequences in Germany (e.g., 
Gigerenzer 2016). Last, fear and happiness are among the emotions one can reliable 
induced using film clips in experimental laboratories whereas for instance sadness or 
anger are rather difficult to induce (Kreibig et al. 2007, Rottenberg et al. 2007). 
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II Theory – models and relevant literature  
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II.1 Goal and structure of this part 
Part II provides the theoretical foundation of this thesis. This part is structured in an 
interdisciplinary approach in order to account for the important findings from different 
fields of research. The goal of this part is to provide a theoretical base for the 
experimental studies in chapter IV. This is important, as recently, more and more 
empirical studies have been published showing how emotions influence and shape our 
decision making. However, a clear theoretical frame is oftentimes lacking (see also 
Vohs and Hertwig (2016) for a discussion). 
 Chapter 2 introduces important scholars from the field of standard emotion 
psychology as one of the oldest fields of research in psychology. Here I provide an 
overview of general theories and models on how emotions influence behavior. This 
includes cognitive theories and attributional theories of emotions (e.g., Weiner 1985) 
as well as evolutionary approaches (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 2000).  
 Chapter 3 discusses rather ‘modern’ approaches to emotions. I provide a short 
overview of dual-process models and findings from neurophysiology including 
Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, and important experimental findings by 
for example Bechara and colleagues.  
 Chapter 4 further examines important specific models of the role of emotions in 
judgment and decision making. I will cover important theories of decision making 
under risk and uncertainty, economics, and management, and discuss how scholars 
modeled emotions within these frameworks. I evaluate the main features of those 
models discussed that are important for my research questions.  
 Chapter 5 further summarizes and discusses important contributions from the 
literature on strategic games as base for part IV.2. Intuitively plausible and previous 
literature shows that emotions oftentimes play an important role in interactive 
decisions. Behavioral game theory provides a suitable tool to study emotions and 
strategic decisions (see Winter 2014). 
 Chapter 6 finally provides important theoretical frameworks and empirical 
evidence from entrepreneurial decision making that incorporate emotions. Previous 
literature shows that entrepreneurs oftentimes differ in their decision making and 
proneness to cognitive biases from non-entrepreneurs (e.g., Busenitz and Barney 1997, 
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Schade and Burmeister 2005). The role of emotions in entrepreneurial decision making 
has not been studied (especially empirically) much yet and is an exciting and new 
avenue of research in the domain.  
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II.2 Emotions in standard psychology 
One of the most important and oldest streams of literature in psychology research is 
the study of emotions. Questions such as what are emotions, what is the function of 
emotions, can we control our emotions, or what is the relation between emotions and 
memory (see Ekman and Davidson 1994) have been studied ever since psychology 
evolved as an own discipline in the late 19th century. Research on emotions was very 
popular in the late 19th century until the 1920s amongst researchers such as John B. 
Watson (1919), William James (1884), or Wilhelm Wundt (1986) who – by the way – 
studied emotions as one of the first psychologists’ using experimental methods2 
(Wallach 2005). During the mid 20th century psychology focused more on behavioral 
approaches and not much progress was made within the field of emotion study until 
the 1970’s. Over the past 40-50 years the topic became of more importance again in 
psychology and decision making research and remains an important stream of research 
to date – and recently became more prominent in other disciplines such as economics 
or management.  
 
II.2.1 Behavioral theories 
For John Watson (1919) an emotion: “is a hereditary pattern-reaction involving 
profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral 
and glandular systems.” (p.165). For him, emotions are merely inherited, physical 
reactions to certain stimuli. Watson was very interested in the conditioning of emotions 
and reports on a range of experiments with babies and children trying to further clarify 
how emotions such as fear, rage, and love evolve. In his experiments, he presented a 
range of stimuli (mostly animals) to babies in a hospital and observed at first no 
reaction of fear to any of the stimuli presented. He finds that babies only reacted when 
loosing physical support and hearing sudden noises. Watson concludes that children 
                                                 
2 In 1879, Wundt founded the first laboratory for psychology research in Leipzig (Wallach 
2005).  
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are not inherited with but learn about fear provoking stimuli such as being afraid of 
dogs or darkness.  
 His experiments are obviously largely criticized and discussed nowadays. One 
experiment, oftentimes called the ‘Little Albert experiment’ is especially provoking 
and from today’s point of view extremely unethical. Watson and his student Rosalie 
Rayner carried out conditioning experiments with a nine-month-old boy called Albert 
(Watson and Rayner 1920). They exposed the toddler to furry objects including a white 
rat and observed that he greatly enjoyed playing with the rat. Subsequently, Watson 
made loud noises whenever the child was in contact with the rat. They continued to 
‘condition’ the child over several sessions. Then, they continued showing the rat 
without making loud noises and observed that the boy did not enjoy playing with the 
rat anymore but rather was afraid of the rat. Hence, the two researchers claim to 
successfully condition the child to experiencing fear triggered by furry objects. They 
never de-conditioned the boy.3  
 Even though Watson is largely criticized for his conditioning experiments, he 
inspired subsequent researchers to a great extent by providing groundbreaking work 
in the field of emotion research especially in the experimental field.  
 
II.2.2 Cognitive-physiological theories 
Maybe most popular nowadays is the work by William James (1884) asking the 
questions ‘What is an emotion?’. Being one of his most cited quotes, James explains 
his view of emotions with the following example: it is not that we “meet a bear, are 
frightened and run” (p. 190) but rather we meet a bear, run away, and consequently 
are frightened. Hence, the bodily changes arise from the perception of the object (bear) 
and our feeling of this change is the emotion. This view of James has lead to a long 
debate on the so-called ‘feeling theory of emotions’ and is discussed to date. In his 
                                                 
3 The identity of ‘Albert’ remains unclear to date and probably adds to the popularity of the 
experiment. According to Beck, Levinson and Irons (2009), ‘Albert’ was the son of one of the 
nurses at Johns Hopkins hospital at the time called Douglas Meritte and sadly died at the age 
of 6. Powell, Digdon, Harris, and Smithson (2014) however claim that Albert’s real name was 
William Barger and he did at age 87 having antipathies towards dogs. Please refer to both 
articles for further details of this detective story.      
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work, James (1884, 1890) emphasizes the physiological aspects of emotions and hence 
implies potential for empirical research of emotions. He proposes each emotion is 
physiologically distinct so that through detailed experimental study it becomes 
possible to categorize and better understand emotions. By this approach, he heavily 
influenced experimental psychologists of the field.  
 In the 1920’s, Cannon and Bard (1927) propose somewhat opposing theories to 
James’ theory of emotions. Already at that time, the two researchers highlight the role 
of studying the brain for understanding arousal and experiencing emotional states. 
Mainly, they state that arousal and emotional states are co-existing implying that 
emotional states do not necessarily need to evolve from physiological arousal. 
Schachter und Singer (1962) contribute to the discussion with their two-factor theory 
of emotion. They propose that emotional states are a function of both physiological 
arousal and cognition suitable to the respective state of arousal. Imagine some stimulus 
physiologically arouses an individual. If the individual does not have an explanation 
for this arousal he labels this state he or she is in and in turn experiences an emotional 
state. It is important to note that the same physiological arousal may result in different 
emotional states depending on the cognitive labeling process. If the individual has an 
immediate and satisfying explanation, no cognitive evaluation process happens and 
the emotional state does not alter. Moreover, emotional reactions or feeling states 
always and only happen as reaction to physiological arousal. Note however that in this 
model cognitive evaluations are necessary to label discrete emotions such as joy or 
fear. Schachter and Singer (1962) find empirical support testing these propositions in 
two experiments. Their experiments are oftentimes criticized and replications were 
unsuccessful (Marshall and Zimbardo 1979, Maslach 1979). However, they foster lots 
of research in the domain of cognitive emotion theories. In general, cognitive emotion 
theories were very popular in the 1960s-1980s and are still today but oftentimes lack 
empirical backup.  
  
II.2.3 Appraisal and attributional theories 
Appraisal and attributional theories of emotions stress the role of appraisals or 
attributions for experiencing emotional states. In contrast to previous theories, Bernard 
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Weiner’s (1985) attributional theory of emotions does not concern itself very much 
with physiological reactions. Rather, he stresses the importance of causal attributions. 
Discrete emotions (such as anger, pride, or joy) are evaluated according to three causal 
attributions: locus, stability, and control. Locus refers to whether I perceive the cause 
for the emotion as internal, such as experiencing joy from own abilities, or as rather 
external, such as anger over bad exam results from difficult tasks. The dimension 
stability further determines whether I perceive such a cause as temporary or 
permanent. For instance, experiencing joy from solving quizzes due to my math 
abilities is permanent. Having received difficult question in an exam by chance is 
rather temporary. Last, causes are evaluated as controllable or not. I can control how 
much effort I put into solving math riddles and experience joy but not whether I have 
the ability to solve the difficult exam questions and experience anger. This dimension 
is important for experiencing emotional states caused by other individuals. For 
instance, if I observe that an entrepreneur fails with his business due to uncontrollable 
factors I will experience pity. If he however fails because of causes he could have 
controlled better I am angry about his failure and burning money (see also Weiner 
1985, Michl et al. 2009 for examples and elaboration). Weiner’s theory captures the 
different dimensions nicely but is also relatively complex. Moreover, it cannot explain 
all emotions (such as disgust).   
 Lazarus’ (1991) appraisal theory of emotions posits in a similar manner to Weiner 
(1985) that appraisals precede cognitive evaluations and then lead to physiological 
arousal and emotional responses simultaneously. This contrasts with cognitive theories 
stating that emotional responses are an outcome from cognitive evaluations and 
physiological arousal.  The appraisal tendency framework (ATF) (Han et al. 2007, 
Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001, Smith and Ellsworth 1985) provides a useful theory 
of emotion-specific influences on individuals’ judgments and choices. The ATF relies 
on three basic assumptions. First, the model assumes that a discrete set of cognitive 
dimensions actually leads to distinguished emotional experiences. Second, emotions 
trigger individuals’ responses and reactions. Third, emotions have motivational 
properties and initiate adaptive responses (Frijda 1986, Levenson 1994). Rather than 
following a valence approach the ATF focuses on appraisal dimensions. Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985) specify six cognitive dimensions that are defining appraisal patterns 
underlying different emotions: certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, 
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anticipated effort, and responsibility. The dimensions allow distinguishing between 
discrete emotions as compared to only comparing good and bad valences. Note that 
pleasantness actually accounts for 20-25 percent of the variance when distinguishing 
between 15 discrete emotions (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). The dimension certainty 
refers to how much uncertainty is involved in a respective situation. Attentional 
activity means how much somebody in an emotional state wants to further attend this 
state or shut it down. Control of an emotional situation could be either associated with 
high own control, or rather situational or others’ control. Further, anticipated effort 
simply refers to how much mental or physical effort someone felt the respective 
emotion requires. Last, responsibility could refer either to one’s own or to others’ 
responsibility. For all scales and descriptions, please see Smith and Ellsworth (1985), 
p. 822. For example, anger and fear are both of negative valence but differ on the 
dimensions certainty and control: anger can be associated with certainty of the cause 
and individual control whereas fear is linked with uncertainty and little control (Han 
et al. 2007). These considerations are especially important when looking at the 
assessment of risk and monetary values.  Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) show for 
instance, that the negative emotions fear and anger have an opposite effect on risk 
perception. Further, Lerner et al. (2004) find that the both negative emotions of sadness 
and disgust influence peoples’ willingness to pay reversely.  
 
II.2.4 Evolutionary psychology of emotions 
Turning to the question of the function of emotions directly leads to the study of 
evolution and emotions. Dating back to the 19th century, Darwin (1872) studied 
emotion expressions in his book ’The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals’ aiming to support his theory of evolution. Other prominent scholars from the 
early to mid-20th century are McDougall (1908) and Plutchik (1958). Recently, taking 
an evolutionary approach to the study of emotions has gained new momentum. 
Scholars around the group of Tooby and Cosmides study the adaptive behavior of our 
ancestors during their evolution in order to better understand the function of emotions, 
instincts, and motivations (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 2000). From an evolutionary 
approach to the role of emotions in decision making we are able to experience 
emotions since they enhance our abilities and fitness in our physical and social 
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environment (already Darwin 2013/1872, Fessler et al. 2004, Frank 1988, Frey et al. 
2014). Hence, the physiological, psychological, and behavioral characteristics of 
emotions serve to enable individuals to deal with threats and opportunities in our 
environment. From this standpoint, emotions are useful and shaped by natural 
selection (Nesse 1990). The function of emotions is closely related to the role of 
instincts. McDougall (1908) discusses the role of instincts and associated primary 
emotions with action tendencies and biological functions. For instance, the instinct of 
flight is characterized by the emotion fear and leads to the tendencies to run away and 
hide away. McDougall (1908) illustrates this by describing a kid’s behavior of running 
away from the source of fear and hiding beyond a blanket – a tendency still well 
pronounced with adults. In its biological function this pattern serves to avoid harm or 
death. Elation on the other hand relates to a dominance instinct and leads individuals’ 
to leading others or asserting oneself. Biological roots are to avoid fights by showing 
others’ dominant behavior. Hence, each primary emotion relates to instincts and serves 
adaptive purposes. Later, Plutchik (1980) takes a similar view as McDougall (1908). 
He considers eight primary emotions (anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, 
anticipation, trust, and joy) that serve distinct adaptive functions. In Plutchik’s work, 
the cognitive part within the evolutionary approach plays a large role. For instance, a 
situation of threat is evaluated as dangerous and leads to fear. Fear results in flight 
behavior in order to serve a biological function of protection. More modern 
evolutionary approaches to emotions focus more on the adaptive function of emotion 
rather than on the evolutionary history.  
 Note that from an evolutionary standpoint it is not reasonable that all emotions of 
the same valence have the same influence on for instance risk taking. In their adaptive 
functions, fear as a response to threat motivates escape whereas anger rather 
encourages involvement (Fessler et al. 2004). Even though most psychologists 
probably share this view of an adaptive function of emotions through history and still 
in our modern world and environment, many scholars (starting with Watson 1919) 
stress that emotions do not always and only serve as useful tool (e.g., Frijda 1994). I 
will further discuss this in later chapters.  
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II.2.5 Concluding: Lewin’s field theory as alternative? 
Table II.1 below summarizes the theories discussed above. The table compares 
stimulus, reaction, and behavior for each of the theories discussed above. As already 
pointed out some scholars argue emotions to cause physiological reactions whereas 
other propose the reverse and some suggest simultaneous processes.  
 For this thesis and as foundation for the experiments in chapter IV, I am not 
particularly interested in whether emotions evoke physiological arousal or vice versa. 
The questions I am asking are whether specific induced emotions influence 
individuals’ risk preferences and strategic behavior. What is important to learn from 
standard psychology for such questions is that certain stimuli evoke emotions and 
those in turn have been shown to influence behavior. Concluding, this is what all of 
the above theories from emotion psychology since the 19th century agree on, as 
summarized below.
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Table II-1: Overview of emotion theories in psychology 
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An alternative approach to model emotions in behavioral decision making that has not 
been considered much in emotion research yet could be Kurt Lewin’s field theory. 
From my point of view, his theory provides a useful formula to study emotions and 
behavior. Ranked 18th of the 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20th century by 
the Review of General Psychology (Haggbloom et al. 2002), Kurt Lewin is without 
doubt one of the most influential psychologists of the last century. Especially well-
known is his field theory developed in the 1940’s. Lewin’s field theory provides a very 
useful holistic theory of behavior in the sense that it includes not only the individual 
but the environment as well (Lewin 1939/19824).  
 According to Lewin, field theory assumes any behavior to depend on a range of 
different factors constituting the psychological ‘field’ (Lewin 1939 / Graumann 1982). 
This field includes factors such as goals and motivations, perception of the past and 
future events, or the group an individual belongs to. At each point in time each 
individual acts in a different field including the person and the environment as 
perceived by the individual. Lewin provides a neat and rather heuristic formula:  
 
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑃𝑃,𝐸𝐸)   
 
Behavior (B) is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E). This implies that 
P and E cannot be independent, hence P = f (E) and E = f (P) (Graumann 1982).  
 Within this model, one could consider that emotions enter the formula – the field 
– and influence behavior B. In this framework, it is not important whether emotional 
reactions, cognitive appraisals, or bodily changes cause each other as explained in 
previous chapters of standard psychology models of emotions or not but rather that 
emotions ultimately influence behavior.  
 Concluding, I view evolutionary approaches to emotions and decision-making as 
most promising in general and specifically for experimental research. Such 
approaches, like Lewin, take the environment of the decision maker into account so 
                                                 
4 Note that Lewin only started in his last years to explicitly label his work ‘field theory’ so that 
it remains difficult to provide a clear cut definition (see also Graumann 1982, pp. 24 ff.) 
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that an evaluation of the influence of emotions goes beyond a pure ‘good versus bad’. 
Moreover, rather than looking at positive and negative emotions only, specific 
emotions are studied. From my point of view, this is crucial given the empirical 
evidence (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2001).  
 I believe drawing on adaptive functions of emotions (fear triggers flight, anger 
triggers attack) to be very reasonable. This is also related to the adaptive function of 
heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). I will further discuss this in part II.4. In this thesis, 
we are interested in the emotional states happiness and fear and specifically study their 
influence on economic and strategic choices. The experimental studies in part IV of 
this thesis build up to a large extend on evolution theories of emotions.  
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II.3 Modern approaches from psychology and neurophysiology 
 
II.3.1 Dual-process models 
‘Yet another dual-process model’ is some economists’ common reaction to articles 
and presentations proposing variations of dual-process models for modeling 
individuals’ behavior. However, being far from realistic the notion of a rather simple 
distinction between two different systems of thinking apparently allows people to 
better understand our decision making and how our brains might work. The success of 
Daniel Kahneman’s book ‘Thinking fast and slow’ (Kahneman 2011) discussing the 
central theme of two modes of thought, a ‘fast’ System 1 (quickly and automatically) 
and a ‘slow’ System 2 (deliberate and complex computation), illustrates this fashion. 
It has been awarded the ‘best book award 2011’ by The Economist, The Wall Street 
Journal and has been a bestseller on the lists of the New York Times and the Spiegel 
for weeks. Kahneman himself of course makes clear that this interpretation of two 
modes is to be understood only conceptually: “I describe mental life by the metaphor 
of two agents, called System 1 and System 2, (…)” (Kahneman 2011, p.13). 
 Historically, dual-process models are a popular approach for modeling decision 
making in psychology (partly also in also economics) (e.g., Epstein 1994, Figner et al. 
2009, Kahneman 2011, Slovic et al. 2002). Dual-process theories distinguish between 
two separate decision systems whereas one system is typically referred to as fast, 
unconscious, hot, or emotional. The other system is described as slow, deliberate, cold, 
and cognitive. Choices then rely either on system A, or system B. Table II-2 below is 
adapted from Epstein (1994) and Slovic et al. (2004) and summarizes key features of 
the ‘two systems’ literature.  
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Table II-2: Illustrative characterization of dual-process models, adapted from Epstein 
(1994) and Slovic et al. (2004) 
‘Experiential system’ ‘Analytical system’ 
Holistic Analytical 
Intuitive Deliberative 
Emotional Cognitive 
Impulsive Controlled 
Fast Slow 
Hot Cold 
Automatic Logical 
  
In psychology, authors often refer to one ‘hot’ and one ‘cold’ system (Figner et al. 
2009). Here, the hot system explicitly represents the emotional and the cold system 
stands for the cognitive part. Figner et al. (2009) similarly describe the hot system to 
work spontaneous and automatic and hence choices driven by the hot system happen 
by affective impulses. The cold system functions by “the rules of logic” (p. 710) and 
control, and can block affective impulses from the hot system.  
 Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Bhatia (2015) recently propose a novel dual-
process framework. They model choice behavior rather than judgment and distinguish 
two different motivational processes: a deliberative process and an affective process. 
The authors provide a formal dual-process model in which behavior can be described 
by a deliberative system (consequentialist fashion) and by an affective system 
(encompasses emotions). A person’s deliberate system evaluates opportunities in a 
consequentialist way whereas in the affective system emotions and emotional states 
(visceral states) are evaluated. Therewith they respond to the interest in emotions by 
for instance economics in recent years and present one of the few formal models. 
Interestingly, the authors define the term affect in line with evolutionary psychologists 
such as Cosmides and Tooby (2000) as being adaptive and carrying action tendencies 
(Frijda 1986). For instance, fear motivates flight and anger motivates attack. 
 Loewenstein et al. (2015) acknowledge that many deliberate processes are 
probably influenced by affective factors and vice versa. They explicitly stress that they 
“use the labels deliberation and affect primarily as labels to help organize two different 
types of motivations” (p. 57). Formally, they assume the two processes work as two 
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objective functions: one motivational function M and one deliberate function U. When 
choosing option x out of choice set X, the affective influences on behavior are captured 
by M(x,a), where a is a factor of intensity. The more deliberate factors can be described 
with U(x). If only one of the two systems where to decide what to do it would simply 
maximize the respective function. However, both systems interactively influence 
behavior. Further, the authors assume that the deliberative system makes the ultimate 
choice what comes with the cost of cognitive effort. This cost is captured by h(W,σ) 
and depends on strength of willpower W and competing cognitive demands σ (e.g., 
cognitive load). Summarized by one function it looks as follows:  
 
𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥) ≡ 𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥) + ℎ(𝑊𝑊,𝜎𝜎) ∗ 𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑥,𝑎𝑎) 
 
When making a choice the individual chooses x somewhere in between the optimum 
of the deliberative function and the optimum of the affective function, depending on 
how costly it is for the deliberative system to engage in willpower (Loewenstein et al. 
2015). The authors apply their model to three domains: intertemporal choice, risky 
decisions, and social preferences. For a thorough discussion of specific assumptions 
and predictions please refer to Loewenstein et al. (2015), pp. 61ff. With their approach, 
the authors provide an interesting framework on how to formally model affect and 
deliberation as distinct processes in one function. Hence, they contribute to the 
increasing interest in affect amongst psychologists and economists with this theoretical 
model that allows empirical testing.  
 The understanding of emotion and cognition being two separate systems evolved 
(or is in line) with brain research starting with findings regarding the limbic system 
from the 1950’s. The limbic system was labeled as the emotional center of the brain 
whereas cognitive functions were associated with the neocortex (Phelps et al. 2014). 
However, advances in neuroscience research in the past 20 years showed that this strict 
distinction is not correct. For instance, Damasio (2005) shows that the orbifrontal 
cortex is essential for emotions. Research by Squire (2004) indicates the hippocampus 
(i.e., part of the limbic system) plays an important role for the process of memory. 
Most authors conclude that there is no ground for distinguishing two distinct regions 
in the brain being responsible for emotion and cognition. LeDoux (2012) and others 
thus argue that it is crucial to work on a better understanding and illustration of the 
complex structure how emotions function in the brain. Moreover, Phelps et al. (2014) 
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in a recent review claim that since neuroscientists already concluded it is not correct 
to follow a notion of two distinct systems we need to rethink the predominance of dual-
process models in the decision sciences for modeling emotions in decision making.   
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II.3.2 Findings from neuroscience 
Neuroscience has a long tradition in studying the role of emotions for decision making. 
The first studies noting that the human amygdala plays a central role in emotional 
behavior date back to the 19th century. Brown and Schaefer (1888) observed that after 
temporal lobes lesions including the amygdala, monkeys showed large behavioral 
changes. Later, Kluever and Bucy (1939) found in lesion experiments with rhesus 
monkeys that after removing both temporal lobes the monkeys showed profound 
emotional changes. For instance, after surgery the monkeys did not fear certain objects 
or subjects that they would not have approached before surgery. This so-called 
‘psychic blindness’ – Seelenblindheit in German – is nowadays known as the Kluever-
Buce syndrome. Further research by Weiskrantz (1956) extended these observations 
and demonstrated the central role of the amygdala. In humans, it remained difficult to 
further elaborate on the role of the amygdala simply because patients exhibiting 
selective bilateral damage restricted to the amygdala or hippocampus where difficult 
to identify and hard to find. Bechara et al. (1994) were one of the first scholars who 
studied humans with distinct brain lesions. They carried out conditioning experiments 
with three patients having brain lesions and conclude that the amygdala is crucial for 
emotional conditioning and moreover for processing information concerning somatic 
states.  
 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio presents a remarkable and very popular theory 
of the role of affect in decision making in his famous book ‘Descartes error’ (Damasio 
1994). He describes how he realized from observations and experimental studies that 
reason and emotion simply cannot be two separate neural systems and how he became 
convinced that certain aspects of emotions are indeed necessary for rational behavior:  
 
“He had had an entirely healthy mind until a neurological disease ravaged a 
specific sector of his brain and, from one day to the next, caused this profound 
defect in decision making. The instruments usually considered necessary and 
sufficient for rational behavior were intact in him. He had the requisite knowledge, 
attention, and memory; his language was flawless; he could perform calculations; 
he could tackle the logic of an abstract problem. There was only one significant 
accompaniment to his decision-making failure: a marked alteration of the ability 
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to experience feelings. Flawed reason and impaired feelings stood out together as 
the consequences of a specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me 
that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason. Two decades 
of clinical and experimental work with a large number of neurological patients 
have allowed me to replicate this observation many times, and to turn a clue into 
a testable hypothesis.” (pp. xi-xii) 
 
Damasio provides with the well-known somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) a theory 
and neuroanatomical foundation of how emotions are involved in the decision making 
process. In the 1990s, he conducted decision making experiments together with and 
building up on research of his wife and co-author Hanna Damasio. Several studies by 
Antoine Bechara, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel and colleagues 
(see e.g., Bechara 2004, Bechara et al. 2002, Damasio et al 2000, Reimann and 
Bechara 2010) study the decision making of individuals with lesions in the 
orbitofrontal sector of the prefrontal cortex. The authors aim to understand better and 
provide an explanation for the fact that those neurological patients with damaged parts 
in the region of the prefrontal cortex start developing difficulties in their daily life and 
decision making. They mostly use the so-called gambling task framework. The 
gambling task is designed as follows: subjects have to choose between four decks of 
cards and can switch as often as they want. The card deck is designed in a way that 
two decks yield high immediate returns but large future losses hence long term losses, 
and the other two decks yield rather low immediate returns but also low future losses 
resulting in a long term gain. The participants do not know this and are asked to 
maximize profits. Usually, in the task the pattern evolves that participants without 
brain damage after a few rounds tend to avoid the disadvantageous decks and choose 
cards from the two beneficial decks. By contrast, participants with damage in the 
ventromedial region (that includes the orbifrontal area) did not avoid the bad desks 
(Bechara et al. 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, Manes et al. 2002, Fellows and Farah 2005). 
These impairments in decision making have been interpreted as evidence for the fact 
that emotions guide decisions as the patients showed a normal intellect (average IQ of 
100). 
 Damasio explains the above observations and findings with his theory of somatic 
markers. When making decisions a person has to access all options that are available 
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and consider costs and benefits associated with them. Oftentimes such choices are 
complex, or conflicting, or are made under time pressure. According to Damasio 
(1994), before applying any reasoning a specific ‘emotional’ process happens. From 
experience, bad outcomes from particular responses are associated with unpleasant 
feelings. For instance, a falling object evokes a negative gut feeling and motivates a 
person to move to the side. He calls this ‘feeling’ a somatic (because soma is the Greek 
word for body) marker (because they mark images). Somatic markers draw attention 
to specific options and hence guide our decision making in the sense that they preselect 
or erase certain options. Before we evaluate all options of a choice process, somatic 
markers already mark particular options.  
 Before some individual starts reasoning how to react as soon as she or he realizes 
a moving object above her or him, the somatic marker already erases a range of 
possible options (such as stay still or duck down) and the decision maker only must 
choose between several options how to move away from the threat. This is why 
somatic markers improve individual’s decision making. They are not involved in 
subsequent reasoning but provide a more accurate choice set to choose from. In this 
way somatic markers are actually adaptive and related to the argument that emotions 
can function like a heuristic as proposed by (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). I will discuss this 
in chapter II.4.7. Hence, Damasio shows that emotions influence our decision making 
in a more complex way than differentiating between reason and emotion. This is what 
he implies with the title ‘Descartes error’: the assumption of a dualism between body 
and mind is not correct (Damasio 1994). 
 Building up on this, Shiv, Loewenstein, and Bechara (2005) experimentally study 
investment decisions with participants who had stable focal lesions in brain regions 
that are related to emotion and healthy participants (control). The authors are interested 
whether having lesions in brain regions that are essential for experiencing emotions 
can also be beneficial, as compared to most prior experimental findings by Damasio 
and colleagues. This idea is motivated by an observation of Damasio (1994, p.192-
193): He writes about one of his patients with brain lesions who reports on his drive 
to the laboratory on a cold day. Instead of hitting the brakes when driving on icy 
surface as most people did in front of him and had accidents, he simply drove steadily. 
His lack of fear served him in this case as he arrived safely at the laboratory. 
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 In the experiment, each respondent received USD 20 and was asked to invest or 
keep one dollar over twenty rounds. If they decide not to invest they would just keep 
the dollar. If they decide to invest they would receive USD 0 with 50 percent or USD 
2.50 with 50 percent. This task is designed in a way that everybody should invest in 
every round as the expected value of investing (US 1.25) is higher than keeping the 
dollar. Shiv et al. (2015) find that people with lesions in brain regions related to 
emotions invested more (around 80 percent as compared to the control group investing 
50 percent) and gained more money overall. The authors suggest this behavior pattern 
evolves because the control group is more affected by past experiences than 
respondents with lesions.  
 Overall, the authors interpret their findings as follows. Control group respondents’ 
emotional reactions to outcomes let them adapt their strategies in subsequent rounds 
to less risk-taking strategies. Hence, the authors provide empirical support for 
emotions playing an important role in individuals’ risk taking behavior. Their findings 
are very interesting as they highlight a potential negative influence of emotions on 
risky decisions. It would be interesting to study different types of risky decisions as 
the above experimental paradigm depicts clear risks as compared to ambiguity or 
uncertainty. I would presume that the findings would not hold in more experimental 
tasks studying ambiguity or uncertain environments. In general, the authors agree with 
Damasio and co-authors in that they find that emotions to play a central role in decision 
making and cannot be viewed as opposing rationality. 
 The SMH has many critics such as Maia and McClelland (2004, 2005) or Dunn et 
al. (2006). Critics argue that the difference in decision making does not necessarily 
mean decisions are guided by emotions but also deficits in memory or learning 
processes can lead to impairments (Maia and McClelland 2004, 2005). However, 
currently there is no other neurological theory or model providing an alternative to the 
SMH so that it in any way remains a helpful guidance. More, it remains that it is 
questionable to motivate dual-system models with findings from neuroscience.  
 Over the past years, the field of neuroeconomics underwent a huge popularity. 
Scholars from different disciplines make use of methods from neuroscience for 
instance measuring brain activity like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
heart rates (HR), or electro dermal activity (EDA). This avenue is very exciting and 
promising since it provides novel insights to behavioral questions, especially when it 
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comes to emotions. However, one has to be careful of interpreting the results and 
whether physiological measures are helpful answering all research questions or are 
rather suitable only for certain problems. For an extensive discussion see Harrison 
(2008) or McCabe (2008). From my point of view, all interdisciplinary approaches 
and insights from novel methodologies are beneficial to the study of emotions in 
behavioral decision making as the field is inherently multidisciplinary. When 
discussing findings as causal relations however, one needs to be careful when 
interpreting empirical data from methods commonly used in neuroscience.  
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II.4 Specific models for emotions in behavioral economics and 
decision making 
So far, I have covered important theories from standard psychology and neurosciences. 
Psychologists largely agree that emotions have strong influences on behavior and have 
proposed different general models. This chapter looks at specific models for emotion 
in the decision sciences including economists’ approaches. I will provide a brief 
overview of normative and descriptive models of decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. Then I will discuss different approaches of how emotions are modeled 
within those standard frameworks. Therefore, I draw on literature from the decision 
sciences, behavioral economics, consumer decision making, and economic 
psychology. I will further discuss research on heuristics and emotions. The chapter 
closes with concluding remarks.  
 
II.4.1 Decision making under risk and uncertainty 
Hence, in order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we 
have to understand what role emotion plays in it.  
(Herbert Simon, 1983, p. 29) 
 
In his seminal work, Herbert Simon already stressed the importance of integrating 
emotions in normative and descriptive theories of decision making. Simon (1957, 
1983) is well known for his theory of bounded rationality. As opposed to mainstream 
economic theory, for Simon, decision making can be described as “search process 
guided by aspiration levels” (Selten 1999, p. 2). Put simply, once the satisficing value 
of an aspiration level is reached the alternative in this process is taken. This idea is 
central to bounded rationality theory. Decision makers’ rationality is limited by the 
information and time available to make a decision, and the cognitive ability of their 
minds, to process this information. Hence, individuals are not necessarily maximizers 
as dictated by standard economic theory but oftentimes satisfice. Little attempts have 
been made to incorporate emotions within this framework (Frey et al. 2014, 
Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Muramatsu and Hanoch 2005). Gigerenzer and the ABC 
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research group (Gigerenzer et al. 1999) who focus on cognitive heuristics note that 
emotions can also function as heuristics for instance as stopping rule in information 
search (see p. 31). Surprisingly, the role of emotions is – to my knowledge – covered 
very little by their research program, and neither included in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
study of ‘irrationality’ and heuristics in the 1970’ and 80’s. 
 Kahneman however concerned himself a great deal with happiness (Kahneman et 
al. 1997, Kahneman 2000, 2003) in the sense of objective happiness or experienced 
utility following the utility concept of Bentham (1789). Bentham (1789) describes 
utility as referring to experiencing pleasure and pain, he states:  
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain 
and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we should do.” (p.ii, chapter II).  
Bentham defines the principle of utility as the impact any action has on a person’s (or 
any entities’) happiness.5 Pleasure evolves from positive utility and pain is given by 
negative utility. Hence, the goal of anybody’s actions is to maximize utility, i.e., 
maximize pleasure. Over the course of the last two centuries this interpretation was 
changed to utility of outcomes and decision weights in order to explain choices 
resulting in our ‘modern’ understanding of utility theory (see Kahneman et al. 1997). 
This development basically resulted in a neglect of emotions in most major normative 
as well as descriptive theories of decision making from the 20th century (see also Volz 
and Hertwig 2016). Table II-4 below provides an overview of the most important 
models of decision making under risk that I will further elaborate in the following.  
  
                                                 
5 Note that this notion of happiness or pleasure is entirely different to the kind of emotion (e.g., 
happiness) this thesis is concerned with.  
35 
Table II-3: Overview of decision making theories 
 
Theory Scholars Model Specifications 
Utiliarism Bentham 
1789 
  
Expected-value 
theory 
 EV=Σ pi xi where pi objective 
probability, xi value of  
objective (monetary) 
outcome 
Expected-utility 
theory 
Bernoulli 
1789, N&M 
1944 
EU=Σ pi u(x)i where pi objective 
probability, u(xi) 
monotonically 
increasing fct over x 
Subjective 
Expected-utility 
theory  
Savage 1954, 
Edwards 
1954 
SEU=Σ pi u(x)i where pi subjective 
probability, and u(xi) 
monotonically 
increasing fct over x 
(Cumulative) 
Prospect Theory 
K&T 1979, 
T&K 1992 
V(A)=Σ π(p)i v(x)i where π(pi) weighting 
fct, and v(xi) value 
function 
(independent) 
‘Affective’ 
prospect theory 
Rottenstreich 
& Hsee 2001 
V(A)=Σ π(p)i v(x)i where π(pi) weighting 
fct, and v(xi) value 
function (dependent) 
 
II.4.2 Normative models and emotions 
In economics, the normative benchmark model for decision making under risk has 
always been the expected utility (EU) model (Bernoulli 1738/1954, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944). Traditionally, decision makers facing risky decisions are assumed 
to choose between alternatives by evaluating possible outcomes (or utilities) and 
respective probabilities of occurrence. They then choose the option with the highest 
expected value and hence maximize outcomes (payouts). This basic model has been 
advanced over time. For an overview of the different consequentialist models, please 
refer to Table II.3 above.  
 As a starting point, expected-value theory simply assumes the decision maker to 
choose the option with the highest expected value from objective outcomes and 
objective probabilities. Mathematician Daniel Bernoulli (1789) already in the early 
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18th century proposed to replace expected values by expected utility in order to account 
for quite obvious contradictions to real life observations like diminishing sensitivity. 
Hence, expected-utility theory replaces expected-value theory’s objective outcome 
with subjective utilities (Bernoulli 1738/1954, von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). 
What Edward (1954) calls the modern period, starts with von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and until today 
postulates a comprehensive and most prominent normative theory of decision making 
under risk. About a decade later, subjective expected-utility theory (Savage 
1954/1972, Edwards 1954) replaces objective with subjective probabilities resulting 
in a personal probability function. None of these models integrate any form of discrete 
emotions. Kahneman in the late 1990’s / early 2000’s re-introduces the utility concept 
of Bentham (1789) with his concept of objective happiness or experienced utility 
(Kahneman et al. 1997, Kahneman 2000, 2003). This however is not what this thesis 
is concerned with.  
 One important approach to model emotions within the EUT model framework 
comes from Loewenstein (2000) who develops a utility model that includes emotions 
or more precise visceral factors. He considers only negative emotions in order to 
maintain a reasonable complexity. He defines a range of visceral factors that are 
negative emotions (such as fear), drive states (such as hunger), and feeling states (such 
as pain). These visceral factors are assumed to systematically influence peoples’ 
behavior and regulate the trade-offs they make. Loewenstein (2000) models visceral 
factors as instance of state-dependent preferences. Let 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑠𝑠) be a utility function of 
a vector c (consumption) and a vector s of an individual’s visceral state. Either, visceral 
factors motivate people or they extremely dissatisfy. For instance, a wine tastes better 
when one is thirsty resulting in the motivation to drink. This can be represented by 
𝜕𝜕2𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗
≥ 0, with i and j being specific pairs of consumption and visceral states. The 
marginal utility of drinking wine and thirst motivates as long as it is ≥ 0. Whenever 
the visceral states cannot be satisfied however, the person feels worse with increasing 
visceral factor, hence: 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐
0,𝑠𝑠�
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
< 0, with 𝑐𝑐0 representing a null level of the respective 
consumption.  
 Naturally, incorporating visceral factors in utility-type models does not come 
without problems. This is for instance when in a certain visceral state people do not 
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behave in their own self-interest anymore. Moreover, people usually underestimate the 
impact on current as well as future behavior. Economists left visceral factors out of 
their models claiming the influence is not strong enough or unpredictable. 
Loewenstein’s model (2000) quite convincingly incorporates negative emotional 
states in an economic model of choice. I believe this model represents a good approach 
to incorporate visceral states of the nature of drive states, i.e., hunger, thirst, arousal. 
One problem however might be the valence-based approach when it comes to other 
emotional states. Research has shown, that fear and anger being of the same negative 
valence do have completely different influences on behavior (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 
2001). It would also be interesting to extend the model for positive emotions.   
 
 
 
II.4.3 Descriptive models and emotions 
Looking at peoples’ actual behavior empirically mostly contradicts the EU predictions. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that people when facing important choices, typically do not 
weight each possible outcome and decide based on a consequentialist’s approach. 
Moreover, people find it hard to understand and objectively evaluate probabilities. For 
instance, for surfers, the probability of dying from a shark attack is very low compared 
to other potential threats but still almost every surfer perceives this probability to be 
very high. Further, people oftentimes act according to reference points rather than final 
states. Imagine your soccer team (Hertha BSC) to finish 2:2 against the leading team 
of the league (Bayern Munich). In scenario one, this result after having scored 2:0 in 
the first halftime would be perceived as a rather negative outcome. Whereas your team 
making up a 0:2 from the first halftime would feel like a success and a good outcome. 
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that people systematically violate the EU model 
predictions. For instance, Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) show and mathematically 
proof that the majority of people violates the axioms of EUT.  
 As a reaction to observations from experimental research in the 1970’s, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) propose prospect theory (PT) as descriptive model of decision 
making under risk. They introduce a value function replacing the utility function that 
is assigned to gains and losses rather than final states. The value function is concave 
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for gains, convex for losses and steeper for losses than for gains (hence incorporating 
loss aversion). Further, they replace the probability weighting function by a weighting 
function that overweights small probabilities and underweights medium and large 
probabilities. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
proposes an inverse s-shaped weighting function and moreover gets rid of the 
independence between values and weights (so called probability outcome 
independence in EUT models). Weights directly depend on values (outcomes) whereas 
largest values have the highest weights and impact. This feature of diminishing 
sensitivity implies that changes in probability diminish and have less impact at both 
ends of the function (0 = impossible and 1 = certainty). Ample studies investigating 
the shape and parameters of the weighting function find similar patterns (e.g., 
Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Prelec 1998).  
 Being the first who bring affect into the picture, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) 
propose an affective weighting function within the CPT framework. They suggest the 
large jumps at both ends of the weighting function can be explained by different types 
of outcomes a decision maker faces: a rather neutral choice (monetary outcomes) or 
affect laden outcomes (both positive such as a potential kiss of movie star or negative 
like a potential electrical shock). Positive affective outcomes that evoke hope would 
explain the curve’s steepness of the left-hand side, negative outcomes evoking fear 
explain the weighting curve’s shape on the right-hand side. Hence, the shape and 
predictions of the weighting function do not differ a great deal from K&T’s version 
but they explicitly account for what type of outcome the decision maker is facing in 
the weighting function. If affective outcomes indeed influence the weighting function 
this will result in larger deviations or a more pronounced s-shape of the function since 
the hope or fear respectively of getting an affective outcome (or not) will be higher 
than for monetary outcomes.  
 Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) experimentally test their proposition in three 
studies with N = 40, N = 138 and N = 156 students and observe behavior supporting 
their predictions. The findings are in line with Camerer’s (1992) observation of 
decision makers putting larger weights on large monetary outcomes and smaller 
weight on small monetary outcomes (hence, dependence of probabilities and 
outcomes). Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) presume and interpret this finding as large 
cash amounts evoking larger emotional reactions than small amounts. In another study, 
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Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) study whether the magnitude of stimuli and their 
subjective value differ when contrasting valuations by feeling and valuation by 
calculus. They find that relying on feelings, peoples’ value function is nearly a step 
function whereas when people rely on calculus it is rather linear.  
 Suter et al. (2015) and Pachur et al. (2013) pursue similar approaches and compare 
choices in rather affect-poor monetary lottery problems with choices in affect-rich 
medical decision problems (decision whether to take a drug that causes side effects 
such as fatigue, insomnia, depression, and memory problems). Before the choice task, 
the N=23 participants were first ask to rank the four side effects (pleasant to 
unpleasant) and then state their willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the side effects. 
Then lotteries were shown to participants based on their respective WTP and a range 
of probabilities. In the end, the participants evaluated how upset they would be losing 
a certain amount of money and also experiencing a side effect. 
 In line with the findings by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), Suter et al. (2015) find 
that affect-rich choices resulted in a stronger curvature of the probability weighting 
function of CPT, see figure below. The authors also acquired FMRI data and examined 
brain activation. They compared regions in the brain showing significant activation 
during affect-rich and affect-poor choices in order to understand whether certain areas 
that are usually associated with affective processing show a different engagement in 
both trials. The authors find that affect-rich choices were associated with brain regions 
that are associated with processing emotions whereas affect-poor choices rather 
involved those regions involved in cognitive processing (please refer to p.13 for brain 
maps).   
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Figure II-1: Expected value function by Suter et al. (2015), p. 9, in line with figure of 
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) 
 
 
 The above findings are important since contrary to most experimental studies 
using purely monetary gambles as decision problems, in our everyday life we 
oftentimes have to make decisions in affect-rich environments. Examples are decisions 
from medical decision making concerning our health like whether to undergo surgery 
or not, or to take some drug that might cause side effects. This is also relevant for 
doctors’ decision making in the hospital, who face very affect-rich choices everyday 
(assuming that they remain affect-rich for doctors who routinely face such type of 
choices).  More examples may concern our love life (the risk of moving in together 
with your new partner or not), or job-related decisions (choosing a career after 
graduation). This field is very exciting and more empirical studies in other 
environments or with other frames in the laboratory are desirable.  
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II.4.4 Feeling-based approaches 
Over the past twenty years the study of emotions and how they interact with cognitive 
processes has massively increased, for excellent reviews, see Lench et al. (2011), Vohs 
et al. (2007), or Lerner et al. (2015). Lerner et al. (2015) provide with their work 
‘Emotion and decision making’ a comprehensive overview of the impact of emotions 
on decision making. They organize and analyze studies from approximately 1970 until 
today. The authors conclude that across different domains emotions do have a 
powerful and predictable impact and even call the recent findings to have “the potential 
to create a paradigm shift in decision theories” (p. 33).  
 As opposed to existing consequentialist’s and purely cognitive approaches to 
decision making under risk and uncertainty (that is assuming people to make a decision 
via assessing probabilities and outcomes of events and expectation-based functions), 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) propose the risk-as-feelings hypothesis. 
The authors emphasize the role of emotions the decision maker experiences at the 
moment he makes the decision. They hence explicitly account for the role of 
immediate emotions in the decision making process. In contrast to the affect heuristic 
emotions do not only serve as ‘bias’, guideline, or additional information but in fact 
alter the decision outcome completely. One example would be to refuse boarding an 
airplane due to being afraid of flying (Loewenstein et al. 2001). Figure II-3 below 
illustrates the model. Rather than only mediating cognitive evaluations emotions can 
have a direct influence on behavior. Anticipated outcomes, subjective probabilities, 
and other factors such as the environment influence emotions and ultimately behavior. 
Behavior results in outcomes (including emotions). The model also captures the 
influences of emotions on cognitive factors and vice versa. Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
discuss empirical studies supporting their model and conclude on the advice to also 
collect emotional reactions whenever researchers are studying risky decisions.  
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Figure II-2: Risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001, p. 270)
Related, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) develop a framework in order to better 
understand how emotions influence decision making. The 2003 model also identifies 
two different ways how emotions influence decisions / behavior but it differs a great 
deal in that they do not explicitly include cognitive evaluations, see Figure II-3. From 
my point of view, the 2003 model describes the influence of emotions more precise as 
it does not predict as many influences as the 2001 model. I will discuss further 
differences and relate both models to the newest EIC framework (Lerner et al. 2015) 
at the end of this subchapter.
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Figure II-3: Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) - Determinants and consequences of 
immediate and expected emotions (p.621)
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) differentiate immediate emotions in having direct and 
indirect influence. First, emotions can have a direct influence on someone’s decision 
making without functioning as mediator of perception of probabilities and outcomes. 
Then, the effect depends on the intensity of the emotion. Either, low or moderately 
intense emotions serve as extra information. According to Clore (1992) and Schwarz
(1990) and their affect-as-information hypothesis people use their feelings in order to 
form judgments. On the other hand, the higher an emotion the higher will also be the 
impact on behavior. More, at very intense levels emotions may override cognitive 
processing. For instance, somebody experiencing intense fear from fire would rather 
freeze than act deliberately and run away. Second, emotions also have an indirect 
impact on decision making since they influence the judgment of expected probabilities 
and outcomes. Johnson and Tversky (1983) for example find that people who are in a 
happy situation judge risky situations more optimistically than those who experienced 
sadness. Immediate emotions are further determined by anticipatory and incidental 
influences according to Loewenstein and Lerner (2003). Anticipatory influences arise 
from someone’s thinking about future consequences of a decision. Emotional 
responses to probabilities are not very sensitive in contrast to e.g. emotional reactions 
to the intensity of an outcome (except when zero probability occurs). Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003) hypothesize that this is because mental images of outcomes drive 
anticipatory emotions (in line with Damasio 1994). 
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 Lerner et al. (2015) further discuss a valence approach opposed to the appraisal 
tendency framework and discuss different factors how emotions shape our decisions. 
They finally propose a general model of affective influences building up on earlier 
models (Loewenstein et al. 2001, Loewenstein and Lerner 2003), see Figure II.4. Their 
emotion-inbued choice (EIC) model builds up on traditional rational choice models. 
In the model, a decision maker evaluates an option by the utility of the respective 
outcome. This evaluation phase is influenced by characteristics of the options (e.g. 
probability or time delay) (C) and characteristics of the decision maker (e.g. risk 
attitude) (B). The overall evaluation results in choosing the best option (decision takes 
place (D)). Emotions come into the picture first in the evaluation phase as influencing 
factor resulting from predicted emotions from the final outcome. Second, unlike 
traditional rational choice models, current emotions felt at the time of the decision 
directly and indirectly influence the decision making. Current emotions influence the 
evaluation of outcomes (e.g. via altering probabilities (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001)), 
changing the weight a person puts on different dimensions (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 
2001). The current emotion itself may be influenced by incidental emotions (H), 
characteristics of the decision maker (i.e., trait emotions) (B’) or characteristics of the 
option (e.g., ambiguity rather than probability) (C’). Moreover, by changing the 
expected utility for possible outcomes current emotions also indirectly influence the 
decision making (I). 
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Figure II-4: EIC model (Lerner et al. 2015, p.3317)  
 
 
 
Concluding, all the models discussed above provide a theoretical framework of how 
to capture emotion’s potential influence on judgment and choices and emotion’s 
interrelation with cognitive evaluations. Moreover, immediate and anticipatory 
emotions, their relation to each other, and on outcomes are well described. Incidental 
factors that might influence the decision process are captured as well. All three models 
take similar approaches but differ quite significantly in how emotions / feelings and 
cognitive evaluations interact and influence outcomes.  
 However, it is very hard to empirically test and establish such causal relationships. 
Empirical evidence for some sub aspects of the model exists of course6. For instance, 
it is rather easy to measure how a certain investment decision and outcome influences 
an individuals’ emotional outcome. I am not sure however if it is possible at all to 
empirically verify all causal relationships the models propose, i.e., manipulate and 
measure all variables in one experiment. Moreover, empirical work shows that 
emotions can have a direct influence on outcome variables such as WTP (e.g., Schade 
                                                 
6 One interesting empirical study by Loewenstein, Nagin, and Paternoster (1997) studies the 
influence of the visceral state of arousal. They find that a group of men who have been shown 
sexually arousing materials answered to behave more sexually aggressive in a hypothetical 
dating scenario (for instance urge the scenario woman to remove her clothes) as compared to 
a neutral control group.  
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et al. 2012) hence contradicting the risk-as-feelings arguments. Within the EIC model 
framework however the findings by Schade et al. (2012) are not contradicting. 
Emotions such as worry influence the evaluation phase (G) and hence the decision (D) 
and outcome (E). It would be interesting to test the findings by Schade et al. (2012) 
within the EIC framework (Lerner et al. 2015). In general, more experimental research 
would be desirable aiming at clarifying the relations in such type of models.  
 From my point of view, such type of models are very appealing for intuitively and 
conceptually understanding the role of emotions and choices. They are very valuable 
for depicting potential interrelations of influencing factors and also illustrating the 
relation between immediate and anticipatory emotions. In this, especially Lerner and 
Lowenstein (2003) provide a simple yet convincing process model. Empirical testing 
of the above models might be very challenging as it is hard to measure and capture all 
variables depicted accurately. However, given there are very little theoretical models 
in emotions research especially when it comes to experimental testing the authors 
provide important frameworks for the field.  
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II.4.5 Marketing and consumer research 
Marketing science and consumer decision making has a long tradition in considering 
emotions’ influence on judgment and choices. Emotions have been studied in the 
context of advertising processes (Batra and Ray 1986, Burke and Edell 1989), 
consumer satisfaction (Alford and Sherrel 1996, Westbrook and Oliver 1991), or 
consumer choices in general (Muro and Murray 2012, Norton and Andrade 2012). One 
interesting recent empirical paper (N > 14,000) by John et al. (2016) studies the 
implications of ‘liking’ brands on Facebook. The authors find that ‘liking’ does not 
alter attitudes or increase the willingness to purchase but rather expresses someone’s 
preexisting affection of the brand. In another study, Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl 
(2008) find sadness induced by a short film clip in the laboratory to increase WTP for 
a sporty water bottle. For excellent overviews of emotions in marketing science see 
for instance Cohen et al. (2008) or Bagozzi et al. (1999). 
 Further, insurance behavior and the role of emotions has been studied extensively 
in order to better understand how people evaluate probabilities in low probability-high 
stake negative events by a range of authors (e.g., Johnson et al. 1995, Kunreuther et 
al. 2001, Wakker et al. 1997). One important stream of literature specifically looks at 
willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance to evaluate whether such a seemingly purely 
monetary decision is influenced by affective factors (Hogarth and Kunreuther 1995, 
Hsee and Kunreuther 2000, Schade and Kuneuther 2002, Schade et al. 2012). Hsee 
and Kunreuther (2000) find using a range of hypothetical decision scenarios that both 
willingness to purchase a certain object and willingness to claim compensation for lost 
objects increases the more affection people have for the respective object. Related, 
Peters, Kunreuther, Sagara, Slovic, and Schley (2012) investigate the influence of 
affect and time on peoples’ willingness of buying protective measures and find that in 
affect-rich situations time is neglected. Baron, Hershey, and Kunreuther (2000) find 
in a large questionnaire study that the desire to take action (personal and government) 
for risk reduction is largely explained by worry.   
 Schade et al. (2012) put the findings of Baron et al. (2000) to the hard scrutiny of 
an incentivized experiment with high monetary stakes. They study WTP for insurance 
in a large incentivized economic experiment (N = 263) and given or ambiguous 
probabilities. Moreover, the levels of state worry as well as trait worry (worry domain 
questionnaire by Tallis, Eysenck, and Mathews 1992 in the end of the experiment) 
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were elicited. The authors find that a large group of people is willing to pay a high 
premium for insurance and most strikingly that worry rather than probabilities drive 
individuals’ WTP. Or put differently, judgments of probabilities do not explain the 
high WTP for insurance but the amount of one’s worry does. 
 These findings have important implications for industry, policy and future 
research. If emotions such as worry drive peoples’ WTP for premiums of insurances 
more research is needed on what causes worry (Schade et al. 2012). Further, it would 
be interesting to study different scenarios of how for instance worry can be reduced 
while making a buying decision. Further, for pro-consumer insurance companies these 
findings are of special interest, as they show that many insurance companies most 
likely use techniques that worry customers so to increase premiums and it would be 
desirable to increase transparency in order to gain consumers’ trust.7 More empirical 
work would be desirable to further elaborate such relations in other industries and 
environments.   
  
                                                 
7 Recently, fin-tech and insurance-tech start-ups like Lemonade (www.lemonade.com) started 
by making use of insights from behavioral decision making to design business models that 
provide more transparency and information to consumers and ultimately aim to transform the 
industry to being more consumer friendly. 
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II.4.6 Behavioral economics 
Emotions are a neglected topic, and the neglect of economists is second to none. I 
find this surprising. I take it that economics is concerned with the best ways of 
promoting human satisfaction in a world of scarce resources. With one exception, all 
human satisfaction comes in form of emotional experiences.”  
(Jon Elster 1996, p.1386)  
 
In his articles on ‘Emotions and Economic Behavior’ (1998) and ‘Rationality and the 
emotions’ (1996), Jon Elster describes the two fields of economic theory and emotions 
“to exist in near complete isolation from each other” (p. 47). Not only do economists 
whose main goal lies in explaining human behavior ignore emotions in their theory 
and models but also emotion researcher never reference economic theory. Economic 
models that incorporate emotions are very rare. Standard economics does not consider 
emotions to have systematic influences neither as independent nor dependent variable 
in models or experimental papers. This is surprising looking at the increase of studies 
and strong findings from neuroscience and psychology. Over the past 15 years a 
change happened though. Rather than solely looking at cognitive processes, 
economists (scarcely) now investigate emotions to better understand and predict 
behavior of economic agents. To my best knowledge two studies exist dealing with 
emotions in a way I am concerned with emotions in the present thesis that have been 
published in the American Economic Review (AER). Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) 
study induced emotions (film clips) and time preferences and find significant 
influences of positive mood. Capra (2014) investigates emotions in strategic games (I 
will discuss this in chapter II.5).    
 In economics, studying anticipatory emotions has a relatively long tradition 
compared to immediate emotions. Sudgens and Loomes (1982) and Bell (1982) 
develop regret theory accounting for the strong effects of anticipated regret influencing 
behavior at the time of making decisions. Further, one important stream of research 
models the influence of anticipatory emotions in agency theory (Koszegi 2006). Here, 
an agent must decide whether to convey information of emotional consequences for 
the principal or not (imagine situations such as the government informing the 
population about current challenges). Agents face the dilemma of anticipating that 
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principals act according to the accurate news or rather giving them good news that are 
emotionally beneficial. This model approach provides important insights to how 
emotions can influence interactive decisions. For the present thesis however, I will 
focus on the role of immediate emotions and economic decision making. Chapter II.5 
provides empirical evidence from the field of strategic games and behavioral game 
theory. In the following I will first turn to emotions and heuristics.  
 
II.4.7 Emotions and heuristics 
The theory of the affect heuristic states that feelings can function like a heuristic 
(Finucane et al. 2000, Slovic et al. 2007), people use their positive and negative 
feelings as guide to evaluating risk and rewards. The group around Paul Slovic became 
interested in further exploring feelings and risks after having discovered that people 
judge a situation they like as high reward low risk situation whereas whenever we 
dislike something we evaluate rewards to be low and risks to be high (Alhakami and 
Slovic 1944, Finucane et al. 2000). This observation contradicts the common notion 
of positive correlations of risks and rewards. Further, they observe that in certain 
situations such as under time pressure or high uncertainty affective reactions can be 
more efficient than evaluating all information available. 
 More precise, people have images of objects or incidents that are tagged with 
positive or negative feelings. When making decisions they refer to this pool of labels 
consciously or unconsciously. For instance, I have been stung by a jellyfish years ago 
resulting in a very painful experience. Whenever I see a jellyfish (whether he is 
harmful or not) I tend to run away or turn away of fear whereas many people explicitly 
look at pictures of jellyfish experiencing joy from the beauty of the creatures. (Those 
people have obviously never encountered a sting of a jellyfish). In this way, similar to 
availability or representativeness, affect works as a heuristic cue. It is important to note 
that the authors define affect as ”the specific quality of "goodness" or "badness" (1) 
experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a 
positive or negative quality of a stimulus.” (Slovic et al. 2002, p. 397). The idea of 
associated images traces back to Zajonc (1980) who already proposed that affective 
responses to stimuli guide our judgment. For Zajonc perception is almost always 
related to affect so that we never just see some object but rather a beautiful object, or 
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ugly object. Moreover, oftentimes we decide based on affective evaluation and justify 
our behavior later by weighting pro and contras. Hence, we oftentimes buy the car or 
house we like and later deliberately justify our decisions (Zajonc 1980). I believe 
almost everybody can relate to this argument when making small and also important 
buying decisions, or when deciding on personal questions. It remains if this holds true 
for economic decisions however. More empirical evidence is needed in order to further 
explore this phenomenon.  
 Finucane et al. (2000) study judgments of risks and benefits and the affect heuristic 
in two experimental settings. The authors present N=54 students with several activities 
or facilities such as smoking, or chemical plants and were to rate the benefits and risks 
of these. One half of the group was assigned to a time-pressure condition with the aim 
to enhance heuristic thinking. The authors find an inverse relationship between risks 
and benefits whereas the negative correlation being higher in the time pressure 
treatment (r = - .80 as compared to r = - .75). In another experiment, the authors 
provide four different descriptions of nuclear technology with varying information of 
whether the perceived benefit and risk is high or low respectively.    
 Further, a few studies incorporate the role of emotions into Simon’s (1957) 
concept of bounded rationality. Kaufman (1999) argues that agents are not only 
boundedly rational because of cognitive limitations but also because of emotional 
influences. Going back to institutional economist Commons (1934) by whom Simon 
was largely influenced, Kaufman highlights Commons arguments abut the human 
nature. Commons argues that human behavior is influenced by stupidity, ignorance 
and passion (Commons 1934). Whereas Simon (1982) acknowledges stupidity 
(cognitive limitations), ignorance (limited availability of information), he does not 
account for passion in his important theory. Kaufman basically concludes that 
emotions as one factor that interfere with rational decision making leads to biases when 
making choices.    
 Related but with a different tone, Hanoch (2002) and Muramatsua and Hanoch 
(2005) discuss ways in which emotions may enter bounded rationality in the thinking 
of the adaptive toolbox as proposed by Gigerenzer and Selten (1999) and Gigerenzer, 
Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999). This implies that emotions (as with 
heuristics in general) do not oppose rationality but are rather rational depending on the 
environment.  Muramatsua and Hanoch (2005) take an evolutionary perspective and 
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stress the important function of emotions in guiding cognition and making decisions. 
They basically highlight the role of emotions when searching for information 
(following Simon’s (1983) thoughts) and when to stop searching (Ketelaar and Todd 
2001). Emotions guide decisions with restricting the range of options and by letting 
the agent focus on specific parameters. They conclude that in certain situations 
emotions are rational, as for instance disgust signals danger in case of harmful food 
ultimately leading to survival from an evolutionary point of view. Further, Simon 
(1983) states that a fundamental role of emotions is to help us prioritize and direct our 
attention. For instance, hunger is a signal for the need of immediate attention. In this 
sense emotions are perfectly rational and even lead to optimal behavior whereas in 
other circumstances emotions can lead to irrational behavior. With this discussion, the 
authors contribute to the fact that humans function incredibly well even though they 
have cognitive limits and time constraints. I find it surprising that so little studies look 
at what is a field I view as very promising. For instance, to the best of my knowledge 
no study draws a connection to emotions and satisficing, see chapter 10.3 for a further 
discussion of potential research avenues. 
 Concluding, approaching the role of emotions and decision making using a 
similar framework as the study of heuristics could increase our understanding of how 
emotions influence people’s choice. From my understanding emotions are not the 
same as heuristics, neither are emotions one type of heuristic. I believe emotions are 
much more complicated in their functions as discussed in chapter II.2. But drawing an 
analogy and studying emotions in their adaptive function just like the study of 
heuristics in an uncertain world (Todd, Gigerenzer, & The ABC Research Group 2012) 
seems to be very promising. Such an approach does not aim to answer whether 
emotion’s influence on choices is rational or irrational in general but rather whether 
and when emotions are ecologically rational (see also Volz and Hertwig 2016). Hence, 
whether emotions have a positive or negative influence on outcomes depends on the 
environment a person makes decisions. Such an approach can also be related to 
Lewin’s field theory as proposed in chapter II.2. Behavior is a function of the person, 
including emotions, and the environment. It is only possible to observe and maybe 
even predict the role of emotions on decisions when we include the environment in the 
equation.   
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II.4.8 Conclusion 
Chapter II.4 summarizes and reviews existing models from decision science and 
economics that model emotions and (economic) choices. Starting with general 
thoughts on emotions in the decision sciences by for instance Herbert Simon and 
Jeremy Bentham, I reviewed normative models such as EUT-type models 
(Loewenstein 1996, 2000). Normatively, these models are quite convincing for 
modeling specific types of emotions such as visceral states. However, for modeling 
discrete emotional states especially positive emotions it will probably be difficult to 
incorporate these in utility-type models. Moreover, scholars incorporate emotions 
within descriptive-model frameworks such as prospect theory (Rottenstreich and Hsee 
2001, Suter et al. 2015) and find that whenever outcomes evoke affective reactions the 
probability weighting function of prospect theory is changed. Affect leads to an even 
more non-linear weighting function. For instance, they find that a small probability of 
receiving a kiss is weighted higher than a small probability of getting cash. Suter et al. 
(2015) find a similar pattern studying negative affective choices (medical side effects). 
This research avenue explains and incorporates affective factors into prospect theory 
models very nicely. More empirical work looking at different emotions and also 
different domains (e.g., fear in financial decisions, or joy in consumption choices) 
would be desirable.      
 As a next approach to the role of emotions I reviewed feeling-based models such 
as the risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001). These models became 
quite popular over the past 20 years and are intuitively appealing since they nicely 
establish relationships between immediate and anticipatory emotions and judgment 
and choices. However, empirically those models are hard to challenge and their 
predictive power remains unclear. Moreover, the ‘original’ risk-as-feelings model 
(Loewenstein et al. 2001) and the most recently proposed EIC model (Lerner et al. 
2015) differ to a great extent. Research somehow contradicting the risk-as-feelings 
model as for instance studies finding direct influences of emotions on economic 
variables (e.g., Schade et al. 2001) could be incorporated into the EIC framework as 
opposed to the risk-as-feelings model. Hence, empirical testing of the EIC model 
would be helpful.  
 Chapters II.4.5 - 6 draw attention to studies and models from marketing and 
behavioral economics highlighting the important role emotions such as worry or joy 
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play in economic choices. This field of research has been growing over the past years 
and emotions have been incorporated increasingly to better understand choices. 
Decisions such as buying a car or insurance are oftentimes especially exposed to 
emotional influences, either naturally or amplified by marketing strategies. Hence, I 
believe this stream of applied behavioral research is especially important and may 
reveal relevant insights on how emotions influence people’s buying choices and how 
to potentially educate or even guide consumer’s choices.  
 The last sub-chapter of this part of the thesis draws attention on how to incorporate 
emotions into bounded rationality and how to possibly approach emotions in a similar 
way as heuristics. The basic tenant here is that emotions do not contradict rationality 
but are rather ecologically rational. Hence, depending on the environment emotions 
can lead to optimal choices or not (see also Volz and Hertwig 2016). Slovic and 
colleagues argue in line with this reasoning with their affect heuristic. As Slovic states 
(2007, p. 339): “Under the right conditions, the perception and integration of affective 
feelings, within the experiential system, appears close to the sophisticated 
maximization process postulated by economic theories since the days of Jeremy 
Bentham.” I find this argument and empirical support very convincing. I do not equate 
emotions with heuristics. I believe emotions are very different from heuristics but can 
be studied more successful in their adaptive function within their environment. From 
my point of view, approaching emotions like heuristics in an adaptive framework 
highlighting ecological rationality is a very promising stream of research that is in need 
of further especially empirical research. 
 This also relates back to the emotion theories from evolutionary psychology 
discussed in chapter II.2.4. According to evolutionary psychology emotions have 
adaptive functions. For instance, the negative emotion of fear has the adaptive function 
to avoid danger and leads to flight behavior. From this point of research, it does not 
make sense to pursue a valence based approach but it is important to consider discrete 
emotions. Being able to distinguish discrete emotional states is also important for part 
IV of this thesis where I experimentally study and induce the emotions happiness and 
fear.    
 Concluding, all of the specific models discussed above and empirical evidence 
shows that emotions play an important role for judgment and decision making. 
Scholars work in different paradigms, different disciplines, and take different 
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approaches to the study of emotions. However, they all find that emotions play an 
important role in our decision making and influence choices. More empirical evidence 
and theoretical progress will help to better understand this relatively young but 
growing field. This thesis aims to contribute to the field by first providing a thorough 
review of different theories (chapter II) to identify testable hypotheses. Moreover, we 
experimentally study induced happiness and fear in two important economic 
paradigms. Experiment 1 deals with individual risk preferences and experiment 2 with 
strategic choices. The next chapter will provide insights to emotions in the literature 
on strategic games.  
 
 
 
   
56 
II.5 Emotions in the literature on strategic games 
So far, I have discussed different theoretical and empirical approaches from decision 
theory. However, economic decision making and studying emotions most of the time 
includes interactive decisions. Herbert Simon (1967) states that in order to be 
satisfactory, a theory of emotional behavior has to analyze emotions within social 
interaction (p.37). Further, Winter (2014) stresses the importance of game theory for 
understanding emotions: “The game theoretic approach enables us to understand the 
roles that emotions and other behavioral characteristics have within a context of social 
interaction.” (p. xii). Hence, I turn to emotions in the literature on strategic games in 
the following. The following literature review provides the theoretical base for the 
experimental study in part IV.2 of this thesis where we investigate the role of induced 
happiness and fear in market entry decisions, i.e., two discrete emotions in strategic 
games. In the following, I will review and synthesize all to my best knowledge existing 
experimental papers studying emotions in strategic games.  
 Albeit fragmented, over the last ten to 15 years research on emotions in strategic 
behavior has experienced more and more attention by experimental economists and 
psychologists. One important stream of research empirically studies the role of 
induced emotions on decisions in strategic games such as dictator, ultimatum, and trust 
games (Kirchsteiger 1994, Sanfey et al. 2003, Capra 2004, Harlé and Sanfey 2007, 
Andrade and Ho 2007, 2009, Andrade and Ariely 2009, Kausel and Connoly 2014), 
prisoner’s dilemma (Nelissen et al. 2007), gift-exchange games (Kirchsteiger et al. 
2006), and a two-person market entry games (Kugler et al. 2014). No academic study 
exists looking at emotions in repeated market entry games. Four of the studies include 
a ‘strategic component’ of emotions in the sense that emotions of other players in the 
experiment are communicated and become relevant for individual decisions (Andrade 
and Ho 2007, Gneezy and Imas 2014, Kausel and Connoly 2014, Kugler et al. 2014). 
I will proceed chronologically in the following.    
 Sanfey et al. (2003) were one of the first to study emotions in games using tools 
from the fields of neuroscience. The authors use functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to study neural and behavioral reactions of the responders in the 
ultimatum game (e.g., Güth et al. 1982). The authors do not induce emotions but rather 
study emotional reactions to behavior in the ultimatum game. However, as one of the 
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very first studies in the field I report their findings for completeness in the following. 
In the ultimatum game, player A receives some amount of money and proposes how 
to split the sum. Player B responds by accepting or rejecting the respective offer. 
Previous studies find that rather than accepting all offers as the standard economist 
predicts, the responder would oftentimes reject offers that appear unfair to them. One 
explanation for this ‘anomaly’ (as the standard economist would call it) in the 
responders behavior could be that the rejection results from being angry (Sanfey et al. 
2003). Sanfey et al. (2003) test the ultimatum game (USD 10) with half fair (USD 5 / 
USD 5) and half unfair offers over 30 rounds with N=19 participants whereas part of 
the offers were made by human partners and part by a computer. The authors find that 
responders would reject unfair offers of USD2 and USD1, and they would reject unfair 
offers by humans significantly more often compared to offers by computers. Further, 
the fMRI shows greater activation for unfair offers compared to fair offers, and for 
unfair offers by humans compared to a computer, in the areas of the bilateral anterior 
insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. Hence, apparently, 
respondents reacted to unfair offers stronger when it was proposed by a human as 
compared to computers. The bilateral anterior insula has been associated with negative 
emotional states such as pain or hunger. Participants with high activation levels of the 
bilateral anterior insula rejected unfair offers significantly more often than others. 
Sanfey et al. (2003) interpret these results as direct empirical support for the influence 
of emotional factors on economic choice. Results from fMRI studies have to be treated 
with caution regarding their implications. However, the findings of this remarkable 
study definitely serve as very good starting point and motivation for further studies 
evaluating how emotions influence choices in economic games and how people expect 
choices in economic games to impact their emotions.  
 Capra (2004) explicitly induces emotions in the laboratory as one of the first 
authors in the field of economics (study published in AER). She investigates the 
influence of mood on behavior in dictator, ultimatum, and binary trust games in the 
laboratory. She induces positive and negative mood using (1) experience of success or 
failure from answering an easy or hard set of trivia questions and (2) memory 
elicitation tasks. The N = 72 subjects first complete the easy or hard set of questions 
(three good mood and three bad mood sessions) and a self-report on how they felt. 
They then play a dictator game: A has the role of the proposer (‘dictator’) who can 
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choose to propose either a fair (USD 5 and USD 5) or unfair (USD 6 and USD 2 or 
USD 6 and USD 1) outcome to B who passively accepts that amount. Thereafter, 
subjects were again randomly assigned role A and B and played an ultimatum game 
(USD 10). Then, the memory elicitation task was completed and finally all subjects 
played a binary trust game (similar to McCabe et al. 2003). Capra (2004) finds that in 
the dictator game 92 percent of subjects in the good mood treatment offer fair splits 
compared to 62 percent in the negative mood group. In the ultimatum game, only small 
differences are found (bad mood treatment players offered slightly higher amounts). 
All responders accepted the offer. In the trust game, 59 percent made trusting choices 
(i.e., offered the outcome to B) in the bad mood compared to 42 percent in the good 
mood treatment and 70 percent reacted trustworthy in the bad mood compared to 62 
percent in the good mood. These findings are in line with prior findings of people 
reacting trusting and trustworthy (McCabe et al. 2003). The differences between the 
mood treatments are not significant. The study by Capra (2004) has a very interesting 
approach and is especially being one of the first studies including mood in an economic 
game very important. However, the author uses a pure valence approach. Thus, it is 
not clear whether the bad mood induction resulted in an experience of sadness or anger 
for the subjects. Further, the first ‘mood induction’ may not actually have the result of 
people being in a good or bad mood. Also, as Capra (2004) herself notes, the different 
tasks might have affected subsequent tasks. The weak influence of emotions in the 
ultimatum may be the case because in between the mood inducement and the 
ultimatum game, players already played the dictator game. Hence, there might be 
testing effects at hand and the results must be treated with caution. Interestingly all 
responders accepted the offer. This is in line with standard economic predictions 
however not with the strong findings of other studies (e.g., Güth et al. 1982). So 
maybe, playing a dictator game directly before an ultimatum influenced responders to 
not show as strong reactions in the ultimatum game.  
 Related, Harlé and Sanfey (2007) study the impact of amusement and sadness 
(versus a neutral control group) induced with short film clips in the ultimatum game. 
They find that whereas amusement did not have any influence, sadness let to lower 
acceptance rates of offers that were unfair. Mussel, Göritz, and Hewig (2013) find in 
a large online experiment with N = 1,326 that in the ultimatum game offers from 
proposers with smiling faces are accepted more often than neutral proposers, and offers 
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from proposers with angry faces were accepted less often. Moretti and di Pellegrino 
(2010) find that induced disgust as compared to sadness and neutral groups results in 
a higher acceptance of unfair rejection rates in the ultimatum game but only if the 
partner is a human being. In computer interaction, this effect disappears. Bonini, 
Hadjichristidis, Mazzocco, Demattè, Zampini, Sbarbati, and Magon (2011) find 
similar patterns of accepting more unfair offers in ultimatum games with one group of 
subjects being in a room with a disgusting smell as compared to a neutral room. These 
findings stress the importance of studying specific emotions and not only good or bad 
mood.  
 Andrade and Ho (2007) experimentally study the effect of incidental emotions on 
strategic behavior. Specifically, they propose that people believe that incidental 
emotions have an influence on others’ behavior, and that they can strategically benefit 
from this as long as the other does not realize it. The N=122 subjects either watched 
film clips eliciting a happy or angry emotional state (and describing a story related to 
that feeling) or a neutral film clip. They then played a modified version of the 
ultimatum game. Subjects assigned the role of the receiver were watching the 
happiness or anger film clip. Proposers were watching the neutral clip and were told 
about the emotional state of the receiver. More, in one treatment the proposer was told 
the receiver does not know that he knows how he feels, and in the other treatment the 
proposer was told the other knew. The authors find that proposers offered unfair 
amounts more often if they knew the receiver had watched a funny film clip (as 
compared to the angry video). As soon as they were told that the other knew that they 
knew about his prior emotional experience this effect disappeared. Andrade and Ho 
(2007) thus conclude that subjects being in the role of the proposer acted strategically 
and expected a happy receiver to be more cooperative than the angry one (as long as 
he does not know that the proposer may behave strategically). This finding is 
especially striking relating to our study on strategic emotions.  
 In another ultimatum game experiment, Kopelman et al. (2006) find that receivers 
more often accept offers from proposers displaying positive emotions as compared to 
neutral and negative emotions. The authors were interested in negotiation strategies 
similar to van Kleef et al. (2006), Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) and Pietroni et al. 
(2010). Pietroni et al. (2010) are interested in the role emotions (happiness and anger) 
play in negotiations. This is important because emotions are intuitively central in such 
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settings but have not been considered very much in research on negotiations and 
strategies of negotiators. They find in ultimatum game experiments that the influence 
depends on the desired outcome: positive emotions result in higher offers of 
negotiators whenever the others’ exit strategy was highlighted.  
 Further, Andrade and Ariely (2009) suggest that the effect of incidental emotions 
on decision making lasts longer than the emotion itself. In their experiment, emotions 
are manipulated by letting a group of subjects watch film clips inducing happiness and 
anger. These subjects were assigned the role of the receiver in the ultimatum game in 
the next step. Proposers watched a documentary (neutral state) instead. Then, 
participants played the ultimatum game. “Study 3” contained a filler task about 
pictures and memory (20 minutes) attempting to neutralize subjects’ positive and 
negative emotions. Thereafter, subjects played the reversed role in the ultimatum game 
and finally, they played a dictator game. The emotion manipulation check happened 
directly after watching the clip and again after completing the filler task (question of 
feeling happy or angry was embedded in a range of questions). The authors find that 
subjects were feeling angrier or happier after watching the film clips and that the 
feeling faded away after completing the filler task. More, in the first ultimatum game 
only 40 percent of the subjects in the happy condition rejected the unfair offer whereas 
73 percent of the angry subjects rejected the unfair offer. In the second ultimatum game 
with reversed roles and neutral states, the once angry receivers now proposed a fairer 
amount (less to themselves) to the receivers than the once happy receivers. Similarly, 
in the dictator game the once angry receivers offered an outcome with a smaller share 
to themselves as the once happy subjects. Andrade and Ariely (2009) interpret this 
result as incidental emotion having an indirect and long-lasting effect on behavior, i.e., 
those subjects who were once angry made a fairer offer to their opponents than the 
once happy ones – even in the dictator game where receivers had to accept any amount.   
 Related, Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) investigate the impact of mood on behavior in 
a gift-exchange game, i.e., two players decide sequentially whereas the first mover 
allocates some amount of an endowment to another player who then chooses an effort 
level. Effort is costly meaning it decreases the second mover’s payoff but increases 
the first mover’s payoff. In the laboratory with N=130 students they manipulate the 
second mover’s mood by letting subjects watch a sad or a funny movie before playing 
the game. The authors observe that the mood induction has an effect on behavior. 
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Comparing behavior in the good to the bad mood treatment, both transfer and effort is 
larger in the bad mood treatment (higher reciprocity). Players in a good mood on the 
other hand are more generous. 
 Nelissen and Dijker (2007) study the influence of fear and guilt on behavior in 
simultaneous one-shot dilemma games. In their experiment with N=277 undergraduate 
students they induce the emotions fear, guilt, and neutral states using autobiographical 
recall procedure. The authors find fear to reduce and guilt to increase levels of 
cooperation. Interestingly, this relation depends on individual’s value orientation: fear 
reduces cooperation only for individuals with pro-social value orientation whereas 
guilt only increases cooperation of people with pro-self value orientation.  
 Furthermore, Kausel and Connoly (2014) investigate individuals’ expectations 
about trustworthiness and study the impact of incidental emotions on behavior in trust 
games. Specifically, the authors study the impact of three incidental emotions (anger, 
guilt, and gratitude) on players’ expectations of trustworthiness in a series of three 
experiments. In study 1, subjects (N=112) answered a package of questionnaires (in 
the laboratory and beginning of an MBA class) inquiring their beliefs about the impact 
each of the emotion (anger, gratitude, and guilt) may have on acting trustworthy, 
altruistic and fair. Kausel and Connoly (2014) find that participants believe that 
gratitude leads to a more trustworthy behavior. Anger and guilt however negatively 
impact others’ trustworthiness whereas anger has a higher mean impact, i.e., the results 
show different findings for the same valence. Study 2 was a laboratory experiment. 
Participants were randomly assigned a role player A or B. Participants’ assigned to 
role B were to write down a scenario of their life where they have been especially 
angry, guilty, or grateful. A neutral control group and players A wrote about a recent 
classroom experience. Subsequently, all players played a trust game with the crucial 
manipulation of giving them ‘emotional knowledge’ about their opponents, i.e., 
Players A were told whether Player B has written about a situation that made them feel 
angry, guilty, grateful or neutral, and they would now as a result experience anger, 
guilt, gratitude or be in a neutral state. In the trust game, players A could decide about 
sending a share of their endowment (USD 20) to players B, the amount was then 
tripled, and players B could send back any amount they wanted. The amount sent by 
A is interpreted as measure of trust in the literature. Moreover, players A were asked 
about their expectations of what B would send back.  Mean expectations show that 
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players A expected angry Bs return less than neutral Bs (M = 12.06 vs. M = 20.59, p 
< .05). Further, As expected guilty Bs return more than angry Bs (M = 21.25 and M = 
12.06, p < .05). Expectations about returns from grateful Bs as compared to neutral Bs 
did not significantly differ. Regarding As’ behavior, they sent a smaller amount facing 
an angry B (M=8.71) than facing a neutral B (M=13.53, p < .05). More, As sending 
money to guilty Bs gave more (M=14.75) compared to facing angry Bs (M = 8.71, p < 
.05). The authors find no significant differences comparing the amount sent by As to 
grateful or neutral Bs. Overall, the findings show that information about others’ 
emotions influence expectations, and more, actual behaviors.   
 Kugler et al. (2014) measure anxiousness and aggressiveness of two players in 
entry decisions. The authors conduct an online experiment (N=106) with a within-
subjects design (5 dimensions). Subjects’ anxiousness (Leary 1983) and 
aggressiveness (Bryant and Smith 2001) were measured using self-report 
questionnaires. Both measures showed reasonable reliability (Cronbach’s α of .90 and 
.81 respectively). Interestingly the correlation of both scales was significant and quite 
high (.29, p<.01). Participants then played a simple 2-player simultaneous market 
entry game for 45 rounds. They were matched with an opponent randomly and were 
informed about his personality characteristic. The matching was done so that each 
player played against each personality type for nine rounds (anxious, non-anxious, 
aggressive, non-aggressive, random). They found that subjects’ personality influenced 
their behavior in the market entry game and that players adjusted their behavior 
according to another players’ personality. More precise, they found that aggressive 
subjects entered more and anxious subjects entered less. Subjects were more likely to 
enter against anxious players and less likely to enter against aggressive players. The 
authors presume that the players adjusted the beliefs about their opponents.  
 On a related note, Gneezy and Imas (2014) pursue a novel approach for studying 
emotions in strategic situations. They allow people in the laboratory to explicitly anger 
their opponents and find that people use anger strategically in different interactive 
games. Depending on the environment angering people results in less effective (simple 
strength games) or more effective (more cognitive demanding games) behavior. 
Moreover, and most strikingly, the authors find that people anticipate this effect and 
when given the chance use angering their opponents whenever it is strategically 
advantageous. The authors hence conclude that people understand how emotions affect 
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behavior and moreover make use of this knowledge in strategic settings. These 
findings motivate our experimental study greatly and more empirical research is in 
demand.   
 Summarizing, there is a relatively good understanding about the role of specific 
emotions in some games such as the ultimatum game. Fear, disgust, and anger have 
been studied quite well. Here, it would be interesting to further study discrete positive 
emotions and their influence on behavior of proposers and responders. The dictator 
game however has not received as much attention as one would have presumed even 
though Capra (2004) finds a strong influence of positive mood on dictators’ offers. 
Hence, it would be desirable to further study the impact of positive and especially of 
negative discrete emotions on peoples’ behavior in dictator games.  
 Further, people’s expectations about opponents’ emotions and potential 
adjustments in behavior have received some attention in the literature. Andrade and 
Ho (2007), Kausel and Conolly (2014), and Kugler et al. (2014) find that player expect 
other players in experimental studies to react to induced emotions and they adjust their 
strategies accordingly. These findings are important and we build our hypotheses 
directly on this empirical evidence. 
 One new and very interesting study explicitly allows people to use emotions 
strategically by giving participants in the laboratory the opportunity to explicitly anger 
opponents. Those findings demonstrate that people apparently understand a strategic 
value of emotions. More research with different emotions would be desirable. 
 Concluding, in this chapter, I provided a thorough over view of what has been 
done in the field of emotions in strategic situations in order to synthesize the current 
state of the field. We are directly building our hypotheses on such findings. Whereas 
some paradigms such as the ultimatum games have been studied extensively, some 
other games have received little to no attention. Amongst those is the classic market 
entry game, an important framework for studying people’s coordination behavior. We 
are interested in how induced fear and happiness influence behavior in this game.  
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II.6 Emotions in entrepreneurship research 
Emotions and entrepreneurial activity are a relatively under researched field. This is 
surprising as anecdotal evidence from talking to entrepreneurs nearly always involves 
emotional facets.  
 Only recently, a strong interest in the topic of affect in entrepreneurship research 
evolved. In a foreword of a special issue on ‘emotions in entrepreneurship research’ 
in the journal Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (ET&P), Cardon et al. (2012) 
highlight the importance of studying emotions. They coined the term ‘entrepreneurial 
emotions’ referring “to the affect, emotions, moods, and/or feelings-of individuals or 
a collective-that are antecedent to, concurrent with, and/or a consequence of, the 
entrepreneurial process, meaning the recognition/creation, evaluation, reformulation, 
and/or the exploitation of a possible opportunity.” (Cardon et al. 2012, p.3). The recent 
handbook of entrepreneurial cognition (Mitchell et al. 2014) devotes three out of 14 
chapters to the topic of affect and entrepreneurial thinking. However, concrete and 
especially empirical research on immediate emotions in the entrepreneurial domain is 
still rare. A handful of studies explore the relation of state and trait emotions on 
opportunity evaluation and exploitation (e.g., Grichnik et al. 2010, Welpe et al. 2012) 
or on entrepreneurial risk propensity and perception (e.g., Foo 2011). Incentive 
compatible experiments are to my best knowledge nonexistent with one exception. 
Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) experimentally explore the influence of one’s 
regulatory focus, i.e., emotional tendencies, on part-time entrepreneurs’ time 
allocation. They indeed find that entrepreneurs can be better described by a rather 
emotional concept than by normative utility theory. Hence, there is need for more 
theoretical and empirical research in the entrepreneurial domain to better understand 
how emotions influence entrepreneurs’ decision making. Just recently, Schade (2016) 
provides an overview of existing studies in the field asking the question of the role of 
emotions in entrepreneurial decision making. 
 This chapter provides an overview of theoretical frameworks incorporating 
emotions in entrepreneurial decision making. Building on this, I discuss empirical 
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evidence. A brief overview of emotional outcomes from entrepreneurial activity is 
provided. Finally, studies looking at immediate emotions are discussed and evaluated.
II.6.1 Theoretical frameworks
The field of emotion research in entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial decision making 
is rather young. Robert Baron (2008) highlights the importance of the role of affect in 
all stages of the entrepreneurial process. He develops one of the first and very
comprehensive theoretical frameworks. It is important to note that throughout his 
review, he refers with the term affect to both state affect, i.e., generated by specific 
events, and trait affect, that is stable tendencies being experienced across many 
situations. Baron motivates his thoughts of why affect is especially relevant to 
entrepreneurship for two major reasons: (i) entrepreneurs act in a highly uncertain and
changing environment, and (ii) entrepreneurs have to perform tasks that have shown 
to be influenced by affect in prior research from psychology. For instance, important 
domains are creativity (Isen et al. 1987), negotiation (Baron 1990), and of course 
decision making under risk and uncertainty in general (Lerner und Keltner 2001). 
Baron models the influence of affect in the entrepreneurial process as follows: both, 
incidental and event generated affect influence different domains of the entrepreneur’s 
tasks via cognitive processes. Affect functions as heuristic cue or results in priming of 
relevant connotations and thereby alters perception or judgments and ultimately 
influences processes such as opportunity recognition. 
Figure II-5: Baron’s theoretical model of the role of affect in entrepreneurship (2008, p. 
335)
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Baron (2008) proposes a model that argues in the line of Loewenstein et al. (2001):
affect influences cognitive thinking and hence alters individuals’ (entrepreneurs’)
choices. Note that this is in contrast to findings by scholars from the decision sciences 
who find in incentive compatible experiments that emotions influence choices directly 
(Schade et al. 2012). Besides, though an important and interesting approach, the model 
lacks clear specifications on how affect influences processes (e.g., valence or appraisal 
tendencies). Such kind of model is moreover relatively difficult to empirically 
challenge in order to make causal inferences.
In a similar approach, Michl et al. (2009) present a model based on the stimulus-
organism-response model (S-O-R) to examine emotions and cognitions in the 
entrepreneurial context, following Shaver and Scott (1991) who first applied the S-O-
R model to the entrepreneurship domain. In their model (Michl et al. 2009), the 
stimulus is represented by some feature of an opportunity such as probability of 
success or time to profit, and the organism consists of psychological variables, i.e., 
emotions, cognitions, perceptions, motivations. The organism is naturally never fully 
observable but must be inferred (Shaver and Scott 1991, Michel et al. 2009). Driven 
by stimuli and organism the response can be either the evaluation or exploitation 
(resulting directly or mediated by the evaluation) of the opportunity. The response then 
again influences the stimulus. 
Figure II-6: S-O-R model (Michl. et al. 2009, p. 180)
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The model of Michl et al. (2009) is less conceptual from my point of view and mimics 
the underlying psychological process well. Moreover, the authors experimentally 
tested their proposed model and find quite convincing evidence, see below. 
Interestingly, in the above model the psychological variables do not influence the 
features of an opportunity, i.e. emotions do not influence probabilities directly but 
certain features do evoke emotions. This is different from the other consequentialist 
models reported in this and previous chapters.  
 Concluding, a handful of theoretical models building mostly on Baron (2008) 
exist. Most of the models consider opportunity evaluation and exploitation as 
dependent variables. There is urgent need for further theoretical and empirical research 
on how emotions influence the entrepreneurial process and vice versa (see also Cardon 
et al. 2012, Shepherd 2015). In the following sub-chapter, I will discuss empirical 
papers in the entrepreneurship literature that examine emotions and entrepreneurial 
decision making.  
 
II.6.2 Empirical evidence 
II.6.2.1 Emotional outcomes from entrepreneurial activity  
Only a handful of empirical papers explicitly study the influence of basic emotions (as 
independent variable) on entrepreneurial choices such as opportunity recognition or 
exploitation (Grichnik et al. 2010, Foo 2011, Welpe et al. 2012). A somewhat larger 
stream of literature investigates emotional outcomes from entrepreneurial activity, i.e., 
emotions as dependent variable: emotion = f(x). Especially regarding positive 
emotions several studies examine the influence of entrepreneurial activity on for 
instance passion, wellbeing, and excitement. Already in the 1980s being self-
employed instead of being a wage employee has been linked to higher job satisfaction 
and wellbeing (Blanchflower et al. 2001, Bradley and Roberts 2004, Thompson et al. 
1992, Van Praag and Versloot 2007). Further, Gielnik et al. (2015) find using 
experimental and longitudinal data of US entrepreneurs that effort influences 
entrepreneurial passion. This view somewhat contradicts studies by Cardon and 
colleagues (Cardon et al. 2005, 2009) claiming the reverse effect that passion 
influences entrepreneurial effort (see next subchapter). Chen et al. (2009) investigate 
the influence of entrepreneurial passion on venture capitalists’ investment decisions. 
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They find in one laboratory and one field experiment (business plan evaluations and a 
business plan competition respectively) that preparedness of the entrepreneurs is more 
important when it comes to funding decisions. Note however, that in these two settings 
no further interaction between VC and entrepreneur and therewith demonstration of 
being passionate was possible. It would be interesting to further explore this topic. 
Further, Schindehuette et al. (2006) pursue a very interesting approach and relate 
entrepreneurship to the concepts of peak performance, peak experience, and flow. 
Conducting interviews with N=140 entrepreneurs the authors find that challenges and 
experiences from entrepreneurial activity lead to peak experiences and further 
experiencing a state of flow. Given rather high stress levels of entrepreneurial careers 
other studies look at entrepreneurs' coping strategies and influence on wellbeing 
(Drnovšek et al. 2010). 
 A related stream of literature looks at negative emotions and entrepreneurial 
activity such as firm failure (Jenkins and Brundin 2009, Shepherd 2003, 2009). 
Shepherd (2003, 2009) studies the important topic of negative emotional responses to 
business failure. He suggests that entrepreneurs experience grief after losing a business 
and that those entrepreneurs experiencing high levels of grief learn less from the 
process of business failure (Shepherd 2003). He further provides a theory of grief 
recovery time after losing a family business and highlights the importance to further 
explore the phenomenon (Shepherd 2009). Building up on these propositions, Jenkins 
and Brundin (2014) empirically investigate entrepreneurs’ emotions from firm failure. 
The authors use the appraisal tendency framework to hypothesize how individuals 
respond to firm failure. The authors measure grief using a 9-item scale and also 
appraisal tendencies. A firm’s bankruptcy was used as operationalization of failure. 
They conducted N= 284 telephone interviews with owner–managers who recently 
experienced bankruptcy and received N=120 questionnaires of those managers. They 
find that entrepreneurs’ feelings after firm failure vary depending on appraisal 
tendencies. On a related note, Biniary (2012) explores the role of envy within corporate 
venturing processes in an interesting approach. Patzelt and Shepherd (2011) study 
entrepreneurs' negative experienced emotions in general and find drawing on a large 
US survey dataset (N = 2700) that self-employed individuals experience fewer 
negative emotions (depending on regulatory coping behavior). This stream of research 
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is important to get a better understanding of the emotional consequences of 
entrepreneurial decision making and further empirical studies are desirable. 
 Concluding, this field of research is very important and provides exciting future 
research opportunities. For instance, studies frequently find that entrepreneurs have a 
higher job satisfaction even though they earn less than wage employees. Further 
exploring this relation using survey or experimental methods would be interesting. In 
this thesis however I focus on immediate emotions in decision making. Hence, the next 
chapter will discuss empirical evidence on how emotions influence entrepreneurial 
decisions.  
 
II.6.2.1.1 Emotional drivers of entrepreneurial activity 
To my best knowledge five papers exist that study the role of emotions as driver of 
entrepreneurial activity in an experimental fashion (Michl 2009, Grichnik et al. 2010, 
Foo 2011, Podoynitsyna et al. 2012, Welpe et al. 2012). First, Grichnik, Smeja and 
Welpe (2010) investigate the impact of emotions on distinct phases of the 
entrepreneurial process. Precisely, they analyze the influence of joy and fear on 
entrepreneurial evaluation and exploitation in an online experiment with start-up 
employees. The authors develop their hypotheses based on the emotion-as-information 
theory stating that emotions influence the way someone processes information 
(emotions as heuristic cues) and on the concept-priming theory suggesting that 
emotions prime people's memories (Bower and Forgas 2001). Building on the 
emotion-as-information theory Grichnik at al. (2010) presume someone in a positive 
emotional state will use the emotion as extra information, evaluate the situation as less 
risky and evaluate the opportunity more positive. For the negative state the opposite 
holds. Regarding the exploitation tendency, the authors build up on the emotion-
maintenance theory by Carver (2003). Here, people thrive to reduce discrepancies 
between actual and desired states. In a positive state, the discrepancy is rather small 
and increases aversion to actions that involve risks (Grichnik et al. 2010). Negative 
emotion though increases someone’s effort to achieve a goal (Schwarz 2001). Thus, 
the authors predict that positive emotions would influence opportunity evaluation 
positively and exploitation negatively, and negative emotional states would impact 
evaluation negatively and exploitation positively.  
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 Participants of the experimental study were 146 employees from 40 
entrepreneurial firms. Originally 541 firms have been identified as young 
entrepreneurial firms and have been contacted, 40 firms volunteered to participate. Of 
the 410 firms, at least three people were asked to participate (CEOs, co-founders, 
employees). The subjects were rather young (M = 31, SD = 6.69), mostly male (70%), 
and 30% owned a significant share of the firm. Experimental instructions and the 
survey link were send out via email, they were asked to provide enough time for the 
survey and have an advice available to play a video clip. Before any manipulation, 
participants were asked questions regarding their current emotional states and 
sensibility. Unfortunately, the authors do not explain the exact questions they use. 
Then, people were assigned to one of the three conditions: watching a video clip that 
induced a joyful emotional state, a fearful emotional state, or no film. Immediately 
after watching the short movies (seven minutes), the participants (in the two video 
groups) filled out the PANAS-X scale by Watson and Clark (1994). Next, participants 
received a short (less than one page) case study introducing a product innovation that 
has been validated by experts as appropriate. After reading the case, subjects were to 
judge how promising they would evaluate the innovation and on whether they would 
judge it to be an opportunity on 5-point rating scales. The mean of these questions 
determines the variable opportunity evaluation. Three more questions were asked in 
order to determine the opportunity exploitation tendency of participants: the subjects 
had to state their willingness to invest a certain percentage (0-100%) from their own 
savings or from a loan in the product innovation (11-point rating scale), and what 
percentage of their free time they would devote. Finally, participants provided 
demographic information (Grichnik et al. 2010). 
 The authors find that positive emotion influences opportunity evaluation 
positively and subjects in a positive emotional state are less willing to exploit the 
opportunity. Subjects in the fear condition evaluated the situation less positive than the 
control group and fear negatively influences exploitation. Especially the last finding 
of a negative influence of fear on exploitation is not in line with their hypotheses. They 
draw the line to findings of negative emotions influencing creativity (Davis 2009). 
Comparing the results by Grichnik et al. (2010) with the experimental papers by Welpe 
et al. (2012) and Foo (2011) the negative relationship of fear and exploitation 
tendencies makes a lot of sense.  
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 Related, Foo (2011) studies the influence of the state emotions anger, happiness, 
fear and hope on risk perception (study 1 with N = 187 students) and the trait emotions 
anger and happiness on entrepreneurs’ risk propensity (study 2 with N = 66 
entrepreneurs). He builds up on the appraisal tendency framework (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985) in order to examine emotions’ influence on risk perceptions and risk 
preferences (or differently put opportunity evaluation). In study 1, Foo (2011) finds 
that those individuals induced to emotions with appraisal tendencies of certainty and 
control, i.e. anger and happiness, estimated the risk for a new venture to be lower 
whereas participants that have been induced to fear and hope, i.e. emotions 
characterized by appraisal tendencies of uncertainty and lack of control, stated higher 
risk estimates. Study 2 concludes that the entrepreneurs’ who had higher scores on 
trait anger and happiness scales preferred to invest in a venture with higher but also 
uncertain outcome. Foo’s (2011) findings are very interesting and certainly contribute 
to the literature on how emotions influence entrepreneurs’ decision making. However, 
at some parts it is difficult to understand the exact experimental design and both studies 
where not incentive compatible so that replicating Foo’s study yields caveats. Foo 
(2011) already discussed the limitation of the student sample in study 1 for making 
general statements about entrepreneurial decision making from this part of the study. 
His findings from study 1 are very interesting regarding the question whether one 
should pursue a valence approach or not. Fear and anger being of same valence result 
in exact opposite risk evaluations, hence a pure valence approach is not suitable when 
studying emotions influence in the domain of decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. This is in line with findings from Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001). 
 Welpe et al. (2012) study the influence of state emotions on opportunity 
recognition and exploitation. In two studies, students were asked to imagine a specific 
entrepreneurial situation associated with either high or low profits and high or low 
probability of success (3x2 design with high, low, and uncertain probabilities and high 
and low profits). Subsequently, the subjects answered to the PANAS-X emotion 
questionnaires (Watson & Clark, 1994) for joy (seven items) and fear (six items in 
study 1, and joy, fear and anger (three items) in study 2. Building up on the affect-as-
information hypothesis (Schwarz and Clore 2007) they expect fear to negatively 
impact a person’s tendency to exploit an entrepreneurial situation and both happiness 
and anger to positively impact exploitation tendencies. Surveying 138 MBA and 
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entrepreneurship students (1) and 178 students (2) they find that both evaluation and 
emotions influence exploitation tendencies. Joy and anger increase exploitation 
whereas fear decreases it. Further, emotions influence the impact of evaluation on 
exploitation with joy and anger increasing and fear decreasing the impact. These 
findings are in line with the findings by Grichnik et al. (2010). 
 These findings are consistent with Baron’s (2008) model who predicts anger and 
joy to have an approach oriented function whereas fear is an avoidance oriented 
emotion. This is also in line with the study by Foo (2011) and Lerner and Keltner 
(2000, 2001). Besides not being an incentive compatible economic experiment the 
above study provides a very rigor experimental design and contributes largely to the 
empirical research on entrepreneurial emotions. Building up on Welpe et al. (2012) 
findings it would be interesting to run the questionnaire experiment with real 
entrepreneurs and moreover to actually manipulate the emotions fear, anger, and joy 
using for instance relived emotions or film clips as in Grichnik et al. (2010). 
 One interesting approach to mixed emotions is the study by Podoynitsyna, Van 
der Bij, and Song (2012) who investigate the role of mixed emotions on 
entrepreneurial risk perception. Drawing on a sample of N=253 venture owners 
(mailing through the VentureOne list) the authors present hypothetical scenarios 
describing a strategic situation involving high risk. They ask the participants to 
evaluate the situation by the extent to which 16 emotion adjectives that are described 
made them feel. Podoynitsyna et al. (2012) find mixed emotions to influence risk 
perception. Moreover, after controlling for basic emotions conflicting emotions seem 
to be a predictor of a more cautious behavior.  
 Closely related to the above studies, Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) investigate the 
important question of how hybrid entrepreneurs allocate their time, i.e., how much 
time individuals who start a business while still being employed devote to their new 
business and how much they spend working for their employer. The authors 
experimentally test two predictions: a rational approach on a utility framework and 
one rather emotional approach based on a person’s promotion and prevention focus. 
They measure risk preferences and also individuals’ prevention focus (someone’s 
tendency to focus on avoiding negative events) and promotion focus (someone’s focus 
on potential gains from a decision). In an incentivized economic experiment with both 
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students and entrepreneurs Burmeister-Lamp et al (2012) find that entrepreneurs’ 
behavior is better described by their promotion and prevention focus rather than by the 
rational standard economic model predictions. Students on the other hand can be well 
described by the rational model. The authors can conclude that entrepreneurs appear 
to decide more emotional than students when facing time allocation problems. This is 
to my knowledge the only incentive compatible experiment in the field.  
 Concluding, a hand full of interesting studies investigating emotions and 
entrepreneurs’ decision making have been published over the past five years. Scholars 
moreover call for more research on emotions in entrepreneurship research (Shepherd 
2015, Cardon et al. 2012). Building up on existing theories from psychology and 
economics it is important to empirically investigate whether entrepreneurs are special 
regarding their decision process and emotional influences. Since most of the studies 
discussed in this chapter have been conducted with students rather than with real 
entrepreneurs and the experimental designs are not incentive compatible (important 
exception: Burmeister-Lamp et al. 2012) it is important to provide data that overcomes 
this issue. We hope to contribute to this gap with our study in part IV. 
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III.1 Methodological foundations 
Homo oeconomicus, noun, masculine 
- never seen in nature 
(Discussion on rationality in ‘The European’) 
 
III.1.1  Experiments as research paradigm 
In the 1960s, philosopher Karl Popper coined the term ‘Critical rationalism’ as a 
theoretical framework that combines both induction and deduction (Popper 1959). 
Scholars develop testable hypotheses from theory that in turn are empirically tested. 
From Popper’s (1959) point of view, scientific theory should be subject to rational 
criticism and empirical testing in order to falsify hypotheses. One excellent empirical 
approach to testing theory-backed hypotheses is experimental research. Using 
experiments as a research method has the advantages of being able to control variables, 
explicitly test hypotheses, and establish causal relationships (Campbell and Stanley 
1963, Schade and Burmeister-Lamp 2009, p.91 ff.). Moreover, experiments are an 
excellent tool for challenging and empirically testing the assumption of the homo 
oeconomicus model. Controlled experiments allow explicit testing of predictions from 
theory and studying behavior. This is also important for policy questions since 
experiments allow testing for instance interventions or implementation of markets 
such as matching markets (Kagel and Roth 2000). 
 An ongoing methodological debate exists about the use of laboratory experiments 
in the social sciences (see e.g., Levitt and List 2007, Falk and Heckman 2009, List, 
2009, Henrich et al. 2010, Bardsley et al. 2009). Henrich et al. (2010) complain that 
“behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and 
behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies.” (p. 61). They 
may well have a point saying that some experimental studies might claim 
generalizability that is not justified and it is necessary for advancement of this field of 
research to conduct more replications of empirical studies. However, I believe the 
statement by Henrich et al. (2010) to be fairly exaggerated. In 2010, the Journal of 
Experimental Psychology published a special issue on ‘Issues in the Methodology of 
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Experimental Economics’ (edited by Rosser & Eckel 2010). Authors including Vernon 
Smith, Werner Güth, and Elinor Ostrom discuss important critics and relevance. This 
discussion is important to guarantee good practice of experimentalists so that results 
remain reliable (see Bardsley et al. 2009 for an interesting overview). One point that 
is oftentimes criticized is using students as subjects. Inviting students has naturally 
certain benefits such as being easily available, or having a steep learning curve. On the 
other hand, this means that the empirical foundation of many domains in economic 
decision making is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected student 
participants (Falk et al. 2011, Friedman and Sunder 1994). Potential problems arise if 
students who participate in laboratory experiment differ systematically from non-
students and also from students who do not sign up for experiments. Falk et al. (2011) 
find using a large dataset (N=16,666) of donation choices that for social preferences 
self-selected students do not differ from other students. Moreover, they find that 
students and non-students behave very similar in other to the participant pool similar 
trust experiments. Hence, the choice of subjects very much depends on your research 
question (see also Gaechter 2010). 
 Experiments are further especially suited for research in a very dynamic 
environment such as entrepreneurial decision making. High dynamics threaten the 
reliability of relationships so that using experimentation allows controlling for certain 
factors or noise (Schade 2005). Moreover, using experiments as empirical method is 
especially suited for emotion research. First, alternatives are rather limited. Simply, 
very little data sets on peoples’ emotions exist. One exception is panel studies 
measuring individuals’ wellbeing or life satisfaction in data sets such as the SOEP, the 
WHO, or the World Valued Survey. Note however that such studies deal with the 
broader concepts of wellbeing or satisfaction and not with induced emotional states, 
i.e., with what this thesis is concerned with. Second, using questionnaire surveys as a 
method would be an option however imposes several limitations. A major drawback 
of survey methods is that they cannot be incentivized. Inducing emotions in field 
experiments implies potential ethical problems. In the next section, I will introduce the 
special characteristics of economic experiments and methodological challenges. 
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III.1.2  Economic experiments 
The use of laboratory experiments has a long history in economics and received 
growing acceptance in the economic community over the past years. For instance, 
Hamermesh (2013) analyzes 748 refereed articles in the American Economic Review 
(AER), Journal of Political Economy (JPE), and Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(QJE), for one year in each decade from 1960-2010. He discovers that the percentage 
of experimental papers increased from 3.7 percent in 1993 and 2003 to 8.2 percent in 
2011 (p. 168). Nobel prize winner Al Roth points out that the first economic 
experiments date back to the 1930s and received increasing attention around the time 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern publishing their ‘Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior’ in 1944 (Kagel and Roth 1995). In the 1960s and 1970s, the field grew 
increasingly and was dominated by experimentalists in Germany (Heinz Sauermann, 
Reinhard Selten, and Reinhard Tietz) and the US (Charles Plott and Vernon Smith). 
For an overview of the history of experimental economics, please refer to Kagel and 
Roth (1995). 
Within the framework of economic experiments, participants are rewarded with 
real monetary outcomes and preferences are elicited via incentive compatible 
mechanisms (Campbell and Stanley 1963). This is in line with induced-value theory 
(Smith 1976) in order to gain experimental control over participants’ characteristics. 
Smith (1976) identifies three sufficient conditions: First, participants must prefer more 
reward to less without becoming satiated (monotonicity). Second, the reward has to be 
dependent on the agent’s choices (and potentially the choices of other players in the 
experiment) (salience). Third, agents’ utility changes only according to the reward, 
other influences are neglect able (dominance) (see Friedman and Sunder 1994 for 
further discussion and examples).   
 The strength of economic experiments as introduced by Nobel Prize winners 
Vernon Smith (2002) and Reinhard Selten (1994)8 is that they are incentive compatible 
and hence elicit the decision makers’ real preferences (Smith 1976, Selten 1993, 
Friedman and Sunder 1994, Kagel and Roth 1995, Schade 2005). A further important 
                                                 
8 Note that Reinhard Selten was awarded the Nobelprize for his theoretical work on the 
analysis of equilibria in non-cooperative games and not for his brilliant early work on 
economic laboratory experiments. 
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criterion is randomization to ensure that the differences between and within groups are 
not systematic (Friedman and Sunder 1994, Kagel and Roth 1995). Well-designed 
experiments ideally are internally and externally valid, whereas validity means the 
extent of a test measuring what it claims to measure. Internal validity raises the 
question of causality of variables, asking: Did the experimental treatment make a 
behavioral difference so that we can rule out alternative explanations? External 
validity is also called generalizability, asking the question whether the observed effect 
can be generalized to different populations, settings, or variables (Campbell and 
Stanley 1963, Friedman and Sunder 1994). Typically, laboratory experiments have a 
very high internal validity as compared to other methods and a comparably less strong 
external validity. Any empirical researcher faces a tricky trade-off between both types 
of validity. Using laboratory experiments in an artificial set up enables testing a direct 
and causal relationship between independent and dependent variables that may be less 
externally valid. Large field studies provide very externally valid results however 
oftentimes lack internal validity in the sense that you cannot ensure that the observed 
effect steams from your treatment. Hence, it always depends on the degree of 
dynamics, relevance of personality or experience, and relevance of incentives when 
deciding what empirical method to use (for an extensive discussion see Schade 2005).  
Several factors are potentially problematic for internal and external validity and 
ideally need to be controlled for in laboratory experiments (for a comprehensive 
discussion see Campbell and Stanley 1963). First, certain events between several 
measurements may be problematic for causality (history effects). For instance, if the 
different experimental sessions are carried out over several weeks some event that 
happened during that time may alter the response. Further, one needs to be aware of 
possible maturation effects, for instance individuals growing hungrier during the day 
(one can control for this with conducting experimental sessions in the morning, mid-
day and evening). Moreover, potential testing effects may occur, e.g., effects resulting 
from testing risk attitudes on subsequent measurements. An easy way to control for 
this is to randomize the order of tasks. Instrumentation in the sense of altering for 
example the observers can also change findings so that it is important to not change 
the experimental conditions during the data collection. The possibility of respondents 
dropping out of experiments (experimental mortality) especially in repeated designs 
has obviously to be accounted for. Further, selection biases when assigning 
79 
participants to treatment ad control groups need to be controlled for with randomizing 
the selection process (e.g., assigning random seat numbers to people entering a 
laboratory). One statistical phenomenon potentially troubling internal validity is 
regression to the mean. It occurs when your sample or groups are drawn nonrandom 
from a population, an extreme group is selected and if then measured again, the mean 
will be closer to the mean for all subjects than the first. Finally, experimentalists need 
to be careful when interpreting results and ruling out the possibility of phenomena 
such as selection-maturation interaction. Regarding external validity, one needs to be 
careful about participants’ responsiveness to experimental tests as prior tests such as 
pretests influence respondents’ behavior as compared to untested participants. 
Recruiting systems such as ORSEE (Greiner 2015) make it possible for the 
experimenter to invite exactly the sample one desires (e.g., only music students that 
have never before participated in an experiment). Moreover, selection biases can be 
problematic for the interpretation of the observed effect. By nature, certain variables 
may have a different effect in experiments than they would have to persons in non-
experimental settings (reactive effects in experimental settings). Last, whenever 
multiple treatments on the same person are used one needs to be aware of the influence 
of first treatments on later ones (multiple-treatment interference) (Campbell and 
Stanley 1963). Generalizability of results is most often problematic whenever 
experiments are carried out with small samples or very specific samples, in one 
geographical location, or in very idiosyncratic environments generally. Good 
experimental designs are strong in both regards, internal and external validity, 
however, some factors can never be fully overcome (Campbell and Stanley 1963).   
In general and concluding, conducting both laboratory and field experiments, 
analyzing survey data and using standard econometric methods in combination should 
be the greatest benefit for the social sciences whereas arguments about what method 
is superior may rather hinder progress (see also List and Heckman 2009). In the present 
thesis, we pursue an experimental approach as for our research questions this is most 
suitable. Part V discusses alternative methodological approaches and compares.   
80 
III.2 Inducing emotions in the laboratory – Developing a database of 
film clips 
A crucial aspect when conducting research on emotions is how to reliably induce them. 
This is not a trivial endeavor. Consider the following example: In the context of the 
recent discussion about a ‘replication crisis’ of laboratory experiments9, Camerer et 
al. (2016) replicated all of the 18 experimental studies published in the American 
Economic Review (AER) and the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) from 2011-
2014. Amongst the replicated experiments is the only experimental study on emotions 
and economic choices published in the AER so far – a study by Ifcher and Zarghamee 
(2011) showing that positive mood influences time preferences. Interestingly, Camerer 
et al. (2016) were not able to replicate the results of Ifcher and Zarghamee. The 
question is why. As Camerer et al. (2016) state: “Mood induction is the key in this 
experiment. It had the intended effect on affect in the original article (…). In the 
replication study, mood inducement did not have the intended effect on affect.” (p.4, 
additional materials10). For mood induction, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) used a short 
clip of stand-up comedian Robin Williams (positive mood) as compared to a 
(seemingly) neutral scene (a documentary about the Denali Wildlife). However, the 
main character of the film clip expected to induce happiness in the original study, 
Robin Williams, died tragically in 2014 – before the replication study took place – by 
committing suicide. Camerer at al. (2016) observed that 11 out of 86 respondents felt 
sadder after watching the Robin Williams clip and 90% of subjects in the happiness 
treatment knew that Robin Williams had previously died. Further, I believe the images 
of the Denali Wild Park may not be perceived as neutral but rather positive to some 
audiences11.  
 The present discussion about the replicability of experimental studies 
demonstrates the importance of choosing the right methods and materials to induce 
                                                 
9 for a discussion see e.g., Maxwell et al. 2015 
10 Additional material, replication reports, and all data 18 of studies that were replicated by 
Camerer et al. (2016) can be found here: https://experimentaleconreplications.com/ 
11 You may refer to Appendix A, for an image of the Denali National Park and build your own 
opinion whether you perceive the scenery as neutral or rather positive.   
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emotions. The current study carefully tests material and methods to induce emotions 
in order to develop a database of appropriate film clips for a German audience. 
 
III.2.2.1 Emotion elicitation 
Scholars interested in emotion research have used different methods to elicit emotions 
in the laboratory. One can distinguish between eight domains of emotion elicitation 
tools according to the ‘Handbook of emotion elicitation’ (Coan and Allen 2007): static 
photos (Lang 1979) and facial expressions (Ekman, Levenson and Friesen 1983), 
relived emotions (Levenson 2007, Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross 2007, Foo, 2011), 
interaction with trained people (Ax 1953), music and singing (Sutherland, Newman 
and Rachman 1982), acoustic startle reflex (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1990), startle 
eye blink modulation (Levenson 2007), directed facial action tasks (Ekman 2007), and 
film clips (Gross and Levenson 1995, Rottenberg, Ray and Gross 2007). Each of the 
elicitation methods imposes certain advantages and disadvantages that I will discuss 
in the following.  
 Static photos either in form of pictures used from a large database such as the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) or pictures of emotional faces work 
quite well for positive, negative and neutral emotions. However, only a limited range 
of emotions can be elicited. Thus, for our approach of eliciting specific emotions (such 
as fear and happiness) using static photos is less favorable. Next, relived emotions 
have been used both with autobiographical memories (e.g., Foo 2011) as well as with 
shared memories, like recalling a memory that made the participant especially angry. 
This has been applied in most studies from the entrepreneurship literature, see for 
example Foo (2011). Recalling memories results in good ecological validity, is 
engaging and personally salient. However it also has the disadvantage that it is 
idiographic, i.e., varies from participant to participant and cannot be standardized 
(Coan and Allen 2007). Dyadic interactions mean that in laboratory or field settings a 
trained person interviews the participant and aims to provoke a certain emotion. This 
method is very naturalistic but also very idiosyncratic. More, music has been used in 
order to elicit emotions in a range of studies (Clark 1983). Researchers highlight that 
even though music effectively induces emotions individual differences plus 
differential responding to music oftentimes pose problems (Västfall 2002). Further, 
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using the acoustic startle reflex method you record a reaction to a certain stimulus 
(Lang et al. 1990). A large eye blink implies a negative emotion whereas a small eye 
blink implies a positive emotion. Here again one can only distinguish the valence of 
an emotion. Other, directed facial action tasks can also elicit emotions. Here, you ask 
the participants to put their facial muscles in the configuration associated with an 
emotion (e.g. corner of lips up or down) what signals the respective emotion to the 
brain (Ekman 2007). Given the advantages and disadvantages of the previous 
elicitation methods we chose to use film clips as means of emotion induction in the 
following experimental studies.  
 Films as method for inducing emotions in the laboratory have already been used 
in the 1960s and 70s in order to evoke different levels of intensity of emotional states 
and stress (e.g., Lazarus et al. 1972, Notarius and Levenson 1972). Moreover, scholars 
interested in eliciting discrete emotions like anger (Brown et al. 1977) or fear 
(Mewborn and Rogers, 1979) have used films as method as well. Using film clips has 
the desirable property of being dynamic rather than static and being readily 
standardized. However, one limitation is the question of which set of stimuli to use. In 
the next chapters I will give an overview of and discuss studies that have identified 
film clips for inducing emotions in the laboratory in the past. Further, an own database 
of film clips is developed.  
  
III.2.2.2 Existing film sets to elicit basic emotions 
Ample scholars from psychology have addressed the question which film clips to use 
in a laboratory to elicit emotions. In the following, I will summarize the findings of 
these studies and as a basis for an own database identify relevant movie clips for our 
target emotions happiness, fear, and for neutral scenes.  
 Lazarus, Speisman, Mordkoff, and Davidson (1962) were one of the first scholars 
to introduce motion picture film into the laboratory in order to induce – in their study 
– psychological stress. McHugo, Smith, and Lanzetta (1982) pioneered in showing 
participants various film clips and let them rate their feelings on a modified 
Differential Emotions Scale (DES) and identified three clusters: fearful-anxious, 
disgusted-scornful, and amused-warmhearted. Further, Tomarken, Davidson and 
Henriques (1990) used short film clips to elicit positive and negative affect. They used 
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baseline electroencephalographic (EEG) measures in order to assess whether resting 
EEG asymmetry predicts affective responses. N=32 female subjects watched five 
(cohort 1) or eight (cohort 2) films clips (duration 45-120 seconds) in color. All clips 
were silent. The first cohort watched first a video targeting a neutral state 
(unfortunately Tomarken et al. (1990) do not provide further explanation on the 
stimulus), then two positive clips (a puppy playing with flowers and monkey playing 
and taking a bath), and two negative clips (depicting an amputation of a leg and a burn 
victim, scenes taken from training videos for nurses). Cohort 2 watched two positive 
stimuli and six negative stimuli, whereas two clips were designed to target each of the 
discrete emotions sadness, anger, and disgust. Here, clips were taken from 
commercially available films selected from a pool of originally 40 clips that were rated 
by N=122 undergraduates in groups of 10 to 15 (9 point rating scale). The study does 
not provide the film names (only stating e.g. The Godfather, see p. 794). However, 
Hewig et al. (2005) reported to have used all clips from the set developed by Tomarken 
et al (1990): On Golden Pond, An Officer and a gentleman, for positive valence, and 
Ghandi, Witness, The Godfather, Mari’s Lover, An Officer and a gentleman, The 
Killing Fields (see Hewig et al. 2005, p.1098-99). Clips were shown in random order 
and each clip preceded a short synopsis. EEG was recorded in both cohorts. For a 
further discussion of frontal asymmetry results please refer to Tomarken et al. (1990).  
 Gross and Levenson (1995) identified a set of films eliciting eight discrete 
emotions (amusement, anger, contentment, disgust, fear, neutral, sadness, surprise). 
They considered a pool of 250 movies that had been nominated by a group of film 
critics, video store employees and film fans. This procedure resulted in 78 films that 
were then shown to 494 undergraduate students at an US university in group film 
viewing sessions (31 groups). Each subject watched ten films. After each film they 
had to complete a questionnaire asking about their emotional states and how much 
they felt each of the following emotions on a 9-point scale. In each group there were 
no two films shown that would target the same emotion and maximum three films 
targeting the same valence were shown in a row. Each group session started with a 
film that was known to arouse relatively low levels of contentment. Gross and 
Levenson (1995) evaluated the films according to their intensity, being the mean level 
at which the emotion was rated (note that they already targeted each film with a 
concrete emotion that was found to be the case in 74 out of 78 films). Discreteness was 
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measured by a hit rate index, i.e., the percentage of subjects who said that they had 
had experienced the target emotion more intensely than the other emotions. These two 
scores combined represent the success index and lead two the following 
recommendations for eliciting eight discrete emotions in the lab. For amusement the 
films are: When Harry met Sally (M=5.54) and Robin Williams live (M=5.86). Fear 
was best evoked with scenes from The Shining (M=4.08) and Silence of the Lambs 
(M=4.24). Two videos depicting abstract shapes and color bars have been identified 
as neutral (mean emotion ratings of smaller than 2 points on each emotion dimension). 
Please see Gross and Levenson (1995), p. 94, table 1 for an overview of all clips. 
 Interestingly, the authors find that women and people who had seen the respective 
movie before showed greater levels of intensity of target emotions. Amongst the eight 
emotions there are considerable differences concerning the intensity and discreteness 
of responses, ranging from rates larger than 80 percent for amusement, disgust, and 
sadness to considerably lower rates for the films eliciting anger (22 / 42 percent). 
Moreover, the different states differ in levels of intensity with disgust, amusement, 
anger, and sadness being elicited more intensely than surprise, fear and contentment. 
Thus, it seems that anger, contentment and especially fear are more difficult to elicit. 
This might be the case because for instance when being asked for their emotions one 
would rather circle happiness than contentment, or simply the films did not work well 
in eliciting the targeted emotions. In conclusion, even though one has to be careful 
when using videos to elicit emotions, the work by Gross and Levenson (1995) provides 
a reliable and carefully tested set of films. Unfortunately, they ‘only’ provide two clips 
per emotion and their subject pool are US college students. Hence, we cannot use these 
recommendations immediately but the findings serve as excellent base for an own 
dataset. 
 More recently, Hewig et al. (2005) revised existing film sets (Gross and Levenson 
1995 and Tomarken et al. 1990) for inducing basic emotions, and explicitly included 
neutral clips that are more comparable to the clips targeting discrete emotions. Rather 
than using abstract forms, they include clips from commercially available films 
targeting neutral states. Overall, 20 clips (four neutral, four clips targeting anger, and 
each three clips targeting disgust, fear, amusement and sadness) were first selected and 
then shown to N=38 subjects. The films were shown in German language in four group 
viewings. The participants watched 20 film clips on a television whereas each session 
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started with a (supposedly) neutral clip and no clips of the same target emotion were 
shown in a row. After watching the clips participants answered an inventory consisting 
of 21 emotion-related items (happiness, pleasure, amusement, hope, affection, desire, 
sympathy, relief, boredom, frustration, anger, rage, sadness, fear, disgust, shame, guilt) 
on a 10-point scale. Hewig et al. (2005) identified at least two clips to elicit the specific 
target emotion whereas they always included those items that corresponded most 
closely to the target emotion, i.e., for the anger clips rage and anger and for the 
happiness clips amusement, pleasure and happiness were included. The film clips 
When Harry met Sally and An Officer and a Gentleman yielded the highest rating for 
the happiness/amusement stimuli. The fear stimuli Halloween and Silence of the lambs 
yielded the highest ratings. For all four neutral stimuli (All the presidents’ men, Hanna 
and her sisters, Crimes and misdemeanors, and The Last Emperor) the highest mean 
was below 2.5. This provides a very useful base for our study. However, we need two 
and four clips respectively for each emotion for the experimental studies in chapter IV 
so that we need to validate new clips.  
 Furthermore, some studies exist that develop databases in other speaking 
languages than English and German. Philippot (1993) conducted a validation study 
with N=60 students (35 female, 25 male) in Belgium. Twelve movie excerpts aimed 
to elicit six specific emotions (joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and neutral state). The 
movies were shown with French subtitles whenever the original version was not 
French. The movies targeting happiness, fear, and neutral state were two clips from Le 
magnifique (French comedy parody); Psycho and Halloween, and two documentaries, 
respectively. Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, and Philippot (2010) developed a new and 
comprehensive set of film clips. They chose ten film scenes (identified out of 824 film 
excerpts rated by 50 film rental store managers) for the target emotions fear, anger, 
sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, and neutral scenes. N=364 French speaking 
students viewed the clips in individual sessions in the laboratory in French language. 
The authors proceeded in the same way as described above (neutral scene first, no two 
scenes of one valence in a row) and for each person ten clips were shown in row. Each 
clip was preceded by a 2.5 minutes relaxation procedure. After each clip, participants 
completed questionnaires about their emotional states (DES (Izard et al. 1974) and 
PANAS (Watson et al. 1988)) on a 7 point scale.. The authors report the following 
scenes ranked highest on the target emotion amusement: Les trois frères, The Dinner 
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Game, La cite de la peur and The visitors. Scenes evoking fear were The Blair Witch 
Project and The Shining (mean 2.93 and 2.77 respectively).   
 Fernandez Megias, Mateos, Ribaudi, and Fernandez-Abascal (2011) validated a 
Spanish version of a dataset of films to induce differentiated basic emotions. 57 scenes 
of Spanish dubbed films targeting seven emotions (anger, fear, sadness, disgust, 
amusement, tenderness and neutral scenes) were tested with N=127 subjects. The 
authors identified When Harry met Sally and Here comes Mary as highest ranked on 
amusement (diversion in Spanish), Scream 2, The Blair Witch Project and The 
Exorcist had highest ratings on the target emotion fear, and four neutral scenes 
depicting Sticks and documentary scenes (see Table 1 in Fernandez Megia et al. (2011) 
in Spanish for further clips). This battery of clips was afterwards employed by 
Fernandez, Pascual, Soler, Elices, Portella, and Abascal (2012) in order to elicit 
physiological responses.  
 Moreover, Carvalho, Leite, Galdo-Alvarez, and Goncalves (2012) aimed to 
develop a database of film clips without auditory content. They selected 52 clips and 
showed them to N=113 people. They also measured the heart rate and skin 
conductance level of N=32 volunteers. The authors showed excerpts of horror movies 
and erotic scenes to participants and measured the dimensions valence, arousal, and 
dominance rather than discrete emotions. Gamboa, Silva, and Fred (2013) just recently 
designed a database (called HiMotion) that provides cognitive tasks and a video set 
for affective elicitation. They aim to provide a more homogenous database for video 
clips (comparable picture and audio stimuli, such as the IAPS or IADS). They 
collected 14 videos targeting the six emotional states amusement / happiness (clips are 
When Harry met Sally, and Officer), anger, disgust, fear (clips are Lambs and Shining), 
sadness, surprise, and neutral states. The experimental procedure followed Hewig et 
al. (2005) and Rottenberg et al. (2007). 
 In 2007, Rottenberg, Ray and Gross wrote a chapter on emotion elicitation using 
films in ‘The Handbook of emotion elicitation and assessment’ (Coan and Allen 2007). 
The authors identify Philippot (1993) and Gross and Levenson (1995) as the two 
notable databases for film clips eliciting emotional states. They give recommendations 
on how to elicit emotions in the laboratory using films. In our own study, we follow 
their guidelines. Moreover they recommend a set of films to use, based on Gross and 
Levenson (1995). For the target emotion happiness, Rottenberg et al. (2007) advice to 
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use When Harry met Sally, Robin Williams live, Bill Cosby, and Whose line Is It, 
Anyway?. For fear, they recommend scenes from The Shining and Silence of the lambs. 
Clips targeting neutral states were again a documentary on the Denali National Park 
and Abstract Shapes. It is important that Rottenberg et al. (2007) differentiate between 
plain neutral (Sticks) and pleasant neutral (Denali), i.e., clips that elicit low levels of 
contentment. With plain neutral scenes, there is the threat that participants get bored 
or frustrated so that the authors favor pleasant neutral clips as baseline.  
 Concluding, based on the above discussion short film clips serve as a promising 
tool to elicit discrete emotions in the laboratory. However, some remarks to the 
existing tools remain for various reasons. First, Gross and Levenson and Philippot 
(1993) as well as Schaefer et al. (2007) use English and French clips and target an US 
American and French audience respectively. The German participant would 
presumably be not as amused by watching US standup comedians or French comedies 
as the US or French student. Moreover, we need to identify two and four clips 
respectively for each of our target emotion in chapter IV.1 and IV.2. Hence, we need 
to develop our own set of film clips targeting the emotions happiness, fear, and neutral 
state. Table III.1 below summarizes film clips targeting our emotions that have been 
used in prior studies. 
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Table III-1: Summary - recommendations for film clips 
 
Target emotion Film clip Paper 
happiness/ 
amusement 
When Harry met Sally Gross and Levenson 1995, Hewig 
et al. 2005, Rottenberg et al. 2007, 
Fernandez Megias et al. 2012, 
Carvalho et al. 2013  
On Golden Pond Tomarken et al. 1990, Hewig et al. 
2005  
An Officer and a Gentleman Tomarken et al. 1990, Hewig et al. 
2005, Carvalho et al. 2013  
Robin Williams live Gross and Levenson 1995, 
Rottenberg et al. 2007  
Bill Cosby Rottenberg et al. 2007  
Whose line Is It? Rottenberg et al. 2007  
Le magnifique Philippot 1993  
Les trois frères Schaefer et al. 2010  
The Dinner Game Schaefer et al. 2010 
  Here comes Mary  Fernandez Megias et al. 2012 
fear The Shining Gross and Levenson 1995, 
Rottenberg et al. 2007, Schaefer et 
al. 2010, Carvalho et al. 2013  
Silence of the Lambs Gross and Levenson 1995, 
Rottenberg et al. 2007, Schaefer et 
al. 2010, Carvalho et al. 2013  
Psycho Philippot 1993  
Halloween Philippot 1993, Hewig et al. 2005  
The Blair Witch Project Schaefer et al. 2010, Fernandez 
Megias et al. 2012 
  Scream 2 Fernandez Megias et al. 2012 
neutral Abstract shapes Gross and Levenson 1995, 
Rottenberg et al. 2007  
Color bars  Gross and Levenson 1995   
Denali National Park Rottenberg et al. 2007  
All the presidents’ men Hewig et al. 2005  
Hanna and her sisters Hewig et al. 2005  
Crimes and misdem. Hewig et al. 2005 
  The Last Emperor Hewig et al. 2005 
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III.2.3 Validating an own set of film clips  
We run two rounds of laboratory sessions in order to identify four film clips for each 
target emotion (happiness, fear, and neutral control). All sessions were conducted in 
the laboratory at Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin in July and September 2014. In the 
first round we were successful in identifying four clips targeting fear and happiness 
each. However, all clips that we chose based on older studies that would presumably 
evoke a neutral state were rather perceived as very happy, joyful, and amusing (up to 
point 6 on a scale from 0 to 8). In the following, I will first describe the sample and 
material of both rounds of experimental sessions. Further I will report and discuss the 
results and finally present our set of clips. 
III.2.3.1 Material 
The first film set included 32 film clips with each 8 clips targeting the emotions 
happiness and fear as well as 8 clips aiming to elicit neutral states. The choice of clips 
was based on the results by Gross and Levenson (1995), Rottenberg et al. (2007), as 
well as Hewig et al. (2005). The length of all movies varied between 62 and 188 
seconds. All clips were presented in German language. For a full description of the 
scenes, length and sources please see tables III.2-4. 
 We picked eight scenes targeting happiness based on past studies. Amongst these, 
the clip that has been used most often in past studies is the famous ‘breakfast scene’ 
from the movie When Harry met Sally. We added two scenes from very successful 
German movies since the target group would be a German audience: Pappa ante 
portas (Loriot) and Der Schuh des Manitu (Bully Herbig). More, we added two scenes 
from the popular comedy show Big Bang Theory: the opening scene from the episode 
‘Fun with flags’ and a scene depicting the characters Sheldon and Penny in the hospital 
‘The Adhesive Duck Deficiency’. Further, we included the ‘wakeup’ scene from the 
very successful movie Hangover, and two scenes from rather classic comical movies, 
Woody Allen’s Hanna and her sisters and The Naked Gun, see table below for an 
overview. 
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Table III-2: Video clips for target emotion happiness 
Target emotion: happiness 
No. Clip title Length 
17 When Harry met Sally (breakfast scene) 02:16 
18 The Hangover (waking up / tiger in bathroom) 03:08 
19 Manitou's Shoe (Bully Herbig) 01:50 
20 Big Bang Theory (Penny and Sheldon hospital) 02:07 
21 Big Bang Theory (Fun with flags) 01:13 
22 Naked gun (Sex Frank?) 02:12 
23 Woody Allen (Conversation) 02:38 
24 Loriot (Pappa ante portas) 01:44 
 
 
Furthermore, for the target emotion fear we chose eight scenes from psycho thrillers 
and horror movies. We opted for scenes creating a tense and frightening atmosphere 
rather than scenes depicting killings or lots of blood for ethical reasons. We used 
scenes from The Shining and Silence of the lambs following Gross and Levenson 
(1995), Rottenberg et al. (2007), and Hewig et al. (2005). Moreover, we used two 
classic Hitchcock movie scenes (The Birds and Psycho), scenes from The Blair Witch 
Project (following Feinstein et al. (2011)), Mirrors, Insidious, and one scene from 
Lord of the Rings, for an overview see table below:  
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Table III-3: Video clips for target emotion fear 
Target emotion: anxiety 
No. Clip title Length 
9 Shining 00:47 
10 Silence of lambs 01:39 
11 The Blairwitch Project 00:48 
12 Insidious 01:59 
13 Mirrors 01:48 
14 Hitchcock, Psycho 01:47 
15 Hitchcock, Birds 01:19 
16 Lord of the rings 01:35 
 
For the neutral clips, we carried out two rounds of eights clips as we could not 
successfully identify four clips from our first dataset. In study 1, we chose a court 
scene from ‘All the presidents’ men’ following Hewig et al. (2005), and several scenes 
out of documentaries about the ocean, desert, or the forest, amongst others. This choice 
was based on the clips used in studies published in A+ journals such as Loewenstein 
et al. (2003) and Ifcher and Zhargamee (2011) who used clips about the Great Barrier 
Reef or the Denali National Park respectively for eliciting neutral states.  
   
92 
 
Table III-4: Video clips neutral scenes I 
Target emotion: neutral 
No. Clip title Length 
1 Adria 01:12 
2 All the presidents’ men 01:02 
3 Birds’ travels 01:47 
4 Our blue planet 01:12 
5 Mythos wood 01:44 
6 Waterfalls 01:22 
7 The desert 01:24 
8 Kaukasus 01:21 
 
Since the only movie that resulted in a neutral perception (i.e., mean values smaller 
than 2) was the scene ‘All the presidents’ men’ we decided to replicate the pretest with 
a new set of clips targeting neutral scenes. This time, we did not use documentaries 
about beautiful landscapes, naturally, but scenes from movies that could be identified 
as neutral (scenes from ‘All the Presidents’ men’, ‘The last emperor’, ‘The Network’, 
‘Jane Eyre’, and ‘North by Northwest’). We also tested some documentaries about 
rather ‘boring’ topics (about fishing, a large cargo ship, and a locomotive). For a 
summary see table below:  
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Table III-5: Video clips neutral scenes II 
Target emotion: neutral 2.0 
No. Clip title Length 
1 All the presidents’ men 01:02 
2 The Last Emperor 01:20 
3 North by Northwest  01:05 
4 The Network 00:55 
5 Locomotive  01:14 
6 Fishing documentary 01:10 
7 Jane Eyre 00:57 
8 Freighter  01:03 
 
Each participant answered a post film questionnaire after each clip. Following 
Rottenberg et al. (2007), we asked first to indicate how the participant felt while 
watching the film on a 9 point scale ranging from not at all to very much for the 
emotions: amusement, anger, anxiety, confusion, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, 
fear, guilt, happiness, interest, joy, love, pride, sadness, shame, surprise, unhappiness. 
Moreover, we asked what they thought which emotion the average of people might 
have felt, how pleasant they experienced watching the movie in general, whether they 
had seen the movie before, and whether they closed their eyes. Finally, each person 
answered demographic questions.   
 
III.2.3.2 Procedure 
In round 1, seven sessions were conducted with each three to nine subjects that lasted 
30-45 minutes. All subjects were recruited via the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 
2015) and the experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). All 
participants watched the videos in separated booths using circumaural earphones. The 
light was dimmed so that they could fully concentrate on watching the videos. 
Participants were told that they would be shown film clips and were asked to watch 
carefully. However, they were told that they could close their eyes or look away 
whenever they would find a film as to distressing. Participants were assured that their 
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data would remain anonymous. They received Euro 6 as compensation for 
participating in our study. Contact between the experimenter and the subjects was 
minimized in order to avoid demand effects. Moreover, we videotaped each session in 
order to being able to control for possible noises in the laboratory such as loud laughter 
or screaming. 
 Each participant watched twelve clips out of the final set of 24 clips, four clips of 
each target emotion. The clips were shown in a random order. The first film shown 
was always a neutral clip in order to accustom the participants (see Hewig et al. 2005). 
Moreover, two clips targeting the same emotion were not shown in a row and we ended 
each session with a clip targeting happiness.  
 We proceeded in the same manner for round 2 of the pretest. For happiness and 
fear we used the successfully validated clips from round two (four each). For our 
neutral target scenes we used eight new clips as described above. Nine sessions were 
carried out with each three to nine subjects. 
  
III.2.3.3 Results  
In this section, I will proceed as follows: First, I report our findings from pretest study 
1 for all 24 clips. Then, I will report the results from study 2 for the eight neutral 
scenes, and the four joyful and four fearful clips that have been pre-selected from study 
1. 
III.2.3.4 Sample 
In study one, 27 male and 25 female persons (N=52) participated. The age range was 
19-69 with an average age of 31 (SD=9.76). Eighty-five percent were students 
steaming from a range of different fields. In the second experiment, N=48 subject 
participated. Thirty-eight percent were male and the mean age was 25 (SD=6.57).  
III.2.3.5 Emotion ratings 
In study 1, for the target emotion happiness all film clips scored highest on the 
dimensions happiness and amusement as expected. Measured on a 9-point scale with 
8 being the highest rating, all clips yielded mean values of larger than four and medians 
of 5 and higher. The highest ranked clips on the dimension happiness all have median 
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values of 6 or 7 (M – mean, Mdn – median): Harry (M=6.52; Mdn=7), BBT I (M=5.47; 
Mdn=6), Hangover (M=5.14; Mdn=6), and Naked (M=5.0; Mdn=6). On the dimension 
amusement means and medians are: Harry (M=7.11; Mdn=7), Hangover (M=5.96; 
Mdn=6), BBT I (M=5.95; Mdn=6), and Naked (M=5.5; Mdn=6). On all other 
dimensions, the clips yield mean values smaller than 3. We can conclude that four 
clips targeting the emotion happiness have been identified successfully. See table 
below for all means (SD) and mediums. Graphical representations can be found in 
Appendix A.  
 Next, the clips targeting fear elicited the expected emotion as well. Both Hitchcock 
movies, and the scene from Lord of the rings only yielded means of slightly above fear 
but more importantly also scored relatively high on the dimension amusement. Four 
of the eight clips however had high mean and median values on the dimensions fear: 
Lambs (M=6.0; Mdn=7), Insidious (M=5.30; Mdn=5), BWP (M=5.1; Mdn=5), and 
Shining (M=4.5; Mdn=5). For anxiety we see find a similar pattern: Lambs (M=5.0; 
Mdn=5), Insidious (M=5.50 / Mdn=6), BWP (M=3.9; Mdn=5), and Shining (M=4.4 / 
Mdn=4). We chose these four clips for our final battery of film clips since those have 
been perceived highest on the dimensions fear and anxiety and had very low ratings 
on all other dimensions. We excluded the clip Mirrors (M=6.11; Mdn=7) as the 
perceived fear when watching the clip was very high, and we did not want to disturb 
our subjects in experimental sessions. Moreover, regarding this clip male and female 
participants perceived the scene quite differently. 
 Then, all neutral clips but Presidents yielded very high mean and median values 
on the happiness and amusement dimension. The documentary about the forest even 
resulted in M=5.79 for amusement, M=6.0 for happiness, and M=3.24 for love. This 
means, we cannot use the clips as neutral scenes. Interestingly, many published studies 
in emotion research use documentaries about topics such as the Great Barrier Reef as 
induction for neutral states. This is potentially problematic. Maybe our findings are 
special for the German audience, i.e., Germans having a different perception of nature 
scenes than US Americans (see also discussion on p.80). 
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Table III-6: Descriptive statistics film clips (round I) 
Target emotion   MEDIANS 
film clip N amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
  neutral                                       
1 Adria 23 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Pres 20 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
3 Birds 20 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 GBR 25 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Wald 24 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 
6 Waterfall 20 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 3 1 0 0 2 0 
7 Desert 25 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Kaukasus 28 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Fear                                       
9 Shining 25 2 0 4 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
10 Lambs 22 2 0 5 3 1 1 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
11 BWP 22 0 0 5 5 0 2 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
12 Insidious 22 1 0 6 5 0 3 0 5 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 
13 Mirrors 24 1 0 5 5 1 3 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
14 H, Psycho 23 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 H, Birds 23 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
16 Lord 24 5 0 4 0 0 1 0 6 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
  happiness                                       
17 Harry  25 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 
18 Hangover 22 6 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 
19 Manitu 21 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 BBT - KKH 21 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 BBT - FFF 24 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
22 Naked 23 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 
23 Woody  24 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 
24 Loriot 23 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Given the results of round 1, we ran a follow up pretest using the four clips for 
happiness and the four clips for fear plus eight new neutral scenes as described above. 
The table below depicts mean and median emotion ratings. As in the first pretest study, 
the clips targeting happiness score high on the dimensions happiness: Harry (M=4.3; 
Mdn=4), BBT I (M=5.2; Mdn=6), Hangover (M=4.5; Mdn=5), and Naked (M=4.0; 
Mdn=4), and amusement Harry (M=5.8; Mdn=6), BBT I (M=5.8; Mdn=7), Hangover 
(M=5.8; Mdn=6), and Naked (M=4.8; Mdn=5). Median values on other dimensions are 
very low (0-2).  
 The same pattern applies to the fearful clips. All four clips have high ratings on 
the dimensions fear: Lambs (M=5.1; Mdn=6), Insidious (M=5.0; Mdn=6), BWP 
(M=5.2; Mdn=6), and Shining (M=4.3; Mdn=4), and anxiety: Lambs (M=3.6; Mdn=4), 
Insidious (M=5.20; Mdn=6), BWP (M=4.4; Mdn=5), and Shining (M=3.5; Mdn=4). 
On other emotion dimensions ratings of 0-2 can be found.  
 Further, this time the neutral scenes have apparently been perceived as neutral. 
Only one clip hat a rating of 4 on the amusement dimension and all clips seem to have 
caught interest (ratings of 3-6). This is important because we do not want to bore 
participants and create negative feelings such as annoyance. Six out of eight clips have 
been evaluated as very neutral (mean values of smaller than 1 or 2 on all dimensions): 
Presidents’, Fishing, Network, Jane, North and Freighter. Out of these the four clips 
depicting scenes from motion movies have been selected in order to achieve a 
homogenous set of films.  
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Table III-7: Descriptive statistics film clips (round II) 
Target emotion MEDIANS 
film clip N amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
 neutral                                       
1 All the pres 21 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2 Last emperor 20 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Fishing 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Network 20 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 Jane  27 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Post 28 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 Freighter 28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 North 28 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  fear                                       
9 Shining 48 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
10 Lambs 48 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
11 BWP 48 0 0 5 4 0 1 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
12 Insidious 48 1 0 6 4 0 1 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
  happiness                                       
13 Harry 48 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
14 Hangover 48 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
15 BBT 48 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 Naked 48 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Concluding, in line with prior studies (e.g., Hewig et al. 2005) we chose out of the 
eight clips those four who (i) had low ratings on the emotion dimensions and (ii) were 
scenes from motion pictures, as our film clips for positive and negative emotions also 
stemmed from motion pictures. Concluding, our final film battery consists of the 
following clips:  
 
Table III-8: Final set of film clips 
Neutral clips Fearful clips Happy clips 
N1 All the presidents’ men F1 The Shining H1 Harry met Sally 
N2 The network F2 Silence of the lambs H2 The Hangover 
N3 Jane Eyre F3 Blair Witch Project H3 Big Bang Theory 
N4 North by Northwest F4 Insidious H4 The naked gun 
 
 
III.2.3.6 Discussion 
In two rounds of experimental sessions with overall N=100 participants a reliable set 
of film clips with four clips for three discrete emotions could be validated. It appeared 
that neutral states are most difficult to evoke and apparently need to be chosen extra 
careful depending on the audience. Hence, the present set of clips is suitable for a 
German audience.  
 Using film clips certainly has some limitations of generality. First, we rely on self-
reported data to assess emotional responses. Using self-reported data for emotion 
research in the present case serves as very good foundation. Have physiological 
measures as well would be a nice addition to identifying discrete emotions. Demand 
effects may also be of concern in this pretest. We asked participants to watch film clips 
and afterwards evaluate what emotional state they were in. Naturally, the participants 
could probably guess the purpose of our research. This might have partly contributed 
to the relatively high ratings in the first round of sessions regarding the neutral scenes. 
However, we explicitly asked participants to carefully think about what they have felt 
and did not encourage them to state one out of all emotions. Given our clear results in 
the sense of discreteness I do not believe demand effects to play out largely here but I 
can of course not rule out influences.   
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 Further, as Hewig et al. (2005) already noted, participants sit passively when 
watching clips in a laboratory rather than being active as in real life situations. This 
raises the question of ecological rationality. Moreover, eliciting emotions via clips 
might be rather specific for western cultures, i.e., the interpretation of those film clips 
is partly owed to western culture and conventions. This is important to keep in mind 
however of no concern for our further experimental studies with German participants.  
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IV  Experimental studies  
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IV.1   Emotions and risk preferences 
IV.1.1 Introduction 
Emotion and decision research demonstrates that emotions influence people’s 
judgment and choices (e.g., Lerner et al. 2015). Understanding the relevance of 
emotions for risk and ambiguity preferences is critical for understanding decision 
making in an uncertain world. It has important implications for communicating and 
presenting information about risky choices, for instance in medical and financial 
decision making. Two emotions that are especially relevant for risk decision making 
are happiness and fear. Both happiness and fear are prevalent emotions in decision 
makers’ daily lives and hence potentially relevant influencing factors on risky choices. 
In this chapter, I study the influence of induced happiness and fear on risk taking 
behavior in an experimental setting. 
 Risk taking behavior has been researched extensively and interdisciplinary by 
economists (e.g., Arrow 1965, Holt and Laury 2002, Falk et al. 2015), psychologists 
(e.g., Slovic 1962, Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1992), neuroeconomists (e.g., 
Camerer et al. 2005, Glimcher and Fehr 2013), and entrepreneurship scholars (e.g., 
Brockhaus 1980, Forlani and Mullins 2000). A thorough understanding of individuals’ 
risk preferences is crucial for research, applications in real life, and policy 
implications. Hence, scholars have studied risk taking in the laboratory and in the field, 
explored risk preferences over a range of different agents (e.g., students, entrepreneurs, 
rural fishermen in Indonesia), and animals such as honeybees (Shafir et al. 2008). 
 Moreover, risk taking behavior and emotions (affect, or mood) have been studied 
especially in psychology for decades. Researchers around Alice Isen in the 1980s find 
significant influences of positive affect on risky choices in laboratory studies (e.g., 
Isen and Patrick 1983, Arres, Herren and Isen 1988). Further, one important stream of 
research focuses on how affect influences risk perception (Lerner et al. 2003, Rakow 
et al. 2015). Johnson and Tversky (1983) for instance find strong influences of a 
person’s affective state and perception of risky situations on risk estimates. 
Understanding this relationship is not only important for economic and cognitive 
modeling but also, or especially, for risk communication and policy implications. 
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 In economic theory, risk propensity is usually assumed a stable preference or 
personality trait. This implies that individuals take similar risks across situations. 
According to standard economic theory, individuals have different risk attitudes. An 
individual can be risk averse, risk neutral, or risk prone. One can further distinguish 
and measure risk aversion as increasing or decreasing and relative or absolute. Recent 
studies from the field of economic psychology and behavioral economics question this 
assumption of context independency. Figner and Weber (2011) review definitions of 
risk attitudes across situations and structure factors influencing risk taking behavior. 
This includes approaches on understanding how emotions influence risk taking. 
Scholars find systematic influences of emotions in economic experiments on for 
instance time preferences (Ifcher and Zaghamee 2011), or risk taking behavior 
measured via WTP for insurances (Schade et al. 2012). One interesting question that 
arises in this context is whether induced happiness and fear systematically influence 
risk preferences in economic laboratory experiments.  
 Risk taking behavior as a personality trait is considered to be one of the key drivers 
of entrepreneurial choices and success. Hence, in entrepreneurial decision making, risk 
propensity is discussed and researched heavily (Brockhaus 1982, Ahmed 1985, Palich 
and Bagby 1995, Carland et al. 1995, Forlani and Mullins 2000, Mullins and Forlani 
2001). This tradition goes back to Knight (1921) who defines the entrepreneur as the 
decision maker under uncertainty. Scholars propose that entrepreneurs accept higher 
risks than non-entrepreneurs and therefore are associated with having a higher risk 
taking propensity. One other argumentation is that entrepreneurs in fact only perceive 
risks differently than others. For instance, Brockhaus (1982) finds when controlling 
for perceptual variables that entrepreneurs and managers do not differ too much in 
their willingness to take risks. Studies on emotions and entrepreneurs’ risk preferences 
are rare (Foo 2011). 
 In this chapter, we study the influence of two specific emotions, happiness and 
fear, on risk preferences in the laboratory. Happiness and fear are especially interesting 
when studying risk preferences as these two emotions are encountered frequently in 
both, daily tasks that include risks such as crossing a street, and high-stake decisions 
such as buying a house or founding a company. Happiness and fear are induced using 
film clips. We measure risk taking behavior with two different measures: the balloon 
analogue risk task (BART) by Lejuez et al. (2002) as sequential measure of risk and 
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the lottery comparison task by Eckel und Grossman (E&G) (2008). Both methods are 
incentive compatible, easy to understand for participants and especially suited for 
research of individual differences in risk taking (Charness et al. 2013). I will explain 
both tasks in the following chapters. We find that people are moderately risk taking in 
the lottery comparison task and in the BART. To our surprise and unexpected, we find 
no significant influence of induced fear and happiness on individual risk preferences. 
Potential reasons and implications will be discussed in part IV.1.5. Moreover, we do 
not find significant gender differences in risk taking behavior.  
 This paper makes the following contributions. Motivated by the amount of 
experimental literature providing mixed evidence about the influence (and if so 
direction) of emotions on risk taking behavior, we provide a random-assigned, 
incentivized laboratory experiment aiming to clarify the relation of emotions and risk 
preferences. Contrary to many not incentive compatible psychological experiments 
that find significant effects of emotions in hypothetical risk situations we observe no 
significant treatment effects of emotions. This indicates that economic experiments 
may reveal preferences more reliably than non-incentive compatible experiments and 
induced emotions do not play a big role when it comes to straight forward and 
incentivized risk evaluations. This finding is relevant for theory building as previous 
literature argues about competing theories and directions of the influence of emotions. 
Further, we provide a comprehensive, condensed, and explicit overview of the 
experimental literature studying the influence of emotions on risk taking behavior. We 
summarize and synthesize relevant studies by respective methods of emotion induction 
and measures for risk preference highlighting the contradicting empirical findings. 
Moreover, regarding our findings in the subsequent chapter on the strategic value of 
emotions this is very interesting. Contrary to the present study, we find that induced 
happiness and fear have a significant influence in market entry decisions. I will further 
discuss these findings and implications in chapter IV.1.5. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews 
and synthesizes the relevant literature, provides theory, and develops the hypotheses. 
Subsequent sections provide the experimental design, analyses, discussions, as well as 
limitations, implications and future research opportunities. This chapter closes with 
concluding remarks. 
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IV.1.2 Theory and hypotheses 
IV.1.2.1 Eliciting risk preferences 
Empirically, one of the biggest challenges when studying risk taking behavior is how 
to measure and elicit risk preferences. Paul Slovic concludes already in his 1962 paper 
where he studies the convergent validity of several instruments that measure risk-
taking behavior (questionnaires and gambling tasks) and finds no to little correlations: 
“(…) (a) none or only few of the variables analyzed actually measure the trait; or 
(b) willingness to take risks may not be a general trait at all but rather one which 
varies from situation to situation within the same individual.” (Slovic 1962, p.70).  
Measures have since then become more advanced (e.g., lottery comparison tasks such 
as the popular task by Holt and Laury 2002), and designed as context dependent 
instruments (e.g., Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale by Weber et al. 2002). 
Moreover, the importance of real incentives when eliciting risk preferences has been 
stressed and demonstrated (Holt and Laury 2002, Treffers et al. 2012). However, the 
debate on what measure to use in which context is still ongoing. Scholars oftentimes 
argue that different measures really measure different phenomena. For instance, in a 
large study with 1,000 subjects Frey et al. (2016) collect a battery of risk attitude 
measures including self-reports and behavioral measures. The authors find only weak 
correlation between self-reports (such as the sensation seeking scale by Zuckerman 
1974) and behavioral measures (such as lottery comparisons). 
 In economics and psychology ample methods for eliciting risk preferences exist. 
According to Charness et al. (2013) choosing the relevant measure mostly depends on 
the characteristics of the sample and the research question at hand. The authors discuss 
relevant methods for eliciting risk preferences and classify them according to 
complexity and suitability. They argue that very complex methods are usually used 
when estimating parameters and these methods demand mathematical sophistication 
of the participants in order to ensure the task is thoroughly understood. Simpler 
methods on the other hand that are easier to understand are most suitable when the 
research question is to identify treatment effects or differences in individual risk 
preferences. Hence, based on this argument we opt for two rather simple methods that 
are easily understood but are incentive compatible: the lottery comparison task by 
E&G (2008) and the BART by Lejuez et al. (2002). 
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IV.1.2.2 Relevant literature on emotions and risk preferences 
Starting in the 1980s, ample experimental studies empirically investigate the influence 
of emotions, affect, or mood on risk preferences or perceptions. Table IV.1 below 
summarizes all studies (to my best knowledge) that aim to study emotions (mood, 
affect) as independent variable and risk preferences as dependent variable (for 
completeness I also included studies looking at risk perceptions) that have been 
published in the economic and psychology literature over the past three decades. These 
studies show very mixed findings and relations. Some studies find positive affect 
leading to less risk prone behavior (e.g., Isen and Patrick 1983, Isen and Geva 1987) 
and some papers find the opposite (e.g., Deldin & Levin 1986, Foo 2011). The table 
is organized as follows. After providing the year of publishing, authors, and academic 
journal, the type of experiment is listed. For each study, the independent variable x (if 
applicable in the sense that emotions are manipulated) and respective measurement as 
well as the dependent variable y and respective measurement is given. Further main 
findings, sample, and incentives are briefly summarized.     
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Table IV-1: Overview of experimental studies investigating the effect of emotions on risk taking behavior 
# Authors Year Journal Method X Measurement Y Measurement Finding Sample Incentive 
1 Isen & 
Patrick 
1983 OBHP Lab exp Positive 
affect 
Delivery of 
unexpected 
McDonald's gift 
certificate ($.50) 
Risk 
taking 
Poker game & 
hypothetical 
dilemmas 
Positive affect 
subjects bet more 
on low-risk bet, 
but less on high-
risk bet 
N=108 
under-
grad. 
students 
None 
2 Johnson & 
Tversky 
1983 JPSP Lab exp Affect Brief newspaper 
report of a tragic 
event 
Risk 
percep-
tion 
Estimates of 
frequency of 
risks & other 
undesirable 
events 
 
Increase in risk 
estimates 
Several 
studies, 
students 
None 
3 Deldin & 
Levin 
1986 Bulletin 
of 
Psycho-
nomic 
Soc. 
Lab exp Positive, 
negative, 
or neutral 
mood 
Velten mood 
induction procedure 
(VMIP): subjects 
read series of 60 
statements 
Risk Evaluation of 
five hypothetical 
risk-taking 
scenarios 
Positive state 
(negative) 
increased (least) 
willingness to take 
risk in some 
hypothetical risky 
scenarios  
 
N=36 None 
4 Isen & 
Geva 
1987 OBHDP Lab exp Positive  
affect 
Receipt of a small 
bag of candy 
Risk  
prefe-
rence 
Prob. level of 
riskiest bet 
subjects were 
willing to make 
in a game of 
roulette (low, 
medium, high 
stake) 
 
Positive affect less 
risk taking with 
moderate to high 
stakes, more risk 
taking with low 
stakes 
N=71 
under-
grad. 
students  
Course 
require-
ment & 
treatment 
candy for 
N/2 
108 
5 Pietromo-
naco & 
Rook 
1987 JPSP Lab exp Depression Beck Depression 
Inventory (RDi-SF; 
Beck & 
Bcamcsderfer, 1974) 
Risk  Set of 10 
hypothetical 
decision 
scenarios and a 
corresponding 
list of potential 
risks and benefits 
Depressed  
participants 
assigned greater 
weight to risks 
than nondepressed 
N=306 
college 
students 
None 
6 Arkes, 
Herren, & 
Isen 
1988 OBHDP Lab exp Positive 
affect 
Bag of candy   Risk 
taking  
(1) WTP for 
lottery tickets, (2) 
WTP to insure 
against losses 
Positive-affect in 
risk situation with 
emphasis on 
potential -> risk 
aversion, when 
potential loss 
minimized -> risk 
proneness 
N=108 
(1), N=51 
(2), N=84 
(3) 
under-
grad. 
students.  
Course 
credits / 
mood 
induction 
gifts 
7 Wright & 
Bower 
1992 OBHDP Lab exp Happiness 
and 
sadness 
Subjects were to 
recall and elaborate 
on past happy or sad 
circumstances they 
experienced, with 
the help of hypnosis 
Probabi-
lity  
judgment 
24 events, 
requiring 
subjective 
probability 
judgment 
Happy (sad) 
people optimistic 
(pessimistic), 
report higher 
(lower) prob. for 
positive  & lower 
(higher) prob. for 
negative events 
N=51 
under-
grad 
students 
Flat sum 
($3.50) 
8 Leith & 
Baumeis-
ter 
1996 JPSP Lab exp Bad mood, 
embarrass-
ment (6 
studies) 
Autobiographical 
narrative method 
Risk Lotteries Bad moods 
increased risk- 
taking behavior  
N=129 & 
N=48 
students 
Course 
participa-
tion 
9 Nygren, 
Isen, 
Taylor, & 
Dulin 
1996 OBHDP Lab exp Positive or 
no affect 
Bag of candy (1) and 
unexpected gift: 
high-quality Maxell 
audiocassette tape 
(2) 
Risk Betting task (11 
three-outcome 
gambles) & 
Probability 
estimation 
Positive affect less 
willingness to bet 
&  optimism about 
the likelihoods 
associated with 
outcomes 
N=109 
(1)N=168 
(2) 
under-
grad. 
students  
Course 
credits / 
mood 
induction 
gifts 
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10 Mittal & 
Ross 
1998 OBHDP Lab exp Positive or 
negative 
affect 
Read a short (about 
half a page) story 
(adapted from 
Johnson & Tversky, 
1983) 
Risk 
taking 
Hypothetical 
situation: a 
manager was 
WTP in strategic 
risk situation 
People in negative 
state willing to 
spend higher 
amount of money 
than those in 
positive  state 
N=63 
under-
grad. & 
MBA 
students 
Course 
credits 
11 Raghu-
nathon & 
Pham 
1999 OBHDP Lab exp Sadness, 
anxiety 
and neutral 
Reading and 
projecting 
themselves into a 
hypothetical 
situation (written 
format) 
Risky 
gambles 
Two gambles of 
equal expected 
return: low-
risk/low-reward 
and low prob.–
higher payoff 
gamble 
Sad individuals in 
favor of high-
risk/high-reward 
options, anxious 
individuals favor 
of low-risk/low-
reward options 
 
N=83 
under-
grad. 
students 
Course 
credits 
12 Gasper & 
Clore 
2000 PSPB Lab exp Positive 
and 
negative 
emotion 
Autobiographical 
narrative method 
(writing) 
Risk Risk estimation 
questions 
Mood influences 
judgments of 
people with high 
attention on 
emotion (not low) 
N=102 
students 
Course 
credits 
13 Lerner & 
Keltner 
2000 Cogn  
Emot. 
Lab exp disposition
al fear and 
anger 
2 fear & 2 trait anger 
scales 
Risk 
percep-
tion 
Johnson & 
Tversky scale 
(1983) 
Fear predicts 
higher, anger lower 
risk assessment 
N=97 
under-
grad. 
students  
Course 
credits 
14 Hockey, 
Maule, 
Clough, & 
Bdzola 
2000 Cogn  
Emot. 
Lab exp State   
anxiety, 
depression, 
and fatigue 
Mood diary (3x a 
day for 14 days (1), 
28 days (2)), 
planning exercises 
designed to increase 
fatigue (3) 
Risk  Personal Risk 
Inventory 
(hypothetical 
everyday choice 
scenarios) 
(1)-(3) riskiness 
affected by state 
fatigue, not by 
anxiety and 
depression 
N=34, 
N= 58 
students 
(1-2), 
N=55 
trainees 
(3)  
None 
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15 Lerner & 
Keltner (1) 
2001 JPSP Class-room Trait  fear 
and anger 
2 fear & 2 trait anger 
scales 
Risk 
percep-
tion 
Asian disease 
problem 
Fearful  people 
express risk averse, 
angry people risk 
taking choices 
N=75 
under-
grad. 
students 
Course 
credits 
15 Lerner & 
Keltner (2) 
2001 JPSP Take  home 
question-
naires 
Trait  fear, 
anger, and 
happiness 
Respective scales Risk 
percep-
tion 
Optimism scale 
(Weinstein) 
Fearful people 
express pessimistic 
risk estimates, 
angry and happy 
people optimistic 
risk estimates 
N=601 
under-
grad. 
students 
Course 
credits 
16 Kliger & 
Levy 
2003 JEBO Data Weather National Climatic 
Data Center 
(NCDC), SCSS, 
‘sky coverage from 
sunrise to sunset’ 
Capital 
market 
risk 
S&P call options Good (bad) mood 
associated with 
investors being 
less (more) willing 
to tolerate risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 na na 
17 Lerner, 
Gonzalez, 
Small, & 
Fischhoff 
2003 Psy Sc. Natural field 
experiment 
Fear and 
anger 
Text description 
stressing either 
anger or fear 
Risk  
percep-
tion 
3 scales: 
probability of 
happening of 
risky events 
Fear increases, 
anger decreases 
risk estimates  
N=973 
US 
Ameri-
cans 
None 
18 Sunstein 2003 J Risk 
and Unc 
Lab exp Emotions Vivid negative 
description of 
outcome variable 
WTP for 
no 
arsenic in 
water 
Question Emotional 
description results 
in higher WTP 
N=84 
students 
None 
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19 Yuen & 
Lee 
2003 J Affect 
Disord 
Lab exp Happiness, 
sadness, 
neutrality  
Film clips Risk  
taking 
tendency' 
Willingness to 
participate in 
hypothetical 
tasks based on 
'Choice 
Dilemmas 
Questionnaire 
People in sad 
group less risk 
taking compared to 
neutral, no 
difference between 
neutral and happy   
N=54 
under-
grad. 
students 
(China) 
None 
20 Williams 2004 Research 
and 
Practice 
in HR 
Mgmt 
Question-
naire 
Positive 
and 
negative 
mood 
Q: How do you feel 
right now? 
Risk   Q: ‘How would 
you rate your 
own willingness 
to undertake 
risky business 
propo-sitions as 
com-pared to 
other managers in 
your firm?’  
Managers  
reporting positive 
affective states 
more willing to 
take risks 
N=149 
managers 
None 
 21 Fessler, 
Pillsworth, 
& Flemson 
2004 OBHDP Lab exp Anger & 
disgust 
Relived emotions Risk  
taking 
Risky gambles & 
questionnaire 
asking for risky 
behavior 
Anger  increases 
men’s, disgust 
decreases women’s 
risk taking 
N=120 
under-
grad. 
students 
$5 + 
gamble 
22 Chou, Lee, 
& Ho 
2007 Psycholo
gy and 
Aging 
Group/lab 
experiment 
Happiness, 
sadness, 
neutrality  
Film clips Risk 
taking 
tendency' 
Willingness to 
participate in 
hypothetical 
tasks ('Choice 
Dilemmas 
Questionnaire') 
Risk taking 
tendency greater in 
happy mood than 
sad mood,  (more 
pronounced with 
older people) 
N=188 
(90 older, 
98 
younger 
people) 
None 
23 Cheung & 
Mikels 
2007 Emotion   Lab 
experiment 
 Emotion 3 strategy groups: 
none (control), 
making decisions 
using emotions 
(emotion-focused) / 
Risk 
seeking 
behavior 
Gambling task, 
choosing 
between a sure 
option & risky 
gamble option 
Positive relation 
between emotion 
reliance & risk 
seeking 
 N=65 
under-
grad. 
students 
 $5 or 
course 
credit 
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wo. using emotions 
(emotion-regulation) 
framed as losses 
or gains  
24 Grable & 
Rosz-
kowski 
2008 J of Risk 
Research 
Mailing 
(question-
naire) 
Positive 
mood 
Self-rating into one 
of three categories: 
happy, neutral and 
gloomy 
Financial 
risk 
tolerance 
13-item risk-
tolerance scale 
(Grable and 
Lytton 1999) 
Happy mood 
positively 
associated with 
having a higher 
level of financial 
risk tolerance 
N=460  
mid‐
western 
emplo-
yees 
None 
25 Fehr-
Duda, 
Epper, 
Bruhin, & 
Schubert 
2011 JEBO Lab exp Good 
mood 
Self-reported 
measure: “How has 
your day been 
going?” 
Risk 
preferenc
e 
Certainty 
equivalents for 
50 two-outcome 
lotteries 
Women in good 
mood more 
optimistic;  men 
less susceptible to 
mood states 
N=107 
students 
Monetary 
26 Hogarth, 
Portell, 
Cuxart & 
Kolev 
2011 BDM ESM via text 
msg 
Emotions Self-assessment 
manikins (SAMs) 
Risk 
percep-
tion 
Evaluation of 
everyday 
situations: "At 
this moment, 
what risk for 
your well-being 
do you associate 
with ACT?  
 
Mood states 
explain variations 
in risk perception 
N=94 
students 
EUR 35 
27 Foo (1) 2011 ETP Lab exp State 
happiness, 
hope, fear 
and anger 
Relived emotions Risk 
perceptio
ns 
Perceived risk in 
business 
opportunity 
Participants in 
angry and happy 
group perceived 
less risk than those 
in hopeful and 
fearful group 
 
 
N=187 
students 
(1) 
Course 
credits 
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27 Foo (2) 2011 ETP Quasi-field Trait anger 
and trait 
happiness  
10 item scale for 
anger (adaption of 
L&K), 6-item 
happiness scale 
(Underwood& 
Froming 1980) 
Risk 
preferenc
e 
Two investment 
decisions 
(Forlani& 
Mullins 2005) 
Trait anger and 
happiness increase 
risk preference 
N=66 
entrepre-
neurs (2) 
None 
28 Schlösser, 
Dunning, 
& Fech-
tenhauer 
2011 JBDM Lab Immediate 
and 
anticipated 
emotions 
“Consider choosing 
the lottery, how do 
you feel about it?” 
Risky 
choice 
$5 for sure, or 
$10 w. 50% prob. 
Emotions have 
direct influence on 
decision (wo. 
Correlation to subj. 
prob) 
N=130 
students 
Course 
credit 
29 Treffers, 
Koellinger 
& Picot 
2012 WP Lab exp Joy, fear, 
sadness 
Film clips Risk 
preferenc
e 
Holt and Laury 
lottery 
Sadness influences 
risk preferences 
when stakes are 
low, no other 
influences 
N=253 
students 
Low, and 
high stakes 
(money) 
30 Demaree 
& Burns 
2012 Emotion  Lab exp Affect Q: “How do you feel 
right now?” after 
feedback about 
outcome in slot task 
Risk 
taking 
Forced choice 
repeated 
gambling task 
(slot tasks) w 
chance of 
winning 13%, 
50%, or 87% 
Reduced risk 
taking in a positive 
affective state (on 
the p=13% game) 
N=144 
under-
grad. 
students 
Partial 
course 
credits 
31 Podoynit-
syna, Van 
der Bij, & 
Song 
2012 ETP Survey Mixed 
emotions 
Extent to which 16 
emotion adjectives 
described feeling 
about strategic issue 
Entrepre-
neurial 
risk 
perceptio
n 
Q: characterize 
whether a 
hypothetical 
strategic issue 
perceived as 
opportunity or 
threat 
Mixed and after 
controlling for 
basic emotions 
conflicting 
emotions predict 
risk perception 
(more cautious) 
N=253 
venture 
owners 
(Venture
One list) 
None 
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32 Haiko & 
Kaustia 
2012 PLOS one Lab exp Favorite, 
disliked 
and neutral 
music 
Own favorite pieces 
of music 
Risk 
prefe-
rence 
Willingness to 
take risk 
Favorite music 
increases risk 
taking, and 
disliked music 
suppresses risk-
taking 
N=25 
teenagers 
(aged 
12–17) 
Monetary 
incentives 
33 Stanton, 
Reeck, 
Huettel, & 
LaBar 
 
2014 JDM Lab exp Happiness,  
sadness, 
neutrality  
Film clips Risk 
prefe-
rences 
Monetary 
gambles 
Happy mood 
induction increased 
gambling 
 N=91 Money, 
incentive 
compatible 
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Comparing the different studies yields some caveats. Often, neither the independent 
nor dependent variables are clearly defined. Approaches to measure risk preferences 
and perceptions vary from non-incentivized psychological scales to very abstract 
economic task. Especially some studies from the psychology literature are not 
accessing risk preferences as in an economic definition. For instance, Wang (2006) 
asks students while studying ‘risk taking behavior’ to decide either emotionally or 
rationally when facing hypothetical conflicting situations. Treffers et al. (2012) on the 
other hand use incentivized monetary gambles (the Holt and Laury lottery). 
Pietromonaco and Rook (1987) use hypothetical decision scenarios and Fehr-Duda et 
al. (2011) present certainty equivalents. Furthermore, many studies often cited for 
measuring risk preferences rather access related, but different aspects, such as selling 
decisions (Lee and Andrade 2011), or stock market behavior in general (Hirshleifer 
and Shumway 2003).    
 Moreover, some of the laboratory studies use (monetary) incentives, some give 
course credits, and some have no incentives at all. Furthermore, emotions are defined, 
measured, and induced in a variety of different ways ranging from film clips to 
providing candy bars. For instance, Grable and Roszkowski (2008) ask participants to 
self-rate own mood into one of three categories happy, neutral, or gloomy. This alone 
seems to be a rather difficult task and poses some challenges when comparing the 
findings to studies inducing emotions with film clips (e.g., Treffers et al. 2012) or to 
relived emotions in the laboratory (Fessler et al. 2004). The respective studies are also 
conceptualized quite differently. Some studies differentiate good and bad mood as 
compared to some studies building their hypotheses on appraisal approaches and 
focusing on discrete emotions.  
 Given all the above reasons it is not surprising that there is no to little agreement 
in the discussion about the influence of distinct emotions on risk preferences. By 
providing a rigorous and incentivized economic experiment studying induced fear and 
happiness and individuals’ risk preferences we aim to provide new insights to the 
discussion. 
IV.1.2.3 Competing theories 
Building up on the studies reviewed above, several theories have been proposed of 
how emotions, affect, or moods influence risk-taking behavior. Amongst the most 
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prominent are two competing theories: the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) and the Mood-
Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH). The AIM states that positive emotions lead to risk 
taking behavior whereas negative emotions lead to risk averse behavior (Forgas 1995). 
The AIM builds on the affect-as-information theory (Clore et al. 2001, Schwarz, 1990, 
2001) proposing that emotions provide additional information when making choices 
and hence influence a person’s response towards a situation or object. This implies 
that people being in a positive mood will evaluate their environment more positive 
(Bower 1981) and react more proactive. The MMH on the other hand states that 
individuals in a good mood want to maintain their current state and hence act less risk 
taking whereas negative moods lead to rather risk seeking behavior (Isen and Patrick 
1983).  
 Reasons why previous studies find support for both concepts that go into opposite 
directions may stem from different implementations and induction of emotions in 
experimental studies and also from conceptual differences backing both theories. First, 
emotions or mood in experimental studies in the laboratory are induced in a range of 
different ways as discussed above. Induction methods range from film clips to little 
presents in the beginning of sessions. Often, in contrast, emotions are not induced but 
respondents simply report their current emotional states. Moreover, studies looking at 
naturally induced moods, for instance using weather data, are directly compared to 
studies looking at induced emotions in the laboratory. Second, affect and mood 
especially in the positive valence domain may not be taken alike. Mood is a rather mild 
state and hence might lead to the wish to maintain a respective mood. Affect on the 
other hand is a strong feeling and may lead to active behavior as discussed in previous 
chapters.  
 Further, both competing models only distinguish between positive and negative 
valence. As previously discussed (see chapter II), emotions of the same valence 
oftentimes lead to different outcomes especially regarding risk taking behavior. For 
instance, Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) find opposite effects of fear and anger on 
risk preferences. Both of the theories above do not account for such findings. Hence, 
our hypotheses are not based on either of the above theories but rather on arguments 
from evolutionary psychology discussed part two and the appraisal tendency 
framework (Han et al. 2007, Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001).  
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IV.1.2.4 Appraisal tendency framework 
The appraisal tendency framework (ATF) introduced in chapter I.2 provides one useful 
structure to systematically link appraisal processes associated with discrete emotions 
to judgment and choice outcomes such as those from risky decisions. The ATF has 
received increasing attention as theoretical base for experimental studies examining 
the influence of emotions on risk taking behavior over the past years (Lerner and 
Keltner 2001, Han et al. 2007). One advantage to other theories is that it distinguishes 
discrete emotions as compared to the MMH or AIM. Within the ATF happiness can 
be described as a very pleasant emotion with high levels of certainty and own control, 
little effort and strong attentional activity. Fear on the other hand is described as very 
unpleasant and having very high levels of uncertainty. Further, fear is associated with 
high situational control and others’ responsibility. High levels of effort and medium 
attentional activity are anticipated. As a consequence of these attributes, the ATF 
classifies fear as an emotion leading to risk averse behavior and happiness as emotion 
leading to risk taking behavior. Table IV-2 below summarizes: 
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Table IV-2: Illustration of appraisal dimensions for fear and happiness, adapted from 
Lerner et al. 2015, p. 806 
 
Appraisal dimension FEAR HAPPINESS 
Certainty Low High 
Pleasantness Low High 
Attentional activity Medium High 
Anticipated effort High Low 
Individual control Low High 
Other’s responsibility Medium Low 
Appraisal tendency Perception of 
negative events as 
unpredictable, under 
situational control 
Perception of 
positive events as 
predictable, under 
human control 
Influence on risk preference  Risk averse Risk taking 
 
This argumentation is consistent with empirical findings by Lerner and Keltner (2001), 
Foo 2009, Han et al. 2007). Also intuitively one would expect fear to lead to more risk 
avoiding behavior and happiness to increased risk taking behavior.  
 Especially when studying induced emotions, the whole process of appraisal 
theories may be questioned as specific emotions are induced and do not arise from the 
individual’s interpretation of an event. I believe the ATF provides a solid framework 
for developing testable hypotheses in emotion research in general as experimental 
studies testing the framework show (e.g., Foo 2011, Lerner and Keltner 2001). For 
induced emotions however, we additionally build our hypotheses on arguments from 
evolutional psychology and approach and avoidance orientation as discussed in 
chapter II.   
 Further, Frederickson and Branigan (2000) find that people in a joyful condition 
(induced via short film clips) produced a broader thought-action repertoire, i.e., 
participants would come up with more things they would like to do than when been 
exposed to a neutral or negative situation. Moreover, Aspinwall and MacNamara 
(2005) find that positive emotion decreases defensiveness and increases effective 
coping. All of the above leads to our first hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 1: Induced happiness leads to higher risk-taking behavior than induced 
fear.  
 
IV.1.2.5 Gender differences in risk preferences  
Ample studies find women to behave more risk averse than men (Byrnes et al. 1999, 
Croson and Gneezy 2009, Dohmen et al. 2011, Eckel and Grossman 2002, Fehr-Duda 
et al. 2006, Finucane et al. 2000, Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). For instance, 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) review literature on gender differences in risk preferences, 
competitiveness, and other-regarding preferences in economic experiments and find 
robust gender differences. They conclude one explanation for the differences might be 
due to different emotional reactions to risky situations. If women experience a risky 
option more emotional this can influence the utility. Specifically, experiencing the 
option as negative emotion would lead to a lower utility. Furthermore, Fehr-Duda et 
al. (2006) find that women and men differ in their probability weighting when eliciting 
certainty equivalents. Women underestimate large probabilities of gains compared to 
men. This is related to the research by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) on probability 
weights for high-affect and low-affect gambles. Moreover, Fehr-Duda et al. (2011) 
find women tend to weight probabilities more optimistically when being in a good 
mood (compared to normal mood) whereas men are not influenced by their mood. 
Hence, we expect hypothesis 1 to be more pronounced with women than with men, 
and we expect different emotional reactions to risky situations to be one explanation 
for gender differences in risk taking.   
 
Hypothesis 2a: Female participants will behave less risk taking than male 
participants. 
Hypothesis 2b: Fear induced female respondents will exhibit more risk averse 
behavior than male respondents. Happiness-induced female players will behave more 
risk taking than happiness-induced male respondents.  
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IV.1.3 Experiment 
IV.1.3.1 Experimental design 
Table IV.3 below depicts the experimental design. Risk preferences are measured 
using the Eckel and Grossmann (2008) lottery task and the BART (Lejuez et al. 2002). 
Happiness and fear are induced with each two well-validated film clips. Each 
participant watches either two film clips inducing happiness or two clips inducing fear. 
The two emotions and the order of film clip and risk task are the between-subjects 
treatments (2x4), see Table IV.4. We randomly allocate participants and randomize 
(R) the order of tasks (participants either get the Bart task first and the E&G task 
second or vice versa) and video  clips (i.e., happiness-inducing clip 1 or 2, and fear-
inducing clip 1 or 2) shown within-subjects.   
 
Table IV-3: Experimental design 
1 Welcome & introduction 
2 Film clip 1 (R) 
3 Risk task 1 (R) 
4 Film clip 2 (R) 
5 Risk task 2 (R) 
6 Questionnaire 
7 Payout (anonymously) 
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Table IV-4: Between-subjects factors 
Group Clip 1 Task 1 Clip 2 Task 2 
1  H1* Balloon H2 E&G 
2 H2 Balloon H1 E&G 
3 F1 Balloon F2 E&G 
4 F2 Balloon F1 E&G 
5 H1 E&G H2 Balloon 
6 H2 E&G H1 Balloon 
7 F1 E&G F2 Balloon 
8 F2 E&G F1 Balloon 
*H1: Harry & Sally, H2: Hangover, F1: BWP, H2: Insidious 
 
The computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of Humboldt-
Universitaet zu Berlin and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Student 
participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Each participant signed a 
consent form before entering the laboratory. After welcoming the participants to the 
laboratory and randomly assigning seats, the different phases of the experiment were 
explained to the participants on screen and instructions were read out loud by the 
experimenter. Both the lottery choice and BART task were explained by the instructor 
in the beginning of the experiment to make sure that everybody understood the tasks. 
Then, either a happy or anxious video clip was shown to the participants (between-
subjects variable emotion) using circumaural headphones. Thereafter, either the BART 
task or the lottery choice (between-subjects variable order) appeared. After completing 
the first task, another video clip of the same type (happy or anxious) was watched and 
the second risk task completed. Finally, all participants answered demographic 
questions. Payments were made anonymously before leaving the lab. The experiment 
was carried out in German (see instructions in Appendix B).  
 
IV.1.3.2 Emotion induction 
Inducing emotions with film clips is very common in laboratory experiments and has 
many advantages as compared to other methods (Loewenstein et al. 2014, Ifcher and 
Zharaghmee 2011). As extensively discussed in chapter III.2, we conducted an 
extensive pretest, identifying four clips each targeting the emotions happiness and fear 
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of which we need two clips for this experiment, please see the appendix for an 
overview. For happiness, short scenes of the movies “When Harry met Sally” and 
“The Hangover” is used. Fear is introduced with scenes from the movies “The Blair 
Witch Project” and “Insidious”. 
 
IV.1.3.3 Risk elicitation 
In this experiment, we elicit risk preferences using two tasks: the gamble choice task 
by Eckel and Grossman (2008) and the BART (Lejuez et al. 2002). Both tasks are 
fairly easy to understand but allow differentiated analyses. The gamble choice is a one 
shot decision whereas the BART is implemented over ten rounds.  
 Eckel and Grossman (2008) developed a choice task for measuring risk attitudes 
as simple as possible in order to reduce errors from comprehension but with sufficient 
heterogeneity in choices (see appendix B). Each participant is shown five gambles and 
has to choose the one he or she wants to play. For all gambles the events A and B have 
an occurrence of 50 percent each. One of the five gambles is a sure thing (in our case 
EUR 3.20). The other gambles are linearly increasing in expected payoffs and also 
standard deviation, i.e., risk. The advantage of this design (in comparison to more 
complicated lottery choice tasks) is that with using only 50/50 gambles the task can be 
easily understood. The variance associated with the increasing expected values is 
considerably large resulting in relatively high heterogeneity in participants’ choices 
(see Eckel and Grossman 2008). We adapted the Eckel and Grossman (2008) task 
using a different scaling of payoffs, see table below. 
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Table IV-5: Gamble selection sheet, adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
Gamble Event Payoff Probabilities Your selection 
1 A EUR 3.20 50%   
B EUR 3.20 50% 
2 A EUR 4.80 50%   
B EUR 2.40 50% 
3 A EUR 6.40 50%   
B EUR 1.60 50% 
4 A EUR 8.00 50%   
B EUR 0.80 50% 
5 A EUR 9.60 50%   
B EUR 0.00 50% 
 
In their original study, Eckel and Grossman (2008) use a ‘no loss’ frame and one frame 
with losses. In order to not run into confounds with loss aversion and more importantly 
in order to remain comparable to the BART we opted for the ‘no loss’ frame. Hence, 
the worst-case scenario for respondents would be to end up with zero Euros. One 
advantage using the ‘loss treatment’ (i.e., option gamble 4 and 5 resulting with 50% 
probability in minus x Euros) would have been to presumably observe larger effects 
on risk taking behavior after having been induced to a fearful clip. This would be 
interesting to study in subsequent experimental studies. Moreover, using loss frames 
would imply endowing participants with an amount of money in order to prevent them 
from losing money over the time of the experiment. We were concerned to create 
confounding effects here again when endowing people in the beginning of the 
experiment so that the ‘no loss’ frame turns out to be the cleaner and more desirable 
design.   
 In the BART task (Lejuez et al. 2002, Wallsten et al. 2005), participants see a series 
of k balloons on a computer screen. They can earn money by clicking a button pumping 
air into the balloon. With each pump participants earn x Cents that are added up over 
all rounds ri as long as the balloon does not explode. The balloon inflates until a 
randomly determined threshold where the balloon explodes. Hence, each pump offers 
the possibility to earn money (reward) but also the risk of explosion and earning zero 
Euro in this round increases with each pump. The participant can stop at any point and 
collect the money. Participants do not know the probability structure of the explosion 
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point of the balloon. They are informed as follows: “Balloons explode if you pump 
them up too much. You can decide on each trial how much air to pump into the balloon. 
Balloons differ. You do not know what type of balloon you are facing and on each trial 
the type of balloon might be different. Some balloons may explode after the first pump 
and some only after they fill the whole screen.” 
 The computer is in fact programmed in a way that it allows a maximum number 
of n pumps and to explode. This explosion point is predetermined and the explosion 
happens random point with probability 1/n (see also Lejuez et al. 2002, Wallsten et al. 
2005). Balloons have different explosion points determined by a randomly drawn 
number from a uniform distribution for each subject. This implies that the ‘conditional 
probability’ of explosion increases with each successful pump. In round 1, the 
probability of explosion is p1 = 1/n. In round 2, p2 = 1 / (n-1) given that the balloon 
did not explode in round 1. In round 3, p3 = 1 / (n-2) in case the balloon did not explode 
in round 1 or 2, and so on. Hence, the probability of the balloon exploding on pump i 
given the balloon did not explode in round n-i is: 
 
      𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  =  1  (𝑛𝑛−𝑖𝑖+1) .              
 
This implies that on each pump decision the participant faces two options from his 
decision: the option to lose the accumulated amount with pi or earn x cents with 1-pi. 
Hence, normatively speaking the decision maker should stop pumping as soon as the 
payout from both options is equal.  
 In the original version of the BART by Lejuez et al. (2002) participants earn USD 
.05 for each pump and see k=3x30 balloons with different explosion points drawn from 
a uniform distribution. In the present study, participants play ten trials of the BART 
task. On each trial, the computer allows 1 to 32 pumps before the balloon would 
explode. In each round they can earn 4 cents with each pump (inflation sound is 
played). The number of clicks, the profit from current round, and cumulated profits 
are displayed to the subjects. In case the balloon pops before they collect the money, 
an exploded balloon is shown and an explosion sound displayed (screenshots can be 
found in appendix B.1).  
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 The validity of the BART has been shown via the association to real world risk 
taking behavior (Hunt et al. 2005). For instance, high risk taking in the BART relates 
to drug and alcohol use, smoking (Lejuez et al. 2003a), gambling, theft, and aggression 
(Aklin et al. 2005, Lejuez et al. 2002). Moreover, the BART is significantly related to 
sensation seeking and impulsiveness (Aklin et al. 2005, Lejuez 2003b), measured by 
the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman et al. 1978), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(Patton et al. 1995), and the Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale (Eysenck and Eysenck 
1978). Studies looking at how emotions influence risk taking behavior in the BART 
are rare. Heilman et al. (2010) find that emotion regulation, i.e., reappraising the 
negative emotions fear and disgust increases risky decisions (measured as average 
pumps per unexploded balloon) in the laboratory and in a natural setting (induced by 
telling students (N = 44) their final exam results). Heilman et al. (2010) find here that 
participants in the positive affect control group (no emotion regulation) take higher 
risks than the negative affect group. Other studies (Maner et al. 2007) relate the BART 
to trait anxiety (r=-.22) (scale by Spielberger 1989), to social anxiety (trait) (r=-.2) 
assessed via the fear of negative evaluation scale (Leary 1983), and to worry (r=-.21), 
measured with the ‘Penn State worry questionnaire’ (Meyer et al. 1990). 
 Previous literature shows that the BART can identify individuals prone to high 
risk taking (Aklin et al. 2005, Lejuez et al. 2002, Lejuez et al. 2003a, Lejuez et al. 
2003b, Lejuez et al. 2004, Wallsten et al. 2005). Interesting features of using the BART 
include that the task is a repeated measure with feedback. Moreover it is easy to 
understand and quite realistic. It allows identifying individual differences in risk taking 
behavior and is hence well suited for the present research question. Note that the 
BART may also be characterized as measure for ambiguity tolerance. We will discuss 
this in the discussion part of this paper. 
 
IV.1.4 Results 
IV.1.4.1 Sample 
Of our N = 184 participants, N=181 are usable responses (three observations had to be 
excluded because one of the video clips did not play steadily or the volume was turned 
off at the respective computer in the laboratory). Overall, 78 males and 103 females 
participated. The mean age was 25 years (SD = 4.78). Forty-three percent of subjects 
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were majoring in business or economics. Mean profit was EUR 6.62 (SD 3.78, range 
EUR 0 - 12.88). Each session lasted about 30 minutes. 
 
Table IV-6: Descriptive characteristics – sample 
 All Females Males 
Observations 181 103 78 
Age 25 (4.78) 24 (4.811) 26 (4.511) 
Major of studies  
Business studies 
Economics 
58 
22   
Biology 21   
Sociology 12   
Language studies 13   
Computer science 9   
Agricultural studies 10   
Other fields 29   
No studies 7   
 
IV.1.4.2 Gamble choices (Eckel & Grossman task) 
Mean gamble choice for all (both women and men) was M = 3.07 (SD = 1.32), median 
= 3, and mode = 2. The histogram below depicts the distribution. Most people chose 
gamble two (36 percent), and interestingly 23 percent chose gamble 5, i.e., the riskiest 
gamble (losing everything with probability of 50 percent). Comparing, E&G find that 
most people chose gamble 3 (33 percent), and second most chose gamble 5 (24 
percent) and 4 (23 percent).  
 
Table IV-7: Gamble choices by gender 
Gamble choice ALL Women Men 
1 8% 7% 1% 
2 36% 19% 18% 
3 20% 9% 11% 
4 12% 10% 2% 
5 23% 12% 11% 
N 181 103 78 
Mean 3.07 3.04 3.10 
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(SD) (1.32) (1.36) (1.27) 
 
 
 
Figure IV-1: Distribution of choices in gamble task 
 
 
We observe differences in choices of women and men. This is in line with E&G 
(2008). Both groups choose gamble 2 most frequently. The frequency distribution for 
women is much more dispersed than for men, see below. Only two male respondents 
choose gamble 1 (safe gamble) as compared to 12 female respondents.  
 Running a Mann-Whitney U test we find however, that distributions for females 
(M = 3.00) do not significantly differ from males (Mdn = 3.00), U = 3876.00, z = -
.419, ns. 
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Figure IV-2: Histogram for dependent variable choice (females) 
 
 
Figure IV-3: Histogram for dependent variable choice (males) 
 
 
IV.1.4.3 Balloon pumps (BART) 
For the BART task, usually the average number of successful pumps (i.e., pumps of 
rounds with no explosion) is used to measure individual’s risk propensity (Lejuez et 
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al. 2002, Wallsten et al. 2005). Measuring risk propensity in this manner is potentially 
problem as it systematically dismisses risk seekers whose balloon exploded. I will 
further discuss this after reporting the findings. The table below summarizes 
frequencies of successful average pumps. Mean successful pumps were M = 6.26 (SD 
= 2.396), median 5.9, mode 7.5, range 0-13.5. Females (M = 6.231, SD = 2.454) and 
males (M = 6.292, SD = 2.332) did not differ, U = 3960.50, z = -.125, ns.  
 For comparisons, we also look at all average pumps and first pumps. Mean average 
pumps were 10.77 (SD = 3.519). Females M = 10.85 (SD = 3.383) and males M = 
10.65 (SD = 3.71) did not differ. Mean first pump was M = 11.65 (SD = 6.591), median 
10, mode 15, range 1-30. Again, no significant gender differences were found 
(Mfemale=11.28 and Mmale = 11.68). Regarding payouts, mean average profits from the 
BART are M = EUR 2.46 (SD = 97.12) and we find no significant gender differences 
(Mmale = EUR 2.49 (SD = 89.79) and Mfemale = EUR 2.44 (SD = 102.58).  
 
Table IV-8: Descriptive statistics BART task 
    
Av. successful 
pump 
First pump Earnings (in 
cents) 
ALL Mean 6.26 (2.396) 11.46 (6.713 246.28 (97.115) 
men Mean 6.30 (2.332) 11.68 (6.456) 249.14 (89.790) 
women Mean 6.23 (2.454) 11.28 (6.925) 244.15 (102.579) 
* Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
The problem with analyzing only successful average pumps is that one automatically 
dismisses those risk seekers whose balloon popped. Hence, the analysis has a bias from 
systematically excluding those. On the other hand, analyzing average pumps of all 
balloons includes a ‘randomized’ censoring problem, i.e., one would analyze all clicks 
of the rounds where the balloon exploded and hence systematically include this 
stochastic factor. Moreover, participants whose balloons exploded early in the first 
few rounds may behave differently than those whose first balloons did not explode 
(randomly determined).     
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IV.1.4.4 Treatment effects 
We do not find significant differences between order of treatments, i.e., choosing a 
lottery first or pumping a balloon first and completing the other task second. Hence, 
in the following I will analyze both groups (order) together. We are interested in group 
differences between participants in a happy versus fearful emotional state.  
 For the dependent variable choice (i.e., the E&G gamble task) we do not find a 
significant main effect of group of emotion (i.e., happiness or fear inducing clip) (F(3, 
173) = 1.120, ns) or gender (F(1, 173) =.032, ns). There is no significant interaction 
effect between group of emotion and gender, F(3, 173) =.456, ns.  
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Table IV-9:ANOVA output table: between-subjects effects (choice) 
Dependent Variable: choice    
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 9.869a 7 1.410 .809 .581 
Intercept 1.561.615 1 1.561.615 896.541 .000 
female .056 1 .056 .032 .858 
Group 5.850 3 1.950 1.120 .343 
female * Group 2.381 3 .794 .456 .714 
Error 301.335 173 1.742   
Total 2.013.000 181    
Corrected Total 311.204 180    
a R Squared = .032 (Adjusted R Squared = -.007)  
 
Graphing behavior of men and women for each group of emotion we observe the 
following. Females in the happy group behave minimally less risk taking (M = 2.9) 
than males (M = 3.08) and females in the fearful group choose slightly riskier (M = 
3.18) than men (M = 3.13). 
 
Figure IV-4: Interaction effects (choice) 
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Non-parametric tests confirm that the small differences between groups are not 
statistically significant. Testing for gender effects in the Eckel and Grossman task, a 
Mann Whitney U test shows no significant differences (U = 3876.000, p = .675). 
Regarding group differences between emotions we do not find significant differences 
either X2 (3) = 4.400, p = .221).  
For the dependent variable average successful pumps there was no significant main 
effect of group of emotion (F(3, 173) = 2.340, ns) or gender (F(1, 173) =.056, ns). 
There was also no significant interaction effect between group of emotion and gender, 
F(3, 173) =.276, ns. The ANOVA table below depicts both main effects (female and 
group) and the interaction effect (female x  group). 
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Table IV-10: ANOVA output table: between-subjects effects (pumps) 
 
Dependent Variable: av. successful pump   
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 8.515a 7 1.216 .205 .984 
Intercept 6.578.887 1 6.578.887 1.110.378 .000 
female .331 1 .331 .056 .813 
Group 4.161 3 1.387 .234 .873 
female * Group 4.902 3 1.634 .276 .843 
Error 1.025.009 173 5.925   
Total 8.119.470 181    
Corrected Total 1.033.524 180       
a R Squared = .008 (Adjusted R Squared = -.032) 
 
Plotting the variable successful average pumps separately by gender for each emotion 
happiness and fear, we observe that happy females pump marginally more in the happy 
group (M = 6.149) than men (M = 6.121) but less in the fearful group (M = 6.309) than 
men (M = 6.459), see figure below. Overall people in the fearful group have slightly 
higher pumps than people induced with happiness. All of the described patterns are 
insignificant. 
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Figure IV-5: Interaction effects (BART) 
 
 
Non-parametric tests show the same results. Employing a Mann Whitney U test and a 
Kruskal Wallis tests, we see that there is no significant difference between males and 
females (U = 3960.500, z = -.125, p = .901) nor group of emotion (X2 (3) =  1.638, p 
= .651) on risk taking behavior in the BART.   
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IV.1.4.5 Further analyses 
In our sample, 43 percent of the respondents were majoring in economics or business 
studies.  Scholars studying risk taking behavior oftentimes find differences in 
demographics such as field of studies. We are interested in whether students who 
specialize in economics or business studies and are potentially more experienced when 
it comes to risky choices show a different behavior from others who do not specialize. 
In the E&G (2008) task, we see that economics and business students make riskier 
choices (M econ/bus = 3.26 (SD = 1.430)) than other students (M others = 2.91 (SD 
=1.201)). Running one-way ANOVAs we find this difference is marginally 
significant, F(180,1)=3.232, p = .074. Regarding mean average pumps, we observe 
that economics and business majors are slightly more risk taking but find no 
statistically significant difference (M econ/bus = 6.29 (SD = 2.445)) than other students 
(M others = 6.23 (SD =2.348)). 
   
Table IV-11: ANOVA output table, by studies 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
choice 
Between 
Groups 5.519 1 5.519 3.232 .074 
 
Within 
Groups 305.686 179 1.708   
  Total 311.204 180       
av succ. 
pump 
Between 
Groups .157 1 .157 .027 .869 
 
Within 
Groups 1.033.367 179 5.773   
  Total 1.033.524 180       
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IV.1.5 Discussion, limitations of this study and future research 
Summarizing, we do not find the expected treatment effects from emotion induction 
in the present study. We also do not observe gender differences in risk taking behavior 
nor interaction effects of emotion induction and type of player. Given ample 
experimental evidence and existing theories on emotions influence on risk preferences 
this is unexpected and surprising. We will discuss this in the following.  
One possible explanation is that the setting in this straightforward laboratory 
experiment was perceived as too artificial. Koellinger and Treffers (2015) find in a 
very clever incentive compatible experiment that joy induced overconfidence but only 
if joy was unrelated to the task in form of an unexpected gift. If joy was induced 
together with asking respondents to reflect on their mood, they did not find this effect. 
They conclude that being aware of one’s mood actually leads to well calibrated 
judgments of participants. Gasper and Clore (2000) find similar behavior of 
participants when evaluating risks in two experimental studies. Hence, one possibility 
in the present design is that people became aware of their emotions and in turn were 
not affected by the induced mood. The participants did not need to engage in difficult 
tasks or consider other factors than the risk tasks. We explicitly aimed to design the 
experiment in such a straightforward in order to reduce noise from people not 
understanding the respective economic task (see Charness et al. 2013 for a discussion). 
Maybe the tasks were too simple to disguise the induction for our sample of students.  
Hence, maybe in the present setting, tasks that are more complex and not 
straightforward risk measures would have been more successful for analyzing risk 
propensity and induced emotions in the laboratory without becoming too obvious. 
Examples for more complex types of situations in the laboratory are strategic games. 
In such type of situations, participants are more involved in the task and have to 
consider several factors such as others’ behavior resulting in strategic uncertainty. The 
subsequent chapter presents and discusses evidence for the value of emotions in 
strategic settings. 
 When studying emotions in the laboratory one issue that is often raised is potential 
demand effects. We did not ask participants to fill out emotion questionnaires such as 
the PANAS-X (Watson and Clarke 1982) for exactly this reason.  One possibility 
remains that the participants may have just by watching the videos before the task 
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anticipated the purpose of the experiment (see also Heilmann et al. 2010, Baillion et 
al. 2016). Both tasks are incentive compatible and incentivized with real cash. Maybe 
participants became aware of the fact that watching the film clip had the purpose to 
induce emotional states and in turn influence their choices so that they consequently 
controlled their own emotions. This is however very unlikely as it would require 
sophisticated recalibration to result in no significant effect over all players. Moreover, 
all respondents anticipating the desired outcome of the induction of fear and happiness 
and purposely deciding against this does not seem plausible. Apparently, there is just 
no effect of induced happiness and fear on our two experimental risk measurements.      
 Overall, emotions and risk taking behavior in the laboratory as compared to the 
field remains an intensely discussed topic as already laid out in chapter IV.1.1.3. It 
would be interesting and desirable to carry out further studies looking at how fear and 
happiness of people in the field or quasi field influence risk preferences. This does not 
come without challenges of course. It is hard to measure or induce emotions in the 
field especially when it comes to emotions such as fear. Moreover, more rigorous and 
incentive compatible experiments looking at induced emotions and economic 
preferences would be desirable. This would allow comparison to mixed findings of the 
influence of emotions on behavior from mostly psychological experiments without 
incentives.  
 In general, risk preferences and especially risk perceptions are oftentimes 
influenced by environmental factors including emotions. Scholars like Johnson and 
Tversky (1983) or Sunstein (2003) have provided clever designs to study such 
questions for instance in the context of terrorists’ attacks. When providing more 
feasible frames as compared to pure economic risk tasks people apparently relate to 
induced emotions to a greater extend even in the laboratory or classroom. Such 
approaches are important regarding policy implications and risk communication 
strategies. Better understanding how emotional components in communicating risks 
influence risk perception needs to be studied further in survey studies with employing 
different frames.  
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IV.2  The strategic value of emotions – happiness and fear in market 
entry 12 
 
IV.2.1 Introduction  
Coordination mechanisms are important in daily life interactions and for economics in 
general. Plenty researchers study how individuals coordinate in a range of games 
(Cooper 1998), and especially markets (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Erev and Rapoport 
1998, Rapoport et al. 1995). Recently, scholars highlight the fact that there is an 
emotional component to strategic decisions. Winter (2014) discusses in his book the 
idea that understanding own and foremost others’ emotions enables people becoming 
better strategists. In this sense, he stresses the concept of ‘rational emotions’. 
Meshulam et al. (2012) and Gneezy and Imas (2014) study anger in strategic games in 
the laboratory and find that people use the possibility to anger opponents in order to 
maximize own outcomes. We are interested in the strategic value of induced happiness 
and fear in repeated market entry decisions. Hence, this next chapter adds one further 
level to the study of emotions. Rather than looking at individuals’ decisions only, we 
include a strategic component to the discussion. Consequently, we draw on concepts 
from game theory to analyze and better understand strategic emotions.  
 In this study, we address the influence of discrete emotions, namely happiness, 
and fear, on individuals’ behavior in an economic experiment with real monetary 
incentives. We conduct an incentive compatible experiment with N=168 students and 
entrepreneurs testing whether discrete emotions influence individual’s choice of 
market entry in a simultaneous market entry game, and how knowledge about others’ 
emotional state influences choices. We employ the framework of the classic 
simultaneous market entry game (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 1988) with three 
asymmetric players who simultaneously decide to enter a market or not (Schade, 
Schröder, and Krause 2010). The framework of the market entry game offers a number 
of desirable features and is widely used in studying entrepreneurs’ behavior. The 
players cannot communicate or observe others’ behavior thus face strategic 
uncertainty about their opponents’ behavior as in real markets. Before making the 
                                                 
12 This chapter is based on joint work with Christian D. Schade. 
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entry decisions, all players are randomly assigned to watch a validated film clip 
inducing either happiness, or fear, or they watch a neutral scene. We then communicate 
the induced emotional states of all three players who will enter the same market so that 
induced emotional states are common knowledge to all players. Individuals are 
matched randomly with opponents knowing their respective emotional state and are 
then re-matched with other players for each new round. In this way, they play multiple 
rounds of the market entry game against players with different induced emotional 
states. Before all entry decisions we measured risk attitude with the lottery comparison 
task by Holt and Laury (2002) and with the risk questions administered in the 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). Further, we measure trait happiness with the 
‘satisfaction with life scale’ (SWLS) by Diener et al. (1985) and trait anxiety using the 
questions of the SOEP.  
 We find that people tend to enter more when induced to a happy clip (mean entry 
rate M=54) as compared to neutral scenes (M=48) and enter less when induced to a 
fearful film clip (M=40). This difference is statistically significant for female players 
(p < .001). Moreover, women enter less than men in all three groups (Mf=43 vs. 
Mm=54) and, interestingly, anxious men enter even more than happy women. Male 
entrepreneurs enter most of all (M=56). Most strikingly, all players react to their 
opponents’ emotions regardless of their emotion. Agents enter most when playing 
against two anxious players and least when facing two happy players (p < .001). When 
playing against one happy and one anxious player, women tend to stay out but men 
enter more (p < .05). We can conclude that people use the information about others’ 
emotional states to coordinate. Moreover, women react more to own emotions than 
men do. 
 Our paper makes the following main contributions: With our study design, we are 
able to determine the strategic value of emotion. Specifically, we add an incentive 
compatible experimental study to the very small number of papers on the influence of 
emotions on strategic choices. To our best knowledge, there exists no experimental 
study that investigates the influence of induced happiness and fear in strategic games.  
We provide an incentive compatible experiment with students and entrepreneurs as 
sample and study an important entrepreneurial decision framework. Moreover, we 
study coordination decisions with entrepreneurs as important application of decision 
makers under uncertainty. Even though studying emotions in strategic games has 
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become more established over the past 15 years, incentive compatible economic 
experiments are still quite rare. We thus contribute to the young but growing field of 
the experimental literature on emotions and decision making. Finally, we add to the 
literature on gender differences in competitive markets.   
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides 
relevant literature, presents the underlying model and derives the hypotheses. 
Subsequent parts describe the experimental design and procedure, present the results, 
and analyses. The chapter concludes with a discussion, limitations of this study and 
implications for future research. 
 
IV.2.2 Relevant literature and hypotheses 
In chapter II.5, I extensively discussed studies investigating the impact of emotions 
and mood on behavior in strategic settings. Of those studies, most of the papers 
discussed actually induce emotions with either film clips (as we do), relived emotions, 
or both. Exceptions are Kugler et al. (2014) who study trait emotions (self-reported 
data), Kopelman et al. (2006) who examine the influence of the display of positive 
versus negative faces of opponents, and Gneezy and Iman (2014) who give 
respondents the option to anger opponents (making them stay in the laboratory for an 
extra-long time). All of these studies agree that (induced) emotions have a significant 
influence on respondents’ choices. Whereas all of the studies discussed investigate 
strategic games only some of them explicitly consider opponents’ emotions in the 
laboratory: Kausel and Connoly (2014) include opponents’ anger, guilt, and gratitude 
in trust games, Andrade and Ho (2009) investigate opponents’ happiness and anger in 
the ultimatum game, Kugler et al. (2014) study opponents’ trait anger and anxiousness 
in entry decisions,    
 In line with the existing literature on emotions in strategic games we are interested 
in the influence of own emotions on choices but also in the influence of knowledge 
about opponents’ emotions on market entry decisions. Hence, what is novel in our 
approach is that we examine both the direct and indirect (i.e., other players’ emotion) 
effect of induced happiness and fear on peoples’ decisions in the setting of an 
important strategic game, the market entry game (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 
1988).  
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IV.2.2.1 Direct effect of emotions 
Recently, a range of studies finds systematic influences of emotions on economic 
variables such as the endowment effect (Lerner et al. 2013), WTP for insurance 
(Schade et al. 2012), or time preferences (Ifcher and Zahrgamee 2011). Scholars from 
psychology largely agree that emotions play an important role for our judgment and 
decision making (e.g., Lerner et al. 2015). Moreover, from an evolutionary 
perspective, people are able to experience emotions in order to deal with threats and 
opportunities in their environment. From this standpoint, emotions are useful and have 
an adaptive function (Darwin 2013/1872, Fessler et al. 2004, Frank 1988, Frey et al. 
2014), see chapter II.2.4.  
 In this experiment, we study induced happiness and fear. Fear is an emotion of 
negative valence and is associated with little individual control and high uncertainty 
according to the ATF (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). In its adaptive function as 
response to threat, fear motivates escape (Frank 1988, Frey et al. 2014, Nesse 1990). 
Further, drawing on the literature on action-tendencies fear presents an avoidance-
oriented emotion (Fredrickson 2004). Happiness on the other hand, is an emotion of 
positive valence and associated with high control and less uncertainty. The adaptive 
function is rather motivational and leads to exploration (Fessler et al. 2004, Frank 
1988, Frey et al. 2014, Nesse 1990). Looking at action-tendencies happiness represents 
an approach-oriented emotion. Happiness triggers the urge to play and to explore and 
motivates people (Fredrickson 2004). Hence, we expect happiness-induced players to 
enter markets more than ‘neutral’ players, and fear-induced players to enter less than 
‘neutral’ players. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Agents enter the markets more when induced to happy film clips and 
less when induced to anxious film clips compared to a ‘neutral’ control group (MH > 
MN > MA). 
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IV.2.2.2 Indirect effect of emotions 
We study the framework of the market entry game. Studying market entry games has 
several benefits for studying individual decision making and especially that of 
entrepreneurs. In the standard framework (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 1988), 
individuals repeatedly decide to enter or to stay out of a market. Players cannot 
communicate or observe others’ behavior and have to decide simultaneously. Usually, 
payoffs are decreasing with N players who enter and agents make losses whenever the 
number of entrants m is larger than the capacity c of the respective market. Hence, the 
structure of the market entry game echoes fundamental properties of real world 
markets. Further, the game is easy to understand for players. Agents should only want 
to enter whenever the total number of entrants [(N-1)+1] is smaller than c and ideally 
aim to enter alone. 
 Economists have been interested in this type of game for a long time. Starting with 
Chamberlain (1933), market entry games have been studied extensively from a 
theoretical perspective highlighting the importance of the Nash equilibrium as 
normative solution to this type of noncooperative n-person games (Selten and Güth 
1982). In the Nash equilibrium each player’s strategy is his best response to other 
players’ strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Hence, no player in the market would 
have been better off staying out and nobody would be better off entering. Several 
experimental studies find that in a class of market entry games with large N that 
behavior is accounted for best by the Nash equilibrium (Duffy and Hopkins 2005, Erev 
and Rapoport 1998, Kahneman 1988, Rapoport 1995, Rapoport et al. 1998, Sundali et 
al. 1995). Finding that the number of entrants usually ranged from [c+2; c-2], 
Kahneman (1988) stated: “To a psychologist it looks like magic” (p.12).   
 We are building our predictions in analogy to the model by Schade, Schroeder, 
and Krause (2010) who investigate the effects of loss and gain experiences prior to 
making strategic decisions in two coordination games. The authors are the first 
studying the influence of gain and loss experiences in strategic decision environments 
developing a mathematical model and hence providing a framework for analyzing 
individuals’ prior loss and gain experiences in strategic decision situations. This is 
important because there are rarely decisions where individuals need to coordinate 
without history.  Schade et al. (2010) assume that individuals’ payoffs can be evaluated 
by a reference-dependent value function according to prospect theory as developed by 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979), i.e. people behave rather risk averse after experiencing 
gains and risk seeking after experiencing losses. Further they assume each individual 
to expect his/her counter player to react to gains and losses in the same way he/her 
does, in line with the concept of social projection (Allport 1924, Festinger 1954). 
Moreover, individuals are assumed to process loss and gain experiences in an 
aggregated form (see e.g., Thaler and Johnson 1990). Finally, the authors assume 
individuals to behave according to general equilibrium point selection theory 
developed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Schade et al. (2010) calculate behavioral 
equilibrium predictions leading to the hypotheses that player should enter most when 
having experienced a loss and facing to people that experienced gains. They should 
enter least when having experienced a gain prior to entering and are facing to player 
who lost before, and so on. They test their predictions in two experimental studies 
employing a market entry game and a battle of the sexes game. The authors find the 
hypothesized pattern for male players; female players do not behave according to the 
predictions.   
 Instead of gain and loss experiences prior to entering markets we are interested in 
different emotional states of players. In line with the existing experimental studies 
finding significant influences of own and others’ emotional states on choices by 
Meshulam et al. (2012), Gneezy and Iman, and Kugler et al. (2014) we expect not only 
own emotions to play a role for individuals’ choices but also information about 
opponents’ emotional states. Contrary to the above studies we do not examine trait 
emotions such as anger and anxiety (Kugler et al. 2014), nor are subjects  given the 
possibility to anger each other (Meshulam et al. 2012, Gneezy and Iman 2014). Rather 
we induce happiness, fear, and neutral states using a battery of pre-tested film clips in 
the laboratory.   
 We expect individuals to react to the information about induced emotional states. 
Specifically, we expect subjects to behave according to social projection hence to enter 
when facing fear-induced players because they assume them to stay out of the 
competitive market (according to hypothesis 1, people enter less when induced to 
fear). We hypothesize individuals to stay out of the market when facing happiness-
induced players because they would expect those players to enter. It would not make 
sense to enter against two people they believe to enter for sure (according to hypothesis 
1) as 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 2 leads to 𝜋𝜋 ≤ 0. Concluding, building on hypothesis 1 and social 
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projection, and in analogy to predictions by Schade et al. (2010) we expect players to 
behave as follows: 
  
Hypothesis 2: Market entry is expected to be highest with a happiness-induced player 
facing two anxiousness-induced players and lowest with an anxious-induced player 
facing two happiness-induced players. 
 
IV.2.2.3 Running the experiment with entrepreneurs and students – a robustness 
check 
Studying entrepreneurs’ behavior is especially interesting for research in judgment and 
decision making as the entrepreneur can be described as expert decision maker in an 
inherently uncertain and complex environment in the economic domain (Knight 1921). 
Moreover, scholars find entrepreneurs to be more or less susceptible to cognitive 
biases such as overconfidence or the status quo bias than non-entrepreneurs (e.g., 
Busenitz and Barney 1997, Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Burmeister and Schade 2005). 
 Market entry problems (Selten and Güth 1982, Kahneman 1988, Camerer und 
Lovallo 1999, Schade et al. 2010) have been of interest to scholars from different fields 
of research for several reasons. Entrepreneurship researchers are interested in how 
individuals behave in entrepreneurial settings (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) or how 
entrepreneurs act in situations facing market entry decisions (Artinger and Schade 
2014). Researchers from organizational behavior are interested in firms’ behavior 
when for instance entering new markets in foreign countries with publicly known 
capacity and competitors (see Sundali et al. 1995). In fact, a typical observation in 
entrepreneurial markets is excess entry of startups (e.g., Koellinger et al. 2007, Bolger 
et al. 2008, Artinger and Powell 2015). Hence, we will run our experiments with 
entrepreneurs as important real life decision makers under uncertainty and observe 
their behavior in comparison to students’ behavior. 
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IV.2.3 Equilibrium analysis 
IV.2.3.1 Normative equilibrium analysis 
Our setting has the following characteristics: N = 3 players can privately and 
simultaneously decide to enter (si = 1) or not (si = 0) on each trial. Payoffs πi are linearly 
decreasing with 0 ≤  m < N number of people who enter and zero entry costs. The 
capacity of the market c = 2 is fixed, and publicly known. The scaling parameter is r 
= 6 and m represents the number of players entering. Players cannot communicate or 
observe others’ behavior. Hence, they face strategic uncertainty about other 
opponents’ behavior. 
 
𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊 = �𝒓𝒓(𝒄𝒄 −𝒎𝒎), 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎                , 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎𝟎 
 
It follows that a profit-maximizing player should stay out of the market if the other 
two players enter, and enter if nobody else enters. If one player enters, the others are 
indifferent between entering and not entering. Hence, this game has six pure Nash 
equilibria (see appendix Figure VII-4) and one mixed strategy equilibrium (Rapoport 
et al. 1998). In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, each agent enters with 
probability p and stays out with 1- p. The mixed strategy equilibrium is 
𝒑𝒑 ∗= 𝒄𝒄−𝟏𝟏
𝑵𝑵−𝟏𝟏
.  
 
Given the parameters in our game the mixed equilibrium is p*= ½.  
 In the market entry game, strategy selection is difficult because of the existence of 
multiple Nash equilibria. Schade et al. (2010) derive unique behavioral equilibria 
under asymmetric starting conditions. 
 
IV.2.3.2 Descriptive equilibrium analysis 
Schade et al. (2010) show that unique behavioral equilibria can be derived under 
asymmetric starting conditions. In their set up asymmetric starting conditions were 
gain or loss experiences prior market entry decisions. Please refer to Schade et al. 
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(2010) for detailed explanations and a mathematical development of equilibrium 
predictions based on prospect theory (TAP games).  
 In our study, we suggest entry tendencies in the following table, in analogy to 
reference dependent equilibrium predictions according to Schade et al. (2010). 
According to their predictions a loser always enter the market in all player 
combinations where a loser (L) faces combinations of winners (G) and neutral players 
(N), i.e., in the following combinations L enters: (L-LN), (L-LG), (L-NN), (L-NG), 
(L-GG). On the other hand, a winner (G) facing combinations of loser (L) and neutral 
players (N) would not enter the market according to the predictions. Table 7 on p.433 
depicts all equilibrium forecasts for asymmetric combinations (Schade et al. 2010). 
 Even though we are not able to calculate equilibrium predictions we attempt to 
translate the above predictions to induced emotions. Respective entry tendencies are 
denoted by ti, tj, and tk for N = 3 players. Positive signs denote a tendency to enter, 
negative signs to stay out, and ~ indifference. For instance, the first row depicts entry 
tendencies for fear-induced player (F) playing against two happiness induced players 
(H,H) with the fear-induced player having a strong tendency to stay out of the market. 
On the other hand, one happiness-induced player (H) facing two fear-induced players 
(F, F) has a very strong tendency to enter the market.  
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Table IV-12: Entry tendency predictions 
 
 ti tj tk 
F – HH - - - + + 
F – HN - + + ~ 
F – HF ~ + + + ~ 
F – NN - + + 
F – NF + + + + 
F – FF + + + 
N – HH - - - - 
N – HN - + + - 
N – HF ~ + - 
N – NN ~ ~ ~ 
N – NF + + - 
N – FF + + + + 
H – HH - - - 
H – HN + + - - 
H – HF + + - - - 
H – NN + + - - 
H – NF + + ~ - 
H – FF + + + ~ ~ 
 
 
IV.2.4 Experimental design 
We carried out a laboratory experiment studying the effect of happiness and fear on 
strategic decisions in the market entry game. The computerized experiment was 
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Table IV-13  depicts the experimental 
design. First, all participants received and signed an informed consent form. They were 
then welcomed to the laboratory and randomly assigned seats. Instructions were 
printed and read aloud. Each student participant received a show up fee of EUR 14. 
Entrepreneurs’ payoffs were scaled by a factor of four in order to account for possible 
income differentials and to ensure salience of incentives. They were informed that only 
one of the rounds would become payout relevant and thus they had the incentive to 
make their best decision in each round. Before all entry decisions and emotion 
induction we measured risk attitude with the lottery comparison task by Holt and Laury 
(2002) and using the risk questions administered in the Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). 
Further, we measure trait happiness with the satisfaction with life scale (SWLS) by 
Diener et al. (1985) and trait anxiety using the questions of the SOEP. Then, 
instructions for the second and main part of the experiment were read out loud. 
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Participants answered five comprehension questions to make sure they thoroughly 
understand the economic task. They played 18 rounds of the three-player market entry 
game. Before starting and after every fifth round, everybody watched a short film clip 
(either four times a happiness-inducing scene, or four times a fear-inducing scene, or 
four times a ‘neutral’ scene). After completing all rounds, the participants answered 
some questions about their strategic behavior and demographic details. Finally, they 
got informed of their payoffs and anonymously received the money in cash. The 
experiment was carried out in German. The instructions can be found in appendix C. 
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Table IV-13: Overview of experimental design 
 
0 Consent form 
1 Welcome and instructions part 1 
2 Holt and Laury task (2002) 
3 Trait happiness and trait fear questionnaire 
4 Instructions part 2 (ME game) & comprehension 
questions 
5 Film clip 1  
ME game round 1-5 
Film clip 2  
ME game round 6-10 
Film clip 3  
ME game round 11-14 
Film clip 4  
ME game round 15-18 
 
6 Demographic questionnaire 
7 Anonymous payoffs 
 
IV.2.4.1 Participants and instructions 
In total, N=168 subjects participated in our experiment. The sample consists of 
students and entrepreneurs. The N=144 students were recruited from an experimental 
database (ORSEE 2.0, Greiner 2015). The experiment took place in the laboratory of 
Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin. Each of the 12 sessions lasted approximately one 
hour. The N=24 entrepreneurs were recruited mainly via the university’s venture 
service. One session was carried out in the laboratory and one session using a mobile 
laboratory in the university’s incubator building. All participants received detailed 
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instructions. They could follow the instructions on their computer screens and they 
were read aloud.  
 
IV.2.4.2 Risk preferences and trait emotions 
After welcoming everybody to the experiment, the Holt and Laury (2002) risk lottery 
was explained. We started off with the lotteries in order not to confound the subjects’ 
risk propensity with the emotion induction process. In the Holt and Laury lottery, 
subjects have to decide between ten paired lottery choices that are structured so that 
the degree of risk aversion can be inferred on the basis of the crossover point to the 
high-risk lottery. Payoffs for option A (EUR 2 or EUR 1.60) are less variable than 
payoffs of option B (EUR 3.85 or EUR 0.10). Hence, option B can be characterized as 
being riskier. In the first decision, the probability of getting the higher payoff of each 
option is ten percent. Only extreme risk seekers would choose option B, i.e., receiving 
EUR 3.85 with a probability of ten percent as compared to receiving EUR 2 with ten 
percent or EUR 1.60 with 90 percent. With each decision, the probability of getting 
the higher payoff of each option increases (in decision two the probability of receiving 
EUR 2 or EUR 3.85 respectively amounts to 20 percent, decision three implies a 
probability of 30 percent, and so on). Appendix C provides screenshots of the actual 
table. At some point, any decision maker should cross from choosing option A to 
choosing B since the probabilities for getting higher payoffs increase. Note that even 
an extreme risk seeker should choose option B in the last decision (probability of 100 
percent of winning the high lottery).  
 Further, all participants answered questions accessing individuals’ risk 
preferences. We chose seven questions that are used in the Socio-economic panel 
(SOEP), a representative panel survey of the German population since 1984 (please 
see e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011, or, Schupp and Wagner 2002 for a detailed description). 
In the first question, individuals are asked for their attitude towards risk in general 
(“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?”). The following questions ask for risk attitude in specific domains: car 
driving, finances, sports, career, and health. Participants could indicate their 
willingness to take risks on a ten-point scale ranging from complete unwillingness to 
complete willingness to take the risk. One further question presents the participants 
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with an investment choice, telling them that they had won 100,000 EUR in a lottery 
and could invest a fraction or everything at a bank whereas the amount of money 
doubles or is cut in half with probability of 50 percent13. We administered both the 
lottery choices and the risk scales in order to get a comprehensive picture of 
individuals’ risk preferences. The Holt and Laury lottery task has the clear advantage 
of being an incentivized measure that reveals individuals real risk preferences. 
However, empirical evidence shows that participants oftentimes show inconsistent 
behavior by having multiple switching points or not choosing option B in the last 
choice. Self-reported risk question cannot be incentivized but are easily accessible for 
respondents. 
 Next, we administered two questionnaires accessing participants’ general 
happiness and fear (before any emotion induction was carried out). Participants 
answered the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), a short 5-item instrument that 
measures cognitive judgments of satisfaction with one's life (Diener et al. 1985). 
Moreover, they answered three questions regarding their general fear that are also used 
in the SOEP (Wagner et al. 2007). Participants could state whether they agree or not 
on a seven point Likert scale.  
IV.2.4.3 Market entry game  
Then, participants received instructions for the second part of the experiment. They 
were informed that they would play 18 rounds of the market entry game and that they 
were playing against a different randomly determined combination of players in each 
round. Before starting and in between the rounds they and every other player would 
see a short video clip, see Table IV.13  (Experimental design) for details. Before each 
round, they would receive information about the nature of the video the other player 
had seen. Moreover, they were informed that all three players simultaneously decide 
to enter the market or not. The market has a limited capacity so that if all three players 
enter everybody suffers a loss, if two players enter everybody gets 0 and if one person 
enters he wins. They were explicitly informed that only one of the rounds will be 
                                                 
13 The exact wording is: “Imagine you had won 100,000 Euros in a lottery. Almost 
immediately after you collect, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, 
the conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money within two 
years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested.” All questions in 
German can be found here: www.diw.de/deutsch/sop/service/fragen/personen/2004.pdf.  
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chosen in the end that becomes payoff relevant. Thus, they had the incentive to make 
their best possible decision in every round.  
 Subsequently, subjects had to answer five comprehension questions to make sure 
they understood the instructions. After all market entry decisions, participants 
answered four questions asking whether they anticipated what the other players would 
do and answered demographic questions. In the end, they were informed about their 
payoffs from part one and two and the experimenter secretly handed out the payoffs 
in cash.  
 Additionally, participants had the opportunity to state their entry decisions by 
using a randomizing device, a procedure called explicit randomization (Anderhub et 
al. 2002, Camerer 2003, Schade et al. 2010). They were told that an imaginary bingo 
cage would determine whether they would enter the market or not. The bingo cage 
contains 100 lots and in each round the participant could decide what type of lots to 
fill it with. They could assign either 100 lots to enter for sure or 0 lots to stay out for 
sure. Alternatively, they could fill any kind of combination of entry and no-entry lots 
that would then reflect the probability of the bingo cage determining entering the 
market or not.14 This procedure has the advantage that participants have the possibility 
to make non-binary decisions and it allows comparing respondents’ strategies with 
mixed strategy equilibria.  
 
IV.2.4.4 Emotion induction 
We introduced emotions in the laboratory via showing participants a short film clip. 
Using film clips to elicit emotions is common in psychological and economic 
experiments (e.g., Ifcher and Zhargamee 2011, Lerner et al. 2011) and has several 
advantages as discussed extensively in chapter III.2. However, one challenge is the 
question of which set of stimuli to use. For this purpose, we conducted a pre-study, 
please refer to chapter III.2 for details. We identified the following movies for each 
treatment condition (N = neutral, F = fearful, H = happy):  
 
                                                 
14 The exact description can be found in appendix C, instructions. 
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Table IV-14: Emotion induction - stimuli 
N1 All the Presidents' Men F1 The Shining H1 Harry and Sally 
N2 The Network F2 Lambs H2 The Hangover 
N3 Jane Eyre F3 Blairwitch Project H3 Big Bang Theory 
N4 North by Northwest F4 Insidious H4 The Naked Gun 
  
IV.2.5 Data and results 
IV.2.5.1 Sample 
We conducted 14 sessions with 12 players each and collected the data within one 
month. Each session lasted about one hour. The table below summarizes by type of 
player. The student sample consists of 90 females and 54 males with an average age 
of 26 from several fields of study. On average, students earned 16 Euro. Only one 
female entrepreneur participated in the entrepreneurial sample (N=24)15, the average 
age here was 31 and average profit 59 Euro. Entrepreneurs enter most of all (mean 
entry 56%) but only slightly more than male students (55%). Female students enter 
significantly less (43%). Looking at the Holt and Laury lottery, students are more risk 
averse than entrepreneurs: students’ average switching point was 6, whereas 
entrepreneurs switched earlier at option 5 (note that the earlier the switching point the 
more risk loving, and a switching point of 4 denotes risk neutrality). Regarding the 
general and domain specific questions of the SOEP (scale from 0-10 with 10 being 
risk loving) we find entrepreneurs to be more risk taking than students and to invest 
more hypothetically. All participants tend to be satisfied with their life (Mstud = 5.11 / 
4.92, Mentr = 5.54) whereas entrepreneurs are slightly more satisfied than female and 
male students are. Male students tend to be a bit more worried than female students 
and entrepreneurs (Mstud = 3.91 / 4.34, Mentr = 3.96). 
  
                                                 
15 In the following analysis, we will not distinguish between male and female entrepreneurs 
since we only have one female in our sample. 
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Table IV-15: Descriptive statistics 
    
  
Female 
students 
Male 
students 
Entre- 
preneurs 
Observations 90 54 24 
Age 26 26 31 
Mean entry  43% 55% 56% 
Av. Profit (in EUR) 16.20 16.70 59 
Risk propensity (H&L) * 6 7 5 
Risk propensity (SOEP) 
General (av.) 4.32 3.84 5.69 
Financial (in EUR) 20k 20k 40k 
SWLS (scale 1-7) 5.11 4.92 5.54 
Anxiety (scale 1-7) 3.91 4.34 3.96 
* switching point    
 
IV.2.5.2 Individual analysis: mean entry rates 
IV.2.5.2.1 Direct effect of own emotional state on behavior 
IV.2.5.2.1.1 Entry lots 
Participants had the possibility to explicitly ‘mix’ their entry strategies, i.e., they could 
specify whether they want to enter for sure (100 lots), want to stay out for sure (0 entry 
lots), or mix over the interval [0,100]. We find, that 57 percent of the players mix their 
entry lots and 43 percent play pure strategies. Sixty-two percent of female players play 
mixing strategies whereas 56 percent of male students and only 38 percent of 
entrepreneurs chose to mix. Mean entry is 48.32 (SD = 25.21) and median is 50. For 
the distribution of our dependent variable entry lots this implies a binary censored 
distribution, see histogram Figure VII-5 in appendix C.  
  
155 
 Looking at mean entry rates separately by groups, we find women overall to enter 
fewer than men. Mean entry of women is Mf = 42.58 (SD = 23.49) whereas men on 
average enter with a mean of Mm = 54.65 (SD = 25.95). Entrepreneurs enter most of 
all Me = 55.63 (SD = 25.45). The difference between entry of females and male 
students and entrepreneurs is significant, F(2, 165) = 5.306, p = .006.    
 
Figure IV-6: Mean entry rate by type of player 
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Moreover, we find that on average individuals tend to enter more when watching a 
happiness-inducing film clip MHAPP = 52.53 (SD = 34.15) as compared to ‘neutral’ 
scenes MNEUT = 49.34 (SD = 39.32) and enter fewer when watching a fear-inducing 
film clip MANX = 43.10 (SD = 37.59), see figure below. This difference is however not 
significant, F(2, 165) = 2.051, n.s. 
 
Figure IV-7: Mean entry rate by emotion 
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Looking at entry behavior by type of player and own emotion we find an interesting 
difference. The difference between men and women is so large that a fear-induced 
male player enters even more (M = 54.70) than a happiness-induced female player (M 
= 49.04). Figure IV-8 summarizes this difference of entry lots by type and emotion.  
 Running a two way ANOVA with el as dependent variable we find a significant 
main effect of the type of player on entry behavior, F(2,159)=5.079, p < .01. There 
was a non-significant main effect of own emotion on entry behavior, F(2,159)=.736, 
p = .481. There was a nonsignificant interaction of type of player and own emotion on 
entry behavior, F(4,159)=.612, p = .654. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed no 
difference in entry behavior between male students and male entrepreneurs, Mdiff = -
.99, 95% [-15.57, 13.59], p = 1. Entry behavior was however significantly lower for 
female students compared to male students, Mdiff = 12.07, 95% [1.84, 22.30], p < .05, 
and compared to entrepreneurs, Mdiff = -13.05, 95% [-.60, 26.71], p < .1.  
Figure IV-8: Mean entry rates by type and emotion 
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Concluding, the above findings are in favor of hypothesis 1. People enter more when 
induced to happy clips as compared to neutral and anxious clips. This difference is 
however only significant for female students, (F(2,87) = 3.473, p = .035). Moreover, 
we find that female students enter significantly fewer than male students and 
entrepreneurs.    
  
159 
IV.2.5.2.1.2 Payoffs 
In the following, we will look at payoffs of respondents by type of player and by 
induced emotion. Female players earned MF = 16.16 (SD = 3.39), male students 
learned a bit more MM = 16.69 (SD = 2.66), and entrepreneurs earned most16 ME = 
16.82 (SD = 2.71). The differences between type of players are not significant, 
F(2,165)=.722, p = .487.  
 Comparing payoffs by type of induced emotion, we find a significant difference 
determined by an one-way ANOVA, F(2,165)=3.370, p < .05. A Bonferroni post-hoc 
test revealed that the happiness-induced players earned significantly more (MHAP = 
EUR 17.08, p = .034) than anxiousness-induced players (MANX = EUR 15.62). There 
are no significant differences compared to the neutral group (MNEUT = EUR 16.58). 
 Running a two-way ANOVA this effect disappears. We observe a non-significant 
main effect of type of players, F(2,159)= .656, p = 520. We also find a non-significant 
main effect of own emotion, F(2,159) = 2.323, p = .101. Last, there was a non-
significant interaction of both variables type of player and own emotion, F(4,159) = 
1.309, p = .269. Individuals’ payoffs by group of emotion and type of player are 
depicted below. 
 
                                                 
16 We scaled back payoffs to entrepreneurs to be able to compare payoffs across groups. 
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Figure IV-9: Mean payoffs by type of player and own emotion 
 
 
 
 
Running split file analyses, we find that female players earn significantly less when in 
an anxious state compared to being in a happy state determined by one-way ANOVA, 
(F(2,87) = 3.719, p = .028). A Bonferroni post-hoc test shows that the final profit was 
significantly lower in the anxious treatment (MANX = EUR 14.92 ± 2.9, p = .028) than 
in the happy treatment (MHAP = EUR 17.20 ± 3.8). There are no statistically significant 
differences to the neutral group (MNEUT = EUR 16.46 ± 3.2). For male students and 
entrepreneurs, we find no significant differences in payoffs between treatments 
(ownemo). 
 
IV.2.5.2.1.3 Pure vs. mixing strategies 
Looking at entry strategies for male and female students separately (see table below), 
we find that women decide for mixing strategies more often than men (62 percent vs. 
56 percent). Entrepreneurs play mixed strategies in 38 percent of cases only. 
Moreover, only 14 percent of the female students fill in 100 lots as compared to 26 
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percent of the male students and 37 percent of the entrepreneurs. The same pattern 
holds for zero entry lots, women indicate to stay out of the market in 24 percent of all 
decisions whereas male students stay out only 18 percent. Entrepreneurs interestingly 
choose zero lots in 25 percent of all cases. Please find all relevant histograms in 
Appendix C.  
Table IV-16: Entry strategies by type 
Entry lots All Female students Male students Entrepreneurs 
mean 48 43 55 56 
100 21 14 26 37 
0 22 24 18 25 
mix 57 62 56 38 
pure 43 38 44 62 
(in percent)    
 
IV.2.5.2.2 Influence of information about others’ emotional states 
Figures IV.10 – IV.12 below graphically show mean entry rates depending on own 
emotional states (depicted on x-axis) and opponents’ emotional states (depicted on y-
axis). Each line represents a combination of two opponent players. Each combination 
of all three players is represented by one of the data points. For instance, the lower left 
square shows mean entry for a fear-induced person playing against two happiness-
induced individuals. The upper right rhomb illustrates the situation of a happiness-
induced individual playing against two fear-induced people. We see that players react 
differently to their opponents’ emotions. All players enter least when facing two 
happiness-induced players (orange line) and enter most when playing against two fear-
induced players (green line). Happiness-induced players facing two fear-induced 
players enter most of all (M=74) and fear-induced players facing two happiness-
induced opponents enter least of all (M=32).  
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Figure IV-10: Mean entry rates given opponents' emotion (0;100) 
 
 
 
Moreover, we observe a clear difference in behavior when comparing the behavior of 
women and men. For both groups, we see the same pattern when facing different 
opponents: highest entry rates against two anxiousness-induced players (green line), 
second highest entry against the combination anxious and neutral; lowest entry rates 
against two happiness induced players, second lowest against happy and neutral. 
However, the graph of men’s behavior depicts flat lines, i.e., they seem to ignore the 
influence of own emotion but behave as presumed to opponents’ emotional states. 
Women do both: they enter more in a happy emotional state and less when anxious 
and expect the same behavior of their opponents. In the next sub-chapter we will 
analyze these pattern estimating regression models. 
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Figure IV-11: Men’s mean entry rates given opponents' emotion (0;100) 
 
Figure IV-12: Women’s mean entry rates given opponents' emotion (0;100) 
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IV.2.5.3 Model estimates 
IV.2.5.3.1 Repeated-measures ANOVA 
We now turn to model estimation in order to be able to evaluate the size and 
significance of the observed patterns in the previous graphs. We run repeated-
measures ANOVAs with Bonferroni post-hoc test and random-effects Tobit models as 
robustness checks. In our general linear model, the between subjects variable is a 
subjects’ own emotion (emo_own). The within-subjects factors are opponents’ 
emotions (emo_opp). Hence we have three between factors (NEUT, ANX, HAPP) and 
six within-subjects factors (NEUT-NEUT, NEUT-ANX, ANX-ANX, NEUT-HAPP, 
ANX-HAPP, HAPP-HAPP). All tables can be found in Appendix C. All effects are 
reported as significant at p < .05.  
 First, there is a significant main effect of own emotion on the dependent variable 
entry lots (el), F(2, 165) = 3.568, p = .03. Bonferroni post-hoc tests reveal that 
happiness-induced subjects enter more than anxiousness-induced subjects (mean 
difference = 12.58, p = .026). There was no significant mean difference comparing 
happy and anxious subjects to the neutral group.  
 We also find a significant main effect of opponents’ emotions on entry lots (el), 
F(5, 825) = 61.044, p = .000). Contrasts show that comparing to NEUT-NEUT, people 
enter significantly more when facing two anxiousness-induced players, F(1, 165) = 
36.505, p = .000, or one ‘anxious’ and one ‘neutral’ player, F(1, 165) = 9.078, p = 
.003. They enter significantly less when facing two ‘happy’ players, F(1, 165) = 
65.324, p = .000, or facing one ‘happy’ and one ‘neutral’ player, F(1, 165) = 39.187, 
p = .000. No significant effect is found when comparing entry against one ‘anxious’ 
and one ‘happy’ player.  
 Looking at the effects per type of player, we find the main effect of opponents to 
be significant for all three groups. Interestingly, comparing the situation (ANX-HAPP) 
to (NEUT-NEUT) by group we find that male students and entrepreneurs enter more, 
F(1, 51) = 3.831, p = .056, whereas female students enter less, F(1, 87) = 3.445, p = 
.067.  
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IV.2.5.3.2 Random-effects Tobit regressions 
We now turn to regression estimation. Analyzing panel data, we can run fixed- or 
random-effects regressions. Whereas fixed-effects always give consistent results 
random-effects models may be more efficient. In order to choose between fixed- and 
random-effects we ran a Hausman (1978) test (the generally accepted test to use). The 
Hausman (1978) test compares both models in order to ensure that the potentially more 
efficient model also provides consistent results (Wooldridge 2010). Here, the 
Hausman test shows no significant difference, Prob>chi2 = 0.9037. Hence, we use 
random-effects models. Further, looking at our predictor we find the dependent 
variable el is binary censored, see figure 8, hence we run Tobit models17. Note that we 
also run OLS models and find the same results.  
 Table IV.17 reports the results for two models both with the dependent variable 
entry lots (el). Model 1 shows the main effects of individuals’ own emotions (emo-
own) happiness (HAPP) or anxiety (ANX) compared to neutral (NEUT omitted), and 
the effects of the five different combinations of opponents’ emotions (emo-opp) 
compared to the situations of two neutral players (NEUT-NEUT omitted). We find that 
compared to the neutral group people enter more in the happy situation and less in the 
anxious group (marginal significance p<.1). Comparing the entry behavior given their 
opponents’ emotional states, we find that participants enter significantly less against 
two ‘happy’ players (HAPP-HAPP) or one ‘happy’ and one ‘neutral’ player (HAPP-
NEUT) (-32.04 and -18.79 respectively, p<.001) and significantly more against two 
anxiousness-induced players (ANX-ANX) or one ‘anxious’ and one ‘neutral’ player 
(NEUT-ANX) (24.51 and 10.72 respectively, p<.001) than compared to two ‘neutral’ 
players (NEUT-NEUT). We do not find a statistically significant difference for the 
situation facing one anxiousness-induced and one happiness-induced player (ANX-
HAPP). Model 2 additionally takes into account the type of player (type). We see 
females entering significantly less than males (-26.39, p<.01) and male entrepreneurs 
entering slightly more than male students do (n.s.). 
 Running split file random-effects Tobit regressions, we see that the influence of 
fear on entry behavior is significant (p<.05) for female players and not for male 
players. Moreover, females facing the ambiguous situation of one ‘happy’ and one 
                                                 
17 For estimations we used the software package Stata 11. 
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‘anxious’ player enter less whereas male players in the same situation enter more often 
(p<.05). Please find all relevant output tables in appendix C.  
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Table IV-17: Random-effects Tobit regression (N=168) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
el Coef. Coef. 
emo-own     
ANX -14,81 † -14,81 † 
 (10,70) (10,37) 
HAPP 7,04 5,62 
 (10,68) (10,36) 
emo-opponent   
NEUT-ANX 10,72 *** 10,72 *** 
 (2,85) (2,85) 
ANX-ANX 24,51 *** 24,51 *** 
 (3,20) (3,20) 
NEUT-HAPP -18,79 *** -18,79 *** 
 (2,86) (2,86) 
ANX-HAPP -2,55 -2,55 
 (2,86) (2,86) 
HAPP-HAPP -32,04 *** -32,04 *** 
 (3,22) (3,22) 
type   
Female student  -26,39 ** 
  (9,46) 
Entrepreneur  3,14 
   (13,48) 
_cons 53,85 68,09 
 (7,85) (9,91) 
/sigma_u 54,98 53,24 
 (3,72) (3,60) 
/sigma_e 39,15 39,15 
 (0,74) (0,74) 
observ. 3024 3024 
Wald CHI 2 437,1 437,1 
Dep. Var.: entry lots; standard errors in parentheses, individual clusters. 
sign. levels ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, †<.1 
 
 
IV.2.6 Discussion 
IV.2.6.1 Summary 
We study the influence of happiness and fear on market entry decisions. We find that 
individuals enter less when fearful and more when happy (compared to a neutral 
treatment). This effect is significant for women. All individuals react to information 
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about other players’ emotions. They enter least when facing two happy players and 
most when competing against two anxious players compared to playing against two 
neutral players. Overall, our findings indicate that people use emotions to coordinate. 
Regarding our hypotheses, this implies we find hypothesis 1 to hold only for women. 
Our main hypothesis 2 holds for all individuals. Moreover, we find that happiness-
induced individuals tend to earn more and that payoffs significantly differ between 
happiness-induced female players and fear-induced female players. We do not find 
important differences between students and entrepreneurs. In the following, we will 
discuss our main findings and relate them to existing experimental findings and 
literature.  
 
IV.2.6.2 Strategic value of emotions 
In this study, we find that people seem to understand the strategic value of emotions 
and use them to coordinate. We are the first that study induced happiness and fear in 
coordination situations in an incentive compatible framework. All respondents use 
emotions strategically - not only women. Even though we do not find significant direct 
influences of emotions on men’s decisions we find indirect influences. This is very 
interesting. Men seem to anticipate their opponents’ behavior in a way we expected 
them to even though they do not act according to this themselves. This is in line with 
findings from existing studies on emotions influence in strategic games.   
  Our findings are in line with Meshulam et al (2012) and Gneezy and Iman (2014) 
who find that people use emotions strategically, i.e., players choose to anger people in 
strategic situations in the laboratory because they expect them to perform worse than 
‘neutral’ people. They are also in line with the findings by Kugler et al. (2014) who 
study trait anger and anxiousness and find that people who score high on trait anger 
do not only enter more and people whose trait anxiousness is high enter less in two 
player entry decisions but also react to their opponents’ personality characteristics 
accordingly. Our findings add to the idea formulated by Winter (2014) that better 
understanding emotions is beneficial for strategic behavior such as coordination 
decisions. This young but growing line of research is very interesting and can help to 
better understand individuals’ strategic decision making and economic behavior in 
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general. More experimental studies inducing different discrete emotions and different 
frameworks are desirable.  
 In coordination decisions, one’s own decision depends on other individuals’ 
decisions. In this type of decisions oftentimes, social projection plays an important 
role, i.e., the tendency to expect other people to think and behave as oneself (Robbins 
and Krueger 2005, Ross, Greene, and House 1977, Schade et al. 2010). Regarding 
emotions, Lee and Andrade (2011) find social projection to explain the phenomenon 
that people sell stocks to early when experiencing fear. In our study, apparently, 
women behave according to social projection. They expect others to enter less when 
being in fear because they enter less themselves in this case.  
 
IV.2.6.3 Gender differences 
We find that that female players react more to own emotions than male players. Our 
findings somewhat relate to Lerner et al. (2003) who find that women who had been 
induced with fear perceive risks as comparably higher than male respondents. Shortly 
after 9/11, using a representative sample of the US population (N=973) the authors 
induce fear and anger using two distinct newspaper articles between subjects. 
Afterwards, respondents answered three questionnaires about perceived risks to the 
US, to self, and to the median American. They find that in general fear-induced people 
perceive risks as greater than anger-induced people. Note that this applies for both 
types of risks, related to and independent of terrorism. The effect was especially strong 
amongst women in the sample.  
 Apparently, male respondents are not influenced by their own emotions but expect 
their opponents to be. It could also be the case that women adjust their own entry 
strategy to their expectations about others’ behavior. This implies they use k-level 
thinking (Camerer et al. 2004). We asked participants whether their decision was 
influenced by what strategies their opponent would play and by their opponents 
thinking strategically but find no gender differences.  
 Moreover, women seem to rather shy away from ambiguous situations whereas 
men try to exploit such situations. In our study, the situation when someone needs to 
decide whether to enter or not against one happy and one anxious player evokes 
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ambiguity. Prior research on ambiguity aversion shows that women tend to be more 
ambiguity and risk averse than men (e.g., Charness and Gneezy 2010, 2012).  
 
IV.2.6.4 Pure vs. mixed strategies 
We find that women choose mixing strategies more often than male students and 
entrepreneurs. This can be interpreted as men being more confident in their decision 
making. This is in line with findings by Schade et al. (2010) and has been interpreted 
as indicating uncertainty about what to expect from opponent players. 
 
IV.2.7 Limitations of this study and future research 
We acknowledge several limitations of our paper. Inducing emotions in the laboratory 
is difficult and of course artificial compared to real-life emotions. However, we 
extensively pre-tested our stimuli and used four different clips for each target emotion 
over the course of each session. Hence, we are confident that the film clips had the 
targeted effect on our participants. Alternatively, one could conduct a field study and 
manipulate real emotions. However, especially for negative emotions we believe this 
to be ethically problematic. One interesting approach would be to conduct research in 
a setting where negative emotions occur naturally. Possible situations could be a 
dentist’s waiting room (Frey et al. 2014), the crocodile house at the local zoo, a scary 
movie in the cinema, or a tunnel of horror on a fair. Especially regarding the latter 
examples, it is questionable as how much individuals would have self-selected into 
this setting, i.e., somebody who is a rather anxious person would probably not actively 
and voluntarily decide to visit a haunted house.  
 Participants’ emotional states were not measured by asking them how they felt as 
in the pretest. We extensively pre-tested the videos and find our clips to evoke the 
desired target emotions as discussed in chapter III.2. We randomized the groups so to 
control for individual differences. Moreover, previous research shows that 
manipulation checks potentially reduce the effect of manipulated emotional states on 
judgments (see for instance Gorn et al. 1993, Keltner et al. 1993).  
 We are only able to evaluate our findings for male entrepreneurs as our random 
selection of high tech entrepreneurs resulted in a sample with only one women. It 
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would be desirable to include women entrepreneurs in future studies on strategic 
emotions.  
 Psychologists have been discussing demand effects as a possible problem resulting 
in potential distortions of responses in questionnaires (e.g., Zizzo 2010, Fleming et al. 
2007). Further, scholars find that social desirability is more pronounced with women 
than with men (e.g., Herbert et al. 1995). We cannot rule out the possibility that maybe 
women show a greater experimenter demand effect as men, i.e., act more towards what 
they think would be a desirable outcome for the experimenter. However, given induced 
emotions it may be hard to justify a demand effect as emotions happen as an immediate 
consequence and are hence presumably not subject to social desirability bias. 
 Running economic experiments in the laboratory always implies a discussion of 
the generalizability of results. Even though experiments have become considerably 
more accepted by economists there is still an ongoing debate on whether researchers 
should use laboratory experiments for analyzing behavioral decision making. 
Criticism usually points to using student samples from mostly US and European 
colleges as sample and of course the generalizability of laboratory results to the ‘real’ 
world (see e.g. Levitt and List 2007, Schade 2005). Whereas students depict some 
desirable characteristics as subjects in economic experiments (see chapter III.1.2 for a 
discussion) the question remains whether findings from running experiments with 
mostly US sophomores can be transferred as general knowledge about human behavior 
(Dothy and Silverthorne 1975, Levitt and List 2007, Rosenthal et al. 2009). This study 
uses both students and entrepreneurs as sample and behavior does not significantly 
differ between our groups of people. So it seems using students subjects is rather 
unproblematic in our setting. However, the question remains whether our findings in 
an artificial laboratory can be applied to actual markets. The setting of the market entry 
game is quite realistic in the sense that players have to decide simultaneously and are 
not able to communicate. We do of course not know as in how far context would 
influence peoples’ choices. Hence, it would be interesting to use different frames of 
the market entry game, e.g., describing a more abstract investment decision as 
compared to a rather emotional application decision to enter into one’s favorite job 
market. One would presume that the role of emotions would be even more pronounced 
in the second scenario. Note however, that in the present study we did not use any 
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frame but a rather clinical description of a market mechanism and we find significant 
influences of emotions.  
  
IV.2.8 Conclusion 
Emotions’ influence on coordination and choices in general is a central question in 
behavioral and entrepreneurial decision making. In real life and in actual markets this 
is important because entrepreneurs and all other decision makers have to make 
important decisions under uncertainty. Information about others’ emotional states 
might provide useful clues to enhance coordination and ultimately decision outcomes. 
We contribute to the field by providing an incentive compatible experiment with 
entrepreneurs and students. Given our significant effects of discrete emotions on 
behavior, we suggest further incorporating emotions into the literature on strategic 
interaction and models of behavioral game theory.  
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V.1 Implications and future research 
V.1.1 Implications for economics and decision making theories 
Emotions potentially influence economic behavior in two ways: in form of anticipated 
or immediate emotions. Decision makers anticipate how they might feel about the 
consequences of their actions and alternatives. For instance, making a substantial 
investment an entrepreneur might anticipate the regret he would experience in case it 
turns out a bad investment and losing money, or the pleasure from gaining a lot of 
money (e.g., Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, Rick and Loewenstein 2008). Economic 
theory has considered and modeled this type of emotions in form of regret theory (Bell 
1982, Loomes and Sudgens 1982) and experiencing relative pleasure from decisions 
(Loewenstein 1987, Mellers 2004).  
 The latter type of emotion is the topic of the present dissertation thesis. Psychology 
has a long tradition in studying immediate emotions. Recently, decision theory started 
to integrate the influence of immediate emotions into models of decision making under 
risk (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 2001, Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001, Loewenstein and 
Lerner 2003, Lerner et al. 2015), and models of intertemporal choice (McClure, 
Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen 2004). Growing empirical evidence studies the 
influence of immediate emotions in the economic domain (e.g., Ifcher and Zarghamee 
2011, Schade et al. 2012) and on social preferences (e.g., Capra 2004, Kirchsteiger et 
al. 2006). Hertwig and Vohs (2016) call for more theory building in the literature as 
opposed to what they call vague and contradictory approaches and concepts (p.101). 
 In Part II of this thesis, I provide a theoretical background of emotions in standard 
psychology discuss more modern approaches including neuroscience. I further review 
and synthesize normative and descriptive decision theories and attempts of modeling 
emotions within these frameworks as well as findings from the literature on strategic 
games. The question whether the influence of emotions is beneficial (i.e., provide 
information for the decision maker that helps to understanding own values) or not (i.e., 
distorting preferences) in general is hard to answer taking a consequentialist approach. 
Rather, I believe emotions’ influence on choices is dependent on the environment – as 
it is the case with heuristics. Emotions cannot be described having a positive or 
negative influence per se but depending on the situation can be beneficial or not (Todd, 
Gigerenzer, & The ABC Research Group 2012). In some environments emotions can 
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be completely rational whereas in other environments emotions lead to irrational or 
undesirable behavior (self-control) (see also Hertwig and Volz 2016, and Winter 
2014). I believe this field of the adaptive function of emotions also in relation to 
evolutionary approaches is a very promising avenue.   
 Further, our findings contribute to the aspiring field of rational or strategic 
emotions (Gneezy and Imas 2014, Meshulam et al. 2013, Winter 2014). Aiming to 
build models of rational decision making that are more complete as proposed by Simon 
(1983) and others, some scholars experimentally investigate whether emotions can be 
rational for decisions makers and of strategic value. In his recent book, Winter 
extensively discusses and synthesizes findings on how emotions are rational and how 
understanding emotions better can be valuable for becoming better strategists. In this 
spirit, some experiments (Meshulam et al. 2013, Gneezy and Imas 2014) study whether 
people understand strategic components of emotions. To date, mostly the role of anger 
has been investigated. Anger is especially important in social interactions such as to 
negotiations or cooperation (Gneezy and Imas 20014, Meshulam et al. 2012). With 
our experimental study, we contribute by providing an incentive compatible economic 
experiment studying the strategic value of two induced emotions: fear and happiness. 
In line with the results of Winter, Gneezy and colleagues, we find an effect of emotions 
on choices in strategic situations.     
 
V.1.2 Managerial implications  
Our results have potential implications for managerial and organizational behavior and 
strategic management practice. Entry into competitive markets is an important 
question for firms, entrepreneurs, and individual decision makers (take for example 
academic job markets). We observe that knowing about opponents’ emotions helps 
people to coordinate.  
 Consider for instance the market for promotion in large organizations. Employees 
oftentimes have to self-nominate themselves to be considered for upcoming 
promotions. This has considerable opportunity costs however large potential benefits. 
Decision makers can potentially make use of their competitors’ emotional states for 
entering the current round of this promotion market, hence coordinate with their 
coworkers.  
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 Moreover, we find large gender effects in market entry tendencies in general and 
depending on own emotions. Hence, it is important to make women aware of the fact 
that they enter markets only about 40 percent as compared to males entering in 55 
percent of cases.   
 Our findings moreover contribute to the growing field of strategic emotions 
(Winter et al. 2016). For instance, anger can be beneficial or destructive in 
competitions and people use such effects of emotions to their strategic advantage 
(Gneezy and Imas 2014). Understanding the effects of emotions on decisions such as 
market entry choice, or competition in general has important value for instance to 
managers and entrepreneurs and calls for future research.   
 Further, communicating risks that evoke fear can have dramatic influences on 
individuals’ perception of small risks such as terrorists’ attacks. Slovic and Slovic 
(2015) provide in their book ‘Numbers and Nerves’ a remarkable compilation of 
studies and thoughts on how only presenting numbers of horrible incidents such as 
hundreds of people dying in the Mediterranean Sea seems to not affect people anymore 
after a while. In contrast, when seeing affect-laden pictures of one child suffering from 
war people become more aware. Slovic coins the term compassion fade or psychic 
numbing in this context. This topic and field of research is one of the most important 
questions in our society and recent situations in the world require further scientific 
elaboration and empirical evidence (see Slovic and Slovic 2015, Slovic and Västfjäll 
2015, Västfjäll et al. 2014). 
V.1.3 Implications for behavioral insights 
The field of behavioral economics and economic psychology has gained prominent 
attention outside academia by policymakers, consulting firms and the media over the 
past decade especially since the success of Cass Sunstein and Dick Thaler promoting 
their concept of ‘nudges’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2008, 2014). Nudges are nothing new 
per se (see for instance, Simon, Dantzig, Hogarth, Plott, Raiffa, Schelling, Shepsle, 
Thaler, Tversky, and Winter 1987). However, the systematic argument of how 
beneficial and costless a certain nudge strategy in contrast to laws or incentives might 
be is new. Moreover, behavioral units advising the governments of for instance the 
UK (Behavioral Insights Team), or the World Bank (GINI) are causing widespread 
suspicion in the media and population. This is partly due to a misunderstanding of 
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what nudges and libertarian paternalism are. By definition: “A nudge, as we will use 
the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. 
Banning junk food does not.” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). This definition is very 
straightforward – a nudge is any intervention that alters peoples’ behavior without 
forbidding options and or changing incentives. This definition has since then however 
been modified largely.  
 In general, the trend of a thorough analysis and application of findings by 
behaviorists is extremely beneficial for finding solutions to a range of problems in our 
world. Pursuing a comprehensive strategy of better educating people about risks and 
benefits in the area of medical or financial decision making (see for instance 
Gigerenzer 2015 on ‘risk savyness’) is important. However, one needs of course to be 
careful when implementing seemingly ‘cost efficient’ means of choice architecture 
especially when such actions are introduced by governmental units.  
 Within the discussion about choice architecture emotions potentially play an 
important role. For instance, in many US states there are waiting times by law before 
people can buy a gun so that people who are angry at the moment of the decision to 
buy a weapon (as immediate emotion) cannot buy one immediately. In this manner, 
using means of choice architecture may reduce the influence of potentially harmful 
emotions (see Lerner et al. 2015). This field of research of reducing ‘unwanted’ 
emotions such as anger or grief is nearly non-existing today; hence further empirical 
studies of mechanisms are desirable. 
 
V.1.4 Future research 
Until today, scholars have a relatively good understanding of how emotional states and 
traits influence choice in the laboratory. Studies employing video clips, relived 
emotions, or scales measuring trait emotions have been increasing over the past 15 
years. One area that from my point of view has received too little attention are field 
studies exploring the influence of emotions in behavioral decision making. Field 
studies provide the advantage that they have a high external validity (especially 
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compared to laboratory studies). However, measuring and what is more manipulating 
emotions in the field is challenging. Regarding negative emotions this is above all 
oftentimes ethically problematic. For instance, frightening people before making 
important insurance buying decisions in real life in order to study the outcome would 
not be right (even though this may in fact be what is happening in reality). In this 
example, using large-scale incentivized experiments with real monetary outcomes as 
in Schade et al. (2012) would be the adequate solution. 
 An interesting field approach would be to make use of aroused states and measure 
decision outcomes in emotion-laden field settings. For instance, Lambsdorff, 
Giamattei, and Werner (2016) study cooperation with individuals during a public 
viewing event in a beer garden during the soccer world cup in 2014. Other possible 
situations would range from studying choices of people after they have been watching 
an amusing film in a theatre, the setting of an amusement park or in sport stadiums. 
Clearly, the people one would reach would be far from a randomized selection but it 
would be interesting to see how emotions impact those economic choices heavily 
studied in laboratory experiments (i.e., risky gambles, simple dictator or trust games, 
or buying decisions). Hence, following up on the findings from part IV, one stream for 
future research would be to implement incentivized risk measures (such as the Eckel 
and Grossmann task) in a surrounding where people are positively aroused. 
 Further research avenues would include looking at different kinds of emotions, 
e.g. anger, sadness, or hope, and mixed emotions. It is important to investigate discrete 
emotions rather than just valence since previous research shows for instance fear and 
anger being of the same valence (negative) having an opposite influence on risk 
perceptions (e.g. Lerner and Keltner 2000). Especially anger is an important emotion 
to study in strategic settings. Gneezy and Iman (2014) find that people use anger 
strategically and also intuitively one can relate to how anger can potentially be 
beneficial (or dreadful) in interactive decisions such as negotiations.   
 Further, emotions and heuristics are extremely under researched to my best 
knowledge. For instance, even though almost all scholars highlight the role emotions 
play when searching for information and choosing (Gigerenzer et al. 2002, Hanoch 
2002, Muramatsua and Hanoch 2005, Slovic 2002) there is no research looking at how 
emotions influence satisficing behavior. Simon (1983) pointed out over 30 years ago 
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that one needs to better understand the role of emotion in decision making. More 
theoretical and empirical studies are needed (see also Hertwig and Volz 2016).   
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V.2 Concluding remarks 
This doctoral thesis takes an experimental approach to studying emotions and 
economic behavior. Research on the role of emotions and behavior in general has a 
long tradition in emotion psychology and has received new attention among decision 
making scholars starting in the 1980s. Behavioral economists have not concerned 
themselves with the role of immediate emotions much yet. Anticipatory emotions on 
the other hand, especially regret, have been investigated considerably more (Sudgen 
and Loomes 1982, Bell 1982). Only recently, a few studies have been published 
examining the role of immediate emotions on economic variables in rigorous 
experiments (Ifcher and Zarghamee 2011, Schade et al. 2012).  Moreover, studying 
the role of emotions using behavioral game theory gained momentum. In 2000, 
Richard Thaler (2000) predicted the:  
“homo oeconomicus will become more emotional by which I mean that 
economists will devote more attention to the study of emotions.“ (p.139).  
About 15 years later this seems indeed to be the case. We hope to contribute to this 
change by providing empirical evidence on how emotions influence economic 
behavior. 
 Part II of this thesis covers theories from psychology, behavioral decision making, 
neuroscience, and economics. Given the recent increase in empirical papers studying 
emotions and decision making (see chapters II.4 and II.5), it is important to provide 
rigorous theory and models in order to be able to form testable hypotheses, and 
experimentally challenge such models – as proposed by Popper (1959). 
 One of the biggest challenges for emotion research and experimental approaches 
is how to induce emotions in the laboratory. Part III-2 extensively covers this topic by 
providing an own database of film clips for reliably inducing discrete emotions 
(happiness, fear, and neutral states) in the laboratory. This is not a trivial question as 
for instance, failed replications of rigor experimental studies inducing emotions (Ifcher 
and Zarghamee 2011 in AER, see Camerer et al. 2016 and chapter III.2) show. These 
film clips serve as induction method for the experimental studies in part IV of this 
thesis. 
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 In Part IV, I present experimental studies explicitly investigating induced 
emotions and economic behavior. The first experiment draws on ample experimental 
evidence of emotions’ influence on risk taking behavior and aims to clarify competing 
findings and theories. We conduct a simple yet rigorous economic experiment with 
real monetary incentives and induced emotions. Contrary to our hypotheses we do not 
find treatment effects of happiness or fear on risk preferences. We also do not observe 
gender differences. Compared to most of previous papers studying emotions and ‘risk’ 
(see table IV-1) finding positive or negative influences of happiness and fear or mostly 
positive and bad mood in psychological experiments without incentives, we do not 
find such effects. We can only hypothesize as to why this is the case. Further research 
employing different economic risk measures and also field research is needed to 
elaborate on the observed phenomena.  
 Chapter IV.2 presents the second experiment that allows determining the strategic 
value of emotions. Scholars such as Herbert Simon or Eyal Winter stress the 
importance for studying emotions within social interaction. The young but growing 
field of research of emotions in strategic games follows this advice (see chapter II.5). 
In a large incentivized experiment with entrepreneurs and students we study happiness 
and fear in market entry games. Building on behavioral equilibrium predictions based 
on Schade et al. (2010) we expect emotions and information about opponents’ 
emotional states to influence behavior. We find that women react more to own 
emotions than men and that all individuals react to others’ emotions.  People use 
emotions to coordinate in the market.  
 This thesis began with the statement that behavioral economics can be described 
as mixture of economics and psychology. Only recently, the field’s attention has 
started to shift to the influence of emotions even though psychology has long been 
studying the role of emotions and behavior. Recent theoretical approaches as well as 
a growing body of empirical, mostly experimental, evidence shows that emotions can 
play an important role not only regarding economic variables but foremost in strategic 
behavior. Interdisciplinary work by economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists 
making use of methods and concepts from evolution theory and game theory provides 
a promising avenue for better understanding the role of emotions in economic 
behavior, and may lead to better (descriptive) models of economic behavior in general.  
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A Additional material chapter III.2 
 
Figure VII-1: Visual of the ‘Denali National Park’ 
 
Source: denaliparkvillage.com  
 XXXVI 
Table VII-1: Descriptives Pretest round 1 by gender 
film clip G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
neutral                      
1 Adria M (N=12) MEAN 4,4 0,0 0,1 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,0 4,3 5,3 3,5 2,0 0,5 0,3 0,0 3,3 0,0 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 
    SD 3,0 0,0 0,3 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,3 1,0 0,0 3,0 3,1 3,0 2,4 1,2 0,6 0,0 2,6 0,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 4,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 4,0 5,7 2,9 1,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 1,7 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,6 0,0 2,0 1,7 2,4 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 
  All (N=23) MEAN 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,1 0,0 3,0 6,9 1,5 0,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,5 0,2 0,2 1,6 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,9 0,0 2,6 2,5 2,7 2,1 0,9 0,4 0,0 2,4 0,0 
                       
2 All the pres M (N=10) MEAN 3,8 0,3 0,0 1,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,1 3,4 5,5 1,7 0,9 0,9 0,0 0,0 2,4 0,2 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 
    SD 2,1 0,9 0,0 1,5 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,3 2,5 2,2 2,5 1,6 1,8 0,0 0,0 2,2 0,4 
  F (N=8) MEAN 2,8 0,0 0,0 3,4 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 1,4 3,6 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,1 
    MEDIAN 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
      SD 1,6 0,0 0,0 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,7 1,7 2,4 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,3 
  All (N=20) MEAN 3,3 0,2 0,0 2,2 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,2 2,4 4,6 1,0 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,0 1,9 0,2 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 1,9 0,7 0,0 2,4 0,7 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,5 2,3 2,4 1,9 1,2 1,4 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,4 
                       
3 Vögel M (N=10) MEAN 4,1 0,6 0,1 0,6 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,9 4,4 3,4 2,3 1,3 0,1 0,0 2,2 0,0 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 
    SD 2,5 1,8 0,3 1,0 0,6 1,5 0,0 1,0 0,6 2,5 2,7 2,5 2,5 2,1 0,3 0,0 2,3 0,0 
  F (N=10) MEAN 4,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,5 6,0 3,7 1,8 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 1,5 2,3 1,9 0,9 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 
  All (N=20) MEAN 4,3 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,3 0,1 4,2 5,2 3,6 2,1 0,9 0,1 0,0 1,4 0,0 
 XXXVII 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,2 1,3 0,2 0,8 0,6 1,2 0,0 0,8 0,4 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,2 1,7 0,2 0,0 2,0 0,0 
Film clip G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
4 GBR M (N=14) MEAN 5,3 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,5 0,1 5,4 6,6 4,5 1,4 0,9 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 1,3 0,3 1,8 1,4 1,9 2,3 1,8 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 3,9 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,4 4,5 5,8 3,3 1,3 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,0 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,3 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,6 1,1 2,3 1,8 2,4 2,1 2,1 0,6 0,0 0,9 0,0 
  All (N=25) MEAN 4,6 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,2 5,0 6,2 3,9 1,3 1,0 0,1 0,0 0,9 0,0 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,4 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,4 1,1 0,8 2,1 1,7 2,2 2,2 1,9 0,4 0,0 1,5 0,0 
                       
5 Mythos  
Wald 
M (N=15) MEAN 6,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,3 5,7 6,0 3,6 1,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 
   MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 
    SD 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,9 2,5 2,5 2,9 1,5 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 
  F (N=9) MEAN 5,4 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,2 5,7 5,1 5,1 2,9 1,3 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,1 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,3 0,6 2,6 1,8 2,3 2,5 1,6 0,9 0,3 0,7 0,3 
  All (N=24) MEAN 5,8 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 6,0 5,4 5,6 3,2 1,2 0,2 0,1 1,1 0,1 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,2 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,2 0,4 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,8 1,5 0,6 0,2 1,7 0,2 
                       
6 Wasserfall M (N=12) MEAN 5,4 0,5 1,0 0,5 0,6 0,0 0,2 1,6 0,2 5,7 6,4 4,6 2,8 1,9 0,3 0,4 2,7 0,8 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 3 1 0 0 3 0 
    SD 2,7 1,2 1,6 1,0 1,7 0,0 0,6 2,4 0,6 2,5 2,2 3,0 2,9 2,2 0,6 0,9 1,9 2,2 
  F (N=8) MEAN 3,9 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 5,3 6,6 4,5 2,0 0,8 1,0 0,0 2,0 0,3 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 2 0 0 0 2 0 
      SD 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 1,3 1,2 2,1 1,9 1,3 2,6 0,0 1,9 0,4 
 XXXVIII 
  All (N=20) MEAN 4,6 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,0 0,1 1,1 0,1 5,5 6,5 4,5 2,4 1,3 0,6 0,2 2,3 0,5 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,5 7 5 3 0,5 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,3 1,0 1,3 0,9 1,3 0,0 0,4 2,0 0,4 2,1 1,9 2,7 2,6 2,0 1,8 0,7 2,0 1,7 
                       
Film clip G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
7 Wüste M (N=13) MEAN 4,6 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,2 4,2 6,4 2,5 0,8 0,8 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,2 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,2 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,5 2,1 1,5 2,4 1,9 1,5 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,5 
  F (N=12) MEAN 3,5 0,2 0,2 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,3 3,3 6,6 2,9 1,3 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,7 0,0 
    MEDIAN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,7 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,3 0,0 0,6 0,6 0,7 2,4 1,8 2,6 2,2 1,8 0,6 0,0 1,1 0,0 
  All (N=25) MEAN 4,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,2 3,7 6,5 2,7 1,0 0,9 0,1 0,0 1,2 0,1 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,5 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,9 0,6 2,3 1,7 2,5 2,1 1,6 0,4 0,0 1,6 0,4 
                       
8 Kaukasus M (N=14) MEAN 3,5 0,2 0,1 1,5 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,2 2,5 5,9 1,2 0,8 0,9 0,0 0,1 1,7 0,1 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,2 0,8 0,5 1,6 0,3 0,0 0,5 0,7 0,6 2,5 1,2 2,5 2,1 1,7 0,0 0,3 1,8 0,3 
  F (N=14) MEAN 2,9 0,1 0,1 1,5 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,2 2,7 4,6 1,6 0,5 0,9 0,3 0,2 1,0 0,0 
    MEDIAN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 1,9 0,5 0,3 2,1 0,6 0,0 0,5 0,7 0,8 2,7 2,1 2,4 1,1 2,0 0,8 0,8 1,6 0,0 
  All (N=28) MEAN 3,2 0,2 0,1 1,5 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,2 2,6 5,3 1,4 0,6 0,9 0,1 0,1 1,4 0,0 
    MEDIAN 3 0 0 0,5 0 0 0 0 0 2 5,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,1 0,7 0,4 1,8 0,4 0,0 0,5 0,7 0,7 2,6 1,8 2,5 1,7 1,8 0,6 0,6 1,7 0,2 
                      
FEAR                      
9 Shining M (N=13) MEAN 3,0 0,6 4,0 3,2 0,8 1,2 0,2 4,2 0,2 1,9 4,0 0,8 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,1 3,2 2,1 
    MEDIAN 2 0 4 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
    SD 2,7 0,8 2,3 2,3 1,7 2,0 0,8 2,2 0,6 2,3 2,6 1,6 0,6 0,0 0,8 0,3 2,3 2,0 
 XXXIX 
  F (N=12) MEAN 1,3 0,3 4,8 1,8 0,7 1,1 0,0 4,8 0,0 0,8 1,8 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,1 2,0 
    MEDIAN 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
      SD 1,7 0,6 2,9 2,3 2,2 2,5 0,0 3,0 0,0 1,5 2,3 0,6 1,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 2,1 2,5 
  All (N=25) MEAN 2,2 0,4 4,4 2,5 0,8 1,1 0,1 4,5 0,1 1,3 2,9 0,5 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,1 2,0 
    MEDIAN 2 0 4 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
        SD 2,4 0,8 2,6 2,5 2,0 2,3 0,6 2,6 0,4 2,1 2,7 1,3 0,8 0,0 0,6 0,2 2,4 2,3 
                       
10 Lambs M (N=11) MEAN 2,5 0,9 5,1 3,2 1,9 2,3 0,5 6,5 0,0 1,7 4,1 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,6 0,4 3,7 1,8 
    MEDIAN 1 0 5 3 1 1 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
    SD 2,8 1,1 2,1 1,8 2,5 2,3 1,2 1,7 0,0 2,6 2,8 0,6 0,3 0,0 1,4 0,8 2,5 2,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 2,4 1,0 4,8 3,1 1,1 1,5 0,2 5,6 0,1 1,6 4,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 2,6 2,3 
    MEDIAN 2 0 4 3 0 1 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
      SD 2,0 1,7 1,8 2,1 1,7 1,7 0,6 2,5 0,3 2,4 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 2,4 2,4 
  All (N=22) MEAN 2,5 1,0 5,0 3,1 1,5 1,9 0,4 6,0 0,0 1,7 4,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,2 3,2 2,0 
    MEDIAN 2 0 5 3 1 1 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
        SD 2,4 1,4 2,0 1,9 2,2 2,1 0,9 2,2 0,2 2,5 2,7 0,5 0,2 0,0 1,0 0,6 2,5 2,2 
                       
11 BWP M (N=12) MEAN 1,3 0,3 3,9 5,5 1,2 1,8 0,8 6,0 0,0 0,6 2,8 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,7 0,8 3,3 4,3 
    MEDIAN 1 0 4 5 0 1 0 7 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
    SD 1,7 0,6 2,1 1,6 1,8 2,2 2,2 1,8 0,0 1,3 2,3 0,0 0,8 0,0 1,7 1,7 2,3 2,3 
  F (N=10) MEAN 0,2 0,3 3,8 3,0 0,3 2,5 0,0 4,2 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,9 2,1 
    MEDIAN 0 0 5 3 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
      SD 0,4 0,9 2,0 2,4 0,9 2,2 0,0 2,2 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 1,0 1,9 
  All (N=22) MEAN 0,8 0,3 3,9 4,3 0,7 2,1 0,4 5,1 0,0 0,3 2,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,4 2,1 3,2 
    MEDIAN 0 0 5 5 0 2 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
        SD 1,4 0,8 2,1 2,4 1,5 2,3 1,7 2,2 0,0 1,0 2,3 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,3 1,3 2,2 2,4 
                      
12 Insidious M (N=12) MEAN 2,5 1,6 5,0 4,8 2,3 3,3 0,8 5,5 0,3 1,9 3,3 0,2 0,3 0,1 1,2 0,9 4,2 2,5 
    MEDIAN 3 0 6 6 0 3 0 6 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 
 XL 
    SD 2,4 2,7 2,0 2,6 2,9 2,8 1,5 2,1 0,8 2,5 3,1 0,6 0,6 0,3 2,1 2,0 2,4 2,9 
  F (N=10) MEAN 0,9 0,2 4,9 5,0 1,1 3,3 0,1 5,1 0,0 0,7 1,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,2 2,9 
    MEDIAN 0 0 6 5 0 3 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
      SD 1,4 0,6 3,0 2,5 1,8 2,9 0,3 2,5 0,0 1,0 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 2,3 3,0 
  All (N=22) MEAN 1,7 0,1 5,5 5,3 0,6 3,2 0,1 5,3 0,0 0,6 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 3,4 1,7 
    MEDIAN 1 0 6 5 0 3 0 5 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 
        SD 2,1 1,7 2,5 2,6 2,3 2,8 0,9 2,3 0,6 2,0 2,7 0,4 0,5 0,2 1,6 1,5 2,6 2,9 
                      
                      
film clip G N   amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy love prid sadn sham surp unha 
13 Mirrors M (N=15) MEAN 1,3 1,4 4,3 4,7 2,0 2,9 1,1 5,7 0,3 0,6 2,8 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,5 0,4 4,0 3,7 
    MEDIAN 1 1 5 5 1 2 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
    SD 1,6 2,1 2,5 2,1 2,5 2,4 2,1 1,9 0,7 1,2 2,8 0,2 0,9 0,2 0,9 1,0 2,2 2,6 
  F (N=9) MEAN 0,7 1,2 6,3 4,0 2,2 3,6 0,1 6,6 0,1 0,6 1,4 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,7 2,8 
    MEDIAN 0 0 7 5 0 3 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
      SD 1,1 1,8 1,8 2,9 2,5 3,1 0,3 1,3 0,3 0,8 1,8 0,0 2,1 0,0 1,1 0,0 1,9 2,6 
  All (N=24) MEAN 1,0 1,3 5,3 4,3 2,1 3,2 0,6 6,1 0,2 0,6 2,1 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,5 0,2 2,8 3,2 
    MEDIAN 1 0 5 5 1 3 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
        SD 1,5 2,0 2,4 2,4 2,5 2,7 1,7 1,8 0,6 1,1 2,6 0,2 1,5 0,2 1,0 0,8 2,4 2,6 
                       
14 H, Psycho M (N=12) MEAN 3,3 0,5 2,5 1,3 1,4 1,0 0,3 3,9 0,0 2,5 4,3 0,9 0,2 0,5 0,4 0,3 2,3 1,5 
    MEDIAN 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 
    SD 2,2 1,0 2,3 1,6 2,0 1,9 0,4 3,1 0,0 1,9 2,2 1,1 0,4 1,7 1,4 0,6 2,4 2,2 
  F (N=11) MEAN 2,7 0,0 3,7 0,4 0,7 0,5 0,1 4,8 0,0 1,7 2,9 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,1 3,3 
    MEDIAN 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,9 0,0 3,1 0,6 1,1 1,0 0,3 2,8 0,0 2,7 2,6 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,3 3,6 
  All (N=23) MEAN 2,5 0,5 3,0 1,0 1,4 1,2 0,3 4,0 0,0 1,8 2,6 0,6 0,2 0,8 0,7 0,4 1,2 2,7 
    MEDIAN 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,6 0,7 2,8 1,3 1,7 1,6 0,4 3,0 0,0 2,3 2,5 0,9 0,3 1,2 1,0 0,6 2,1 3,1 
 XLI 
                      
15 H, Birds M (N=13) MEAN 2,8 0,2 3,7 2,8 0,1 0,9 0,0 4,9 0,0 1,8 4,8 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,1 4,0 1,4 
    MEDIAN 2 0 4 2 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
    SD 2,0 0,5 2,6 2,3 0,3 1,3 0,0 2,5 0,0 1,9 1,7 0,8 0,5 0,0 0,3 0,3 2,0 1,9 
  F (N=10) MEAN 2,1 0,0 2,5 1,6 0,0 1,3 0,0 3,4 0,0 0,5 2,7 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,8 1,1 
    MEDIAN 2 0 3 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
      SD 1,9 0,0 1,1 1,6 0,0 2,3 0,0 1,5 0,0 1,0 2,2 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,5 1,1 
  All (N=23) MEAN 2,5 0,1 3,1 2,2 0,0 1,1 0,0 4,2 0,0 1,1 3,8 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,4 1,2 
    MEDIAN 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
        SD 2,0 0,4 2,2 2,1 0,2 1,8 0,0 2,2 0,0 1,7 2,2 0,6 0,4 0,0 0,2 0,2 1,9 1,6 
                       
16 Lord of  
the rings 
M (N=13) MEAN 5,3 0,7 3,5 0,9 0,2 1,8 0,1 5,1 0,2 3,4 5,4 1,3 1,1 0,8 0,0 0,1 3,4 1,4 
   MEDIAN 6 0 4 0 0 2 0 6 0 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 
    SD 2,0 1,3 1,4 1,1 0,5 1,6 0,3 2,4 0,4 2,6 2,2 1,6 1,4 1,7 0,0 0,3 2,7 1,7 
  F (N=11) MEAN 3,0 1,6 3,9 1,4 2,0 1,4 0,8 4,7 0,0 2,0 3,6 0,3 0,2 0,6 0,7 0,0 2,0 1,1 
    MEDIAN 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
      SD 2,0 2,7 3,1 1,5 2,8 2,2 2,2 2,8 0,1 2,1 2,3 0,5 0,5 1,4 2,2 0,1 2,1 1,3 
  All (N=24) MEAN 4,2 1,1 3,7 1,1 1,1 1,6 0,4 4,9 0,1 2,7 4,5 0,8 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,1 2,7 1,2 
    MEDIAN 5 0 4 0 0 1 0 6 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
        SD 2,4 2,2 2,4 1,4 2,2 2,0 1,6 2,6 0,3 2,6 2,5 1,3 1,2 1,6 1,6 0,2 2,6 1,6 
                      
HAPPINESS                      
17 Harry und Sally M (N=14) MEAN 7,2 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,1 1,6 0,0 0,1 6,5 5,4 4,3 2,5 0,5 0,0 2,1 2,5 0,0 
    MEDIAN 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 6 5 3 0 0 2 2 0 
    SD 1,1 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,3 1,3 0,0 0,3 1,2 2,0 2,2 2,4 1,0 0,0 1,8 2,6 0,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 7,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 6,5 4,8 3,9 0,5 0,1 0,0 1,5 2,1 0,0 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 
      SD 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 2,2 2,1 1,0 0,3 0,0 1,6 2,7 0,0 
  All (N=25) MEAN 7,1 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 1,3 0,0 0,0 6,5 5,1 4,1 1,5 0,3 0,0 1,8 2,3 0,0 
 XLII 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 
        SD 1,1 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,2 1,2 0,0 0,2 1,3 2,1 2,2 2,1 0,8 0,0 1,7 2,7 0,0 
                       
18 Hangover M (N=13) MEAN 4,9 0,2 0,8 3,0 1,5 2,1 1,8 2,7 0,0 4,4 4,0 1,5 0,6 0,5 0,0 2,1 5,3 1,0 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 2 6 0 
    SD 2,5 0,5 1,3 3,0 2,2 1,9 2,1 2,0 0,0 2,6 2,7 1,9 1,6 1,6 0,0 2,1 2,8 2,1 
  F (N=9) MEAN 7,0 0,3 0,1 1,0 0,8 1,3 1,0 0,6 0,0 5,9 4,2 2,4 0,9 0,6 0,0 0,3 3,1 0,2 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 
      SD 0,9 0,9 0,3 1,2 1,6 1,2 1,9 1,0 0,0 1,5 2,5 2,4 1,6 1,6 0,0 0,7 2,7 0,6 
  All (N=22) MEAN 6,0 0,2 0,5 2,0 1,2 1,7 1,4 1,6 0,0 5,1 4,1 2,0 0,8 0,5 0,0 1,2 4,2 0,6 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 
        SD 2,2 0,7 1,1 2,6 2,0 1,7 2,0 1,9 0,0 2,4 2,6 2,2 1,6 1,6 0,0 1,8 2,9 1,7 
                       
19 Manitu M (N=11) MEAN 5,3 0,5 0,0 1,3 0,9 0,4 1,5 0,0 0,2 4,6 3,3 3,0 0,6 0,1 0,3 1,6 1,6 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,7 0,9 0,0 1,8 1,2 0,8 1,7 0,0 0,6 2,5 2,9 2,4 0,8 0,3 0,9 2,1 2,3 0,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 5,4 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 5,0 2,8 1,8 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,5 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,0 2,7 2,4 1,3 0,6 0,9 0,6 0,4 0,9 0,0 
  All (N=22) MEAN 5,3 0,2 0,0 0,7 0,8 0,2 1,0 0,0 0,1 4,8 3,0 2,4 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,9 1,0 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,7 0,7 0,0 1,4 1,4 0,6 1,5 0,0 0,4 2,6 2,7 2,0 0,7 0,6 0,7 1,7 1,8 0,0 
                      
20 BBT - KKH M (N=11) MEAN 5,1 0,9 0,0 0,5 1,5 0,4 1,4 0,1 0,0 4,5 3,2 2,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,6 2,1 0,6 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,3 2,1 0,0 1,2 2,2 0,9 1,9 0,3 0,0 2,5 2,2 1,8 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,2 2,3 2,0 
  F (N=10) MEAN 6,8 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,0 6,4 5,0 3,7 1,6 0,3 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,0 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 1,4 0,4 0,0 0,6 1,8 0,0 2,4 0,0 0,0 1,4 2,5 2,5 2,2 0,6 0,0 1,8 1,2 0,0 
 XLIII 
  F (N=10) MEAN 5,9 0,6 0,0 0,4 1,0 0,2 1,1 0,0 0,0 5,5 4,1 2,9 0,9 0,2 0,0 0,6 1,4 0,3 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,1 1,6 0,0 1,0 2,1 0,7 2,2 0,2 0,0 2,2 2,5 2,3 1,7 0,5 0,0 1,5 2,0 1,5 
                       
21 BBT - FFF M (N=10) MEAN 5,2 0,6 0,0 0,4 0,8 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,4 4,6 3,9 3,3 1,5 0,6 0,2 1,3 1,9 0,1 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 
    SD 2,2 1,8 0,0 0,6 2,1 0,0 1,3 0,0 1,5 2,3 2,0 2,0 2,1 1,8 0,8 1,8 2,2 0,5 
  F (N=14) MEAN 4,2 0,3 0,0 0,9 1,4 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,0 4,2 3,0 3,0 1,4 0,1 0,0 0,7 0,2 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 3,2 0,6 0,0 2,4 1,8 0,0 1,7 0,0 0,0 3,3 2,7 2,8 1,9 0,3 0,0 1,4 0,4 0,0 
  All (N=24) MEAN 4,7 0,5 0,0 0,6 1,1 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,2 4,4 3,5 3,1 1,5 0,3 0,1 1,0 1,1 0,1 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,7 1,5 0,0 1,6 2,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 1,2 2,8 2,4 2,4 2,0 1,4 0,6 1,7 1,9 0,4 
                       
                       
22 Naked gun M (N=12) MEAN 6,0 0,2 0,0 1,6 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,3 0,0 5,3 5,4 3,8 0,6 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,9 0,0 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 
    SD 2,8 0,6 0,0 1,8 1,4 0,3 1,2 0,8 0,0 2,8 2,5 2,9 1,1 2,1 0,0 1,8 2,8 0,0 
  F (N=11) MEAN 5,0 0,1 0,3 2,8 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,0 4,7 3,9 1,7 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0 2,1 0,0 
    MEDIAN 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
      SD 1,9 0,3 0,9 2,8 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,8 0,0 2,1 1,9 1,8 0,9 0,9 0,0 0,0 2,5 0,0 
  All (N=23) MEAN 5,5 0,1 0,1 2,2 0,3 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,0 5,0 4,7 2,8 0,4 0,8 0,0 0,5 3,0 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,4 0,4 0,6 2,4 1,1 0,3 0,9 0,8 0,0 2,5 2,3 2,6 1,0 1,7 0,0 1,4 2,8 0,0 
                      
23 Woody Allen M (N=13) MEAN 6,0 0,9 0,0 1,5 1,2 0,1 1,1 0,2 0,4 5,5 5,4 3,0 1,9 1,0 0,2 1,1 3,2 0,8 
    MEDIAN 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 3 1 0 0 0 3 0 
      SD 1,9 1,4 0,0 1,8 1,7 0,3 1,9 0,6 0,7 1,9 2,2 2,4 2,1 2,4 0,6 1,8 2,3 1,7 
  F (N=11) MEAN 4,3 0,3 0,0 1,1 0,1 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,1 1,5 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,8 1,3 0,0 
 XLIV 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,8 0,6 0,0 1,6 0,3 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,0 2,6 2,2 2,1 1,4 1,2 0,0 1,6 1,9 0,0 
  All (N=24) MEAN 5,1 0,6 0,0 1,3 0,6 0,0 0,8 0,1 0,2 4,4 4,2 2,3 1,2 0,8 0,1 0,9 2,3 0,4 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,5 1,2 0,0 1,7 1,4 0,2 1,6 0,4 0,6 2,5 2,5 2,4 1,9 2,0 0,4 1,7 2,4 1,3 
                       
24 Loriot M (N=12) MEAN 4,6 0,7 0,0 1,7 0,6 0,2 1,8 0,2 0,5 3,7 3,1 2,3 0,5 0,3 0,3 1,5 1,6 0,8 
    MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,0 1,3 0,0 2,4 1,3 0,4 2,2 0,4 1,2 2,1 2,7 2,2 0,9 0,8 0,8 2,1 2,3 1,7 
  F (N=11) MEAN 5,2 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 4,7 4,5 2,5 1,6 1,0 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,0 
    MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
      SD 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,6 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 2,7 2,3 2,4 1,9 2,1 0,0 0,6 1,0 0,0 
  F (N=23) MEAN 4,9 0,3 0,0 1,0 0,4 0,1 1,1 0,1 0,3 4,2 3,8 2,4 1,1 0,7 0,1 0,8 1,0 0,4 
    MEDIAN 5,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,0 4,0 3,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
        SD 2,1 1,0 0,0 1,9 1,1 0,3 1,8 0,3 0,9 2,4 2,6 2,3 1,5 1,6 0,6 1,7 1,9 1,3 
  
 XLV 
Table VII-2: Descriptives Pretest round 2 by gender 
film clip G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy 
lov
e prid sadn sham surp unha 
neutral                      
1 All the pres M (N=7) MEAN 3,3 0,3 0,0 2,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,1 2,7 5,0 1,4 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 2,9 0,4 
        MEDIAN 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 0,8 0,5 0,0 2,4 1,9 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,4 1,0 0,8 1,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,6 0,8 
    F (N=13) MEAN 1,4 0,4 0,3 2,9 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,0 0,1 0,3 3,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,5 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,3 1,6 0,8 2,5 1,9 1,3 1,6 0,0 0,3 0,8 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 1,6 1,1 1,9 
    All (N=20) MEAN 2,3 0,4 0,1 2,6 0,9 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1 1,5 4,1 0,7 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 1,8 0,5 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
        SD 1,0 1,0 0,4 2,4 1,9 0,7 0,8 0,4 0,3 0,9 1,4 0,5 0,0 0,2 0,7 0,8 1,4 1,3 
                       
2 Last Kaiser M (N=7) MEAN 3,4 0,7 0,3 2,1 1,6 0,6 0,9 0,3 0,7 2,6 5,4 1,6 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,7 2,0 0,7 
        MEDIAN 4 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,0 1,5 0,5 2,0 2,1 1,1 1,9 0,5 1,3 1,5 1,4 1,8 1,1 0,5 0,4 1,3 1,9 1,1 
    F (N=13) MEAN 3,0 0,2 0,0 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,5 0,2 0,2 1,4 5,0 0,8 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,5 
        MEDIAN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,6 0,6 0,0 1,4 0,6 0,3 1,0 0,6 0,6 1,7 2,4 1,4 1,4 1,1 0,6 0,9 0,4 1,1 
    All (N=20) MEAN 3,2 0,5 0,1 1,5 0,9 0,3 0,7 0,2 0,5 2,0 5,2 1,2 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,5 1,1 0,6 
        MEDIAN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,8 1,0 0,2 1,7 1,4 0,7 1,4 0,5 0,9 1,6 1,9 1,6 1,3 0,8 0,5 1,1 1,1 1,1 
                       
3 Angeln M (N=7) MEAN 2,3 0,6 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,7 1,4 3,6 0,7 0,0 0,1 0,6 0,4 1,0 0,7 
        MEDIAN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
        SD 1,0 1,0 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,4 1,6 1,3 0,0 0,4 0,8 0,8 1,2 0,8 
    F (N=13) MEAN 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 0,8 0,5 0,1 0,2 0,3 2,7 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,0 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 XLVI 
        SD 1,3 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,0 1,2 1,1 0,3 0,8 0,6 2,2 0,6 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,8 1,1 0,0 
    All (N=20) MEAN 1,6 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,0 0,5 0,9 3,1 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,7 0,4 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,1 0,5 0,2 1,0 0,4 0,9 0,6 0,1 0,9 1,0 1,9 0,9 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,8 1,1 0,4 
                       
Target emotion G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy 
lov
e prid sadn sham surp unha 
4 Presse M (N=7) MEAN 2,0 0,4 0,3 3,9 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,7 0,9 1,0 3,4 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 1,3 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
        SD 1,5 0,8 0,5 2,7 0,5 0,4 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,0 1,0 0,5 0,0 0,8 0,4 0,4 1,6 1,5 
    F (N=13) MEAN 1,1 0,0 0,0 3,3 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,8 0,1 2,6 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,5 0,2 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,1 0,0 0,0 2,6 0,4 0,0 1,0 0,7 1,4 0,3 2,4 0,4 0,0 1,1 0,3 0,0 1,1 0,4 
    All (N=20) MEAN 1,5 0,2 0,1 3,6 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,8 0,5 3,0 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,1 1,3 0,7 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0,5 0 
        SD 1,3 0,4 0,2 2,7 0,5 0,2 0,9 0,8 1,3 0,6 1,7 0,4 0,0 0,9 0,3 0,2 1,4 0,9 
                       
5 Jane Eyre M (N=11) MEAN 1,6 0,2 0,4 1,4 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,8 0,2 1,2 3,3 0,7 0,3 0,5 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,3 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,4 0,6 0,9 1,8 1,6 1,2 1,2 1,8 0,6 1,5 1,4 1,3 0,6 1,5 0,6 0,3 1,5 0,5 
    F (N=16) MEAN 2,4 0,1 0,1 1,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 1,3 4,4 1,0 0,6 0,1 1,0 0,0 1,1 0,6 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,0 0,5 0,3 1,5 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 2,0 1,6 1,2 1,2 0,3 1,8 0,0 1,9 1,5 
    All (N=27) MEAN 2,0 0,2 0,3 1,3 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,8 0,1 1,4 3,9 1,0 0,4 0,4 0,7 0,1 1,0 0,5 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,7 0,6 0,7 1,5 1,2 0,7 0,8 1,5 0,4 1,9 1,6 1,4 0,8 1,1 1,3 0,2 1,9 1,0 
                       
6 Postauto M (N=11) MEAN 3,8 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,4 4,7 1,6 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,7 0,0 
        MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,9 2,2 2,2 0,4 0,6 0,9 0,0 0,9 0,0 
 XLVII 
    F (N=17) MEAN 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 2,3 4,8 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 
        MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,9 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,5 1,9 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 
    All (N=28) MEAN 3,6 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 2,3 4,7 1,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,9 0,0 
        MEDIAN 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 1,7 2,0 1,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,0 1,3 0,0 
Target emotion G N MEAN amus ange anxi conf cont disg emba fear guil happ inte joy 
lov
e prid sadn sham surp unha 
7 Frachter M (N=11) MEAN 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,5 4,1 0,8 0,1 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,4 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,7 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,4 2,8 1,8 0,3 2,6 0,0 0,0 1,2 1,2 
    F (N=17) MEAN 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 3,3 0,6 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,0 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,5 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,2 2,8 1,9 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 
    All (N=28) MEAN 2,5 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 3,7 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,2 
        MEDIAN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 2,8 1,9 0,4 1,3 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,6 
                       
8 60s M (N=11) MEAN 2,8 0,0 0,1 0,9 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 1,7 3,5 1,1 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,2 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,3 0,0 0,3 0,9 0,6 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 2,0 2,5 1,6 0,3 1,5 0,0 0,4 0,7 0,4 
    F (N=17) MEAN 3,1 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 1,8 3,7 1,1 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,1 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,7 0,0 0,0 1,9 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,7 2,6 2,8 1,5 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,3 
    All (N=28) MEAN 2,9 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 1,7 3,6 1,1 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,1 
        MEDIAN 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,5 0,0 0,2 1,4 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,5 2,3 2,6 1,5 0,6 0,8 0,0 0,2 0,8 0,4 
                        
FEAR                      
9 Shining M (N=18) MEAN 1,9 0,0 2,8 2,2 0,4 0,9 0,1 4,2 0,2 1,2 3,4 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,3 3,1 1,7 
        MEDIAN 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
 XLVIII 
        SD 1,6 0,0 2,2 1,8 0,8 1,7 0,2 1,9 0,7 1,4 1,9 0,8 0,0 0,2 1,0 0,8 2,1 2,2 
    F (N=30) MEAN 1,1 0,0 4,2 3,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 4,4 0,0 0,4 2,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 2,3 1,5 
        MEDIAN 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
        SD 1,4 0,0 2,0 2,2 0,6 0,4 0,2 2,4 0,2 1,1 2,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,2 2,1 2,0 
    All (N=48) MEAN 1,5 0,0 3,5 2,7 0,3 0,5 0,0 4,3 0,1 0,8 2,9 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,2 2,7 1,6 
        MEDIAN 1 0 4 2,5 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0,5 
        SD 1,5 0,0 2,1 2,0 0,7 1,1 0,2 2,2 0,5 1,2 2,1 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,5 2,1 2,1 
                              
10 Lambs M (N=18) MEAN 2,1 0,8 2,9 1,9 2,1 1,8 0,6 4,7 0,2 0,9 2,8 0,5 0,0 0,1 0,6 0,6 2,9 1,8 
        MEDIAN 2 0 3 1 1 1 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
        SD 1,7 1,0 2,1 2,2 2,4 2,2 0,9 1,9 0,7 1,3 2,2 0,9 0,0 0,5 1,1 1,3 2,2 2,3 
    F (N=30) MEAN 1,3 0,4 4,3 1,8 1,2 1,2 0,1 5,4 0,0 0,5 2,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 2,4 2,3 
        MEDIAN 1 0 5 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
        SD 1,6 0,9 2,2 1,9 1,6 1,6 0,3 2,0 0,2 1,1 2,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,2 2,2 2,4 
    All (N=48) MEAN 1,7 0,6 3,6 1,9 1,6 1,5 0,3 5,1 0,1 0,7 2,8 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,3 2,7 2,1 
        MEDIAN 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
        SD 1,7 0,9 2,1 2,0 2,0 1,9 0,6 2,0 0,5 1,2 2,3 0,4 0,0 0,2 0,8 0,7 2,2 2,3 
                       
11 BWP M (N=18) MEAN 1,1 0,3 3,6 3,6 1,0 1,8 0,3 4,7 0,3 0,4 3,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 1,2 0,1 2,4 3,2 
        MEDIAN 1 0 3 4 0 1 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 
        SD 1,4 0,6 2,4 2,7 1,8 1,8 0,8 1,9 1,0 0,8 1,8 0,2 0,5 0,0 1,6 0,2 2,2 2,8 
    F (N=30) MEAN 0,4 0,1 5,1 4,2 0,3 1,7 0,1 5,7 0,3 0,1 1,9 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,2 1,2 3,0 
        MEDIAN 0 0 6 4 0 2 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
        SD 1,0 0,4 2,5 2,6 0,5 1,9 0,4 2,2 1,0 0,6 1,9 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,7 1,8 2,7 
    All (N=48) MEAN 0,8 0,2 4,4 3,9 0,7 1,7 0,2 5,2 0,3 0,3 2,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,0 0,1 1,8 3,1 
        MEDIAN 0 0 5 4 0 1 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
        SD 1,2 0,5 2,4 2,7 1,2 1,9 0,6 2,0 1,0 0,7 1,8 0,3 0,3 0,0 1,5 0,5 2,0 2,7 
                               
12 Insidious M (N=18) MEAN 2,1 0,2 4,3 3,9 0,8 1,4 0,2 4,2 0,2 1,1 3,2 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,3 3,3 2,0 
 XLIX 
        MEDIAN 2 0 5 3 0 1 0 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
        SD 2,1 0,4 2,2 2,6 1,4 1,5 0,7 2,1 0,7 1,9 2,1 1,2 0,2 0,9 1,3 1,0 2,4 2,7 
    F (N=30) MEAN 1,0 0,1 6,1 4,6 0,6 2,0 0,1 5,7 0,2 0,3 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 3,0 2,8 
        MEDIAN 0 0 6 5 0 2 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 
        SD 1,7 0,3 1,7 2,4 1,4 2,2 0,4 2,0 0,9 0,7 2,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 0,2 2,4 2,6 
    All (N=48) MEAN 1,5 0,1 5,2 4,2 0,7 1,7 0,1 5,0 0,2 0,7 2,6 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,6 0,2 3,2 2,4 
        MEDIAN 1 0 6 4 0 1 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 
        SD 1,9 0,3 2,0 2,5 1,4 1,9 0,5 2,1 0,8 1,3 2,3 0,6 0,1 0,5 1,3 0,6 2,4 2,7 
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HAPPINES                      
13 Harry und  M (N=18) MEAN 5,3 0,1 0,1 0,8 0,4 0,5 2,1 0,2 0,1 4,1 3,2 1,7 0,7 0,4 0,0 2,3 2,5 0,2 
   Sally     MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 2 3 0 
        SD 1,6 0,3 0,2 1,4 1,0 1,2 2,0 0,5 0,2 2,2 1,9 1,9 1,0 0,8 0,0 2,3 2,5 0,4 
    F (N=30) MEAN 6,2 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,3 0,4 2,2 0,0 0,0 4,6 3,5 1,6 0,7 0,4 0,0 2,1 1,3 0,0 
        MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
        SD 2,1 0,2 0,0 1,0 0,8 1,3 2,4 0,0 0,0 2,5 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,4 0,0 2,7 1,9 0,0 
    All (N=48) MEAN 5,8 0,1 0,0 0,6 0,4 0,4 2,1 0,1 0,0 4,3 3,3 1,7 0,7 0,4 0,0 2,2 1,9 0,1 
        MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
        SD 1,9 0,3 0,1 1,2 0,9 1,3 2,2 0,3 0,1 2,4 2,2 2,0 1,3 1,1 0,0 2,5 2,2 0,2 
                       
14 Hangover M (N=18) MEAN 5,3 0,2 0,3 1,2 0,5 1,2 1,0 0,9 0,1 4,3 3,7 2,8 0,3 0,3 0,0 1,3 2,2 0,7 
        MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 
        SD 2,5 0,4 0,6 1,7 0,9 1,4 1,5 1,1 0,3 2,6 2,4 2,8 0,8 0,7 0,0 1,6 2,5 1,2 
    F (N=30) MEAN 6,4 0,1 0,3 1,4 0,5 1,2 1,2 0,4 0,0 4,7 3,8 2,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,9 2,2 0,3 
        MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 1,8 0,4 0,8 1,8 1,3 1,7 1,7 1,0 0,2 2,5 2,8 2,4 1,1 0,2 0,2 1,7 2,2 0,7 
 L 
    All (N=48) MEAN 5,8 0,1 0,3 1,3 0,5 1,2 1,1 0,6 0,1 4,5 3,8 2,4 0,3 0,2 0,0 1,1 2,2 0,5 
        MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,1 0,4 0,7 1,8 1,1 1,5 1,6 1,1 0,3 2,5 2,6 2,6 0,9 0,4 0,1 1,6 2,4 1,0 
                      
15 BBT  M (N=18) MEAN 5,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,7 0,4 1,1 0,0 0,0 4,7 3,2 1,8 0,6 0,4 0,0 1,4 1,2 0,2 
        MEDIAN 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
        SD 2,3 0,8 0,0 0,8 1,7 1,0 1,5 0,0 0,0 2,3 2,0 2,0 1,4 1,1 0,0 1,9 2,1 0,5 
    F (N=30) MEAN 6,3 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,7 0,0 0,0 5,7 4,9 2,8 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,8 1,1 0,0 
        MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 1,9 0,7 0,0 0,6 1,3 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,0 2,2 2,3 2,3 1,1 0,0 0,9 1,7 1,5 0,0 
    F (N=48) MEAN 5,8 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,2 0,9 0,0 0,0 5,2 4,0 2,3 0,4 0,2 0,1 1,1 1,1 0,1 
        MEDIAN 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        SD 2,1 0,8 0,0 0,7 1,5 0,5 1,5 0,0 0,0 2,3 2,2 2,2 1,2 0,6 0,5 1,8 1,8 0,3 
                       
16 Naked gun M (N=18) MEAN 5,1 0,0 0,1 1,7 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,1 0,0 4,4 3,7 2,3 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,3 2,2 0,0 
        MEDIAN 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
        SD 2,0 0,0 0,2 2,1 0,2 0,2 0,9 0,2 0,0 2,5 1,9 2,2 0,3 0,7 0,0 0,7 2,4 0,0 
    F (N=30) MEAN 4,4 0,0 0,1 2,7 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,0 3,5 3,2 1,1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4 1,7 0,1 
        MEDIAN 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
        SD 2,3 0,0 0,4 3,1 1,0 0,2 1,4 0,4 0,0 2,2 2,0 1,7 0,2 0,5 0,0 1,1 1,9 0,4 
    All (N=48) MEAN 4,8 0,0 0,1 2,2 0,2 0,0 0,5 0,1 0,0 4,0 3,4 1,7 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,3 2,0 0,0 
        MEDIAN 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
        SD 2,1 0,0 0,3 2,6 0,6 0,2 1,1 0,3 0,0 2,4 2,0 1,9 0,3 0,6 0,0 0,9 2,2 0,2 
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Adria (1)
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All the presidents men (2)
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Die Reise der Vögel (3)
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Great barrier reef (4)
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Mythos Wald (5)
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Wasserfall (6)
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Wüste (7)
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Kaukasus (8)
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Shining (9)
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Silence of the lambs (10)
 LIV 
   
   
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
am
us
em
en
t
an
ge
r
an
xie
ty
co
nf
us
io
n
co
nt
em
pt
di
sg
us
t
em
ba
rr
as
sm
en
t
fe
ar
gu
ilt
ha
pp
in
es
s
in
te
re
st jo
y
lo
ve
pr
id
e
sa
dn
es
s
sh
am
e
su
rp
ris
e
un
ha
pp
in
es
s
Blair Witch Project (11)
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Insidious (12)
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Mirrors (13)
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
am
us
em
en
t
an
ge
r
an
xie
ty
co
nf
us
io
n
co
nt
em
pt
di
sg
us
t
em
ba
rr
as
sm
en
t
fe
ar
gu
ilt
ha
pp
in
es
s
in
te
re
st jo
y
lo
ve
pr
id
e
sa
dn
es
s
sh
am
e
su
rp
ris
e
un
ha
pp
in
es
s
Psycho (14)
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Die Vögel (15)
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Lord of the rings (16)
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Harry and Sally (17)
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Hangover (18)
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Der Schuh des Manitu (19)
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Big Bang Theory (KKH) (20)
 LVII 
   
   
  
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
am
us
em
en
t
an
ge
r
an
xie
ty
co
nf
us
io
n
co
nt
em
pt
di
sg
us
t
em
ba
rr
as
sm
en
t
fe
ar
gu
ilt
ha
pp
in
es
s
in
te
re
st jo
y
lo
ve
pr
id
e
sa
dn
es
s
sh
am
e
su
rp
ris
e
un
ha
pp
in
es
s
Big Bang teory (FWF) (21)
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Nackte Kanone (22)
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The network (4)
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Naked (16)
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B.2 Additional tables and figures 
Figure VII-2: Eckel & Grossman (2008), original gamble selection sheet 
 
 
 
 
Table VII-3: Between-subjects variables 
Emotion/Order Risk task 1 Risk task 2 
Happiness clip 1 N=22 N=22 
Happiness clip 2 N=22 N=22 
Fear clip 1 N=22 N=22 
Fear clip 2 N=22 N=22 
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C Additional material chapter IV.2 
C.1  Instructions 
Herzlich willkommen zu unserem heutigen Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre 
Teilnahme. 
Im folgenden Experiment werden Sie gebeten, verschiedene Entscheidungen zu 
treffen. Am Ende des Experiments werden Sie für Ihre Teilnahme bezahlt. Die Höhe 
dieser Auszahlung hängt dabei von Ihren Entscheidungen und von den 
Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. 
Wenn Sie während des Experiments Fragen haben, dann heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand und 
warten darauf, dass jemand zu Ihnen kommt. Bitte reden oder rufen Sie nicht, und 
unterlassen auch jeden anders gearteten Kommunikationsversuch mit anderen 
Experimentteilnehmern. Schalten Sie außerdem Ihre Mobiltelefone und Smartphones 
aus. 
Das Experiment besteht aus mehreren Teilen. Zunächst werden Sie gebeten, 
verschiedene Lotterien zu vergleichen und einige Fragen zu beantworten. Im zweiten 
Teil werden Ihnen in diesem Experiment einige Male emotionale Filmsequenzen 
gezeigt. Außerdem besteht das Experiment aus mehreren Runden eines 
Markteintrittspiels, welches wir Ihnen im Folgenden ausführlich erklären werden. 
Abschließend stellen wir Ihnen noch einige demographische Fragen. Das Experiment 
wird ca. 90 Minuten dauern. 
Nachdem Sie alle Teile des Experiments abgeschlossen haben, wird der 
Experimentalleiter die Abrechnung Ihrer Auszahlungen vornehmen und Ihnen den 
Endbetrag in Bar auszahlen. Alle Angaben, die Sie machen, werden selbstverständlich 
streng vertraulich behandelt. Ihre Anonymität bleibt jederzeit gewahrt. 
Wir wünschen Ihnen viel Erfolg und viel Spaß!  
Zunächst wählen Sie nun zwischen Lotterien  
Ihre Auszahlung hängt nur von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und dem Zufall ab.   
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Auf der nächsten Seite werden Ihnen zehn Wahlmöglichkeiten zwischen zwei 
Lotterien gegeben: Lotterie A und Lotterie B (z.B. Lotterie A: 40% 2,00 €; 60% 1,60 
€; Lotterie B 40% 3,85 €; 60% 0,10 €).   
Die Prozentangaben zeigen, mit welcher Wahrscheinlichkeit Sie den jeweiligen 
Geldbetrag gewinnen können. Bitte entscheiden Sie sich für jede der zehn 
Möglichkeiten für jeweils eine der vorgestellten Lotterien A oder B. Der Computer 
zieht dann zufällig eine dieser Wahlmöglichkeiten und führt die Lotterie aus, für die 
Sie sich entschieden haben. Der Gewinn, den Sie in dieser Lotterie erzielen, wird zu 
Ihrem bisherigen Kontostand hinzuaddiert.  
Da jede Zeile ausgewählt werden könnte, denken Sie bitte gut über Ihre 
Entscheidungen nach. 
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Erklärung: Das Spiel  
Im Folgenden werden Sie 18 Runden eines 3-Personen-Spiels spielen. In jeder Runde 
werden Sie dabei gegen andere zufällig ausgewählte Spieler aus diesem Raum spielen. 
Alle fünf Runden sehen Sie und auch Ihre Mitspieler einen kurzen Videoclip. Sie 
erhalten dann jeweils zu Beginn einer jeden Runde eine Information darüber, welche 
Art von Video die beiden Spieler gesehen haben. 
In dem Spiel entscheiden alle 3 Spieler gleichzeitig darüber, ob Sie in einen Markt 
eintreten möchten oder nicht. Der Markt hat eine begrenzte Kapazität, so dass nur eine 
bestimmte Anzahl von Spielern mit Gewinn eintreten kann. Das bedeutet: 
• Wenn Sie sich alle drei für einen Markteintritt entscheiden, so erleidet jeder von 
Ihnen einen Verlust in Höhe von -6.00 € 
• Wenn sich zwei von Ihnen für einen Markteintritt entscheiden, so erhalten sowohl 
die zwei eingetretenen Spieler als auch der eine nicht eingetretene Spieler 0.00 €. 
• Wenn sich einer von Ihnen als einziger für einen Markteintritt entscheidet, so erhält 
dieser 6.00 € und die zwei nicht eingetretenen Spieler 0.00 €. 
• Wenn keiner von Ihnen sich für einen Markteintritt entscheidet, so erhalten alle 
drei Spieler 0.00 €. 
 Ihre Entscheidung wird mit Hilfe einer imaginären Lostrommel getroffen, deren 
Inhalt Sie selbst bestimmen können. Sie können insgesamt 100 Lose einfüllen, wobei 
es zwei verschiedene Losarten gibt: Eintritts-Lose und Nicht-Eintritts-Lose. 
Der Computer zieht aus dieser Lostrommel und entscheidet damit über Ihren 
Markteintritt. Je nach dem Verhältnis der Lose, die Sie einfüllen, zieht er den 
Markteintritt mit größerer oder kleinerer Wahrscheinlichkeit. Sie können zum Beispiel 
100 Eintrittslose einfüllen und treten dann auf jeden Fall in den Markt ein. Oder Sie 
können 100 Nicht-Eintrittslose einfüllen, sodass sie auf jeden Fall nicht eintreten. Oder 
Sie füllen ein Mischverhältnis an Losen ein, welches dann die Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
des Eintritts / Nicht-Eintritts widerspiegeln.  
Auf der nächsten Seite bitten wir Sie, einige Verständnisfragen zu beantworten. Wenn 
Sie diese Fragen richtig beantwortet haben, können sie mit dem Spiel beginnen.  
Am Ende des Experiments wird per Zufall eine Runde ausgewählt, auf der Ihre 
Auszahlung beruht. Die anderen Runden werden nicht zahlungsrelevant. Da jede 
Runde ausgewählt werden kann, treffen Sie bitte in jeder Runde Ihre bestmögliche 
Entscheidung.  
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Bitte beachten Sie folgendes:  
Sie spielen jede Runde gegen eine neue Kombination von Spielern, genauer: 
mindestens ein Spieler wechselt immer.  
Die Ergebnisse der einzelnen Runden werden Ihnen erst zum Schluss des Experiments 
mitgeteilt. Nach den einzelnen Runden erhalten Sie keine Informationen über die 
Ergebnisse. Zum Schluss wählt ein Zufallsmechanismus aus, welche der gespielten 
Runden für die Auszahlung aus dem Spiel relevant sein wird. 
Ab jetzt kann jede Runde für die Auszahlung relevant sein. Bitte treffen Sie daher in 
jeder Runde ihre bestmögliche Entscheidung! 
Viel Spaß! 
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Figure VII-3: Screenshot of Holt and Laury lottery 
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C.2 Documentation 
Table VII-4: Documentation of experiment 
Frage Variable Fragentyp, Werte 
Risiko   
Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobereiter 
Mensch oder versuchen Sie Risiken zu vermeiden? risktaking_general 
!radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr 
risikobereit"; 10 
Man kann sich in verschiedenen Bereichen ja auch unterschiedlich verhalten. 
Wie würden Sie Ihre Risikobereitschaft in Bezug auf die folgenden Bereiche 
einschätzen?  
  
Beim Autofahren: risktaking_car !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
Bei Geldanlagen: risktaking_money !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
Bei Freizeit und Sport: risktaking_sports !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
Bei Ihrer beruflichen Karriere: risktaking_job !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
Bei Ihrer Gesundheit: risktaking_health !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
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Beim Vertrauen in fremde Menschen: risktaking_trust !radioline: 0 = "Gar nicht risikobereit"; 10 = "Sehr risikobereit"; 10 
Überlegen Sie bitte, was Sie in folgender Situation tun würden: 
Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie in einer Lotterie 100.000 € gewinnen. Unmittelbar 
nach Erhalt des Gewinns bekommen Sie von einer angesehenen Bank ein 
Angebot für eine Geldanlage, die folgendes beinhaltet: 
Es gibt eine Chance, das Geld innerhalb von zwei Jahren zu verdoppeln. Es gibt 
aber auch ein gleich hohes Risiko, die Hälfte des eingesetzten Geldes zu 
verlieren. Sie können das Geld ganz oder teilweise in folgender Weise anlegen 
oder das Angebot ablehnen. Welchen Teil des Lotteriegewinns würden Sie für 
die einerseits riskante, andererseits gewinnversprechende Geldanlage einsetzen?   
Betrag_Geldanlage 
!radio: 1 = "Den ganzen Betrag von 100.000 Euro"; 
2 = "Den Betrag von 80.000 Euro"; 3 = "Den Betrag 
von 60.000 Euro"; 4 = "Den Betrag von 40.000 
Euro"; 5 = "Den Betrag von 20.000 Euro"; 6 = 
"Überhaupt nichts. Ich würde das Angebot 
ablehnen" 
Trait emotions   
In den meisten Bereichen entspricht mein Leben meinen Idealvorstellungen. hap1 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
Meine Lebensbedingungen sind ausgezeichnet. hap2 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
Ich bin mit meinem Leben zufrieden. hap3 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
Bisher habe ich die wesentlichen Dinge erreicht, die ich mir für mein Leben 
wünsche. hap4 
!radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) 
trifft voll zu"; 7 
Wenn ich mein Leben noch einmal leben könnte, würde ich kaum etwas ändern. hap5 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
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Ich bin jemand, der sich oft Sorgen macht. anx1 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
Ich bin jemand, der leicht nervös wird. anx2 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
Ich bin jemand, der entspannt ist, mit Stress gut umgehen kann. anx3 !radioline: 1= "trifft überhaupt nicht zu (1)"; 7 ="(7) trifft voll zu"; 7 
   
Wie stark wurden Ihre Entscheidungen durch Überlegungen beeinflusst, welche 
Strategien Ihre Gegenspieler spielen? strategie_gegenspieler 
!radioline: 
1 = gar nicht; 11 = sehr stark; 11; 
Wie stark wurden Ihre Entscheidungen durch Überlegungen beeinflusst, welche 
Gedanken sich Ihre Gegenspieler darüber machen, welche Strategie Sie spielen? 
gedanken_gegenspiel
er 
!radioline: 
1 = gar  nicht; 11 = sehr stark; 11; 
Wie stark wurden Ihre Entscheidungen durch Überlegungen beeinflusst, welche 
Gedanken sich Ihre Gegenspieler darüber machen, was Sie denken, welche 
Strategien sie spielen werden? 
gedanken_gegenspiel
er2 
!radioline: 
1 = gar nicht; 11= sehr stark; 11; 
Wie stark wurden Ihre Entscheidungen durch Überlegungen beeinflusst, welche 
Gedanken sich Ihre beiden Gegenspieler übereinander machen, welche 
Strategien sie spielen? 
gedanken_gegenspiel
er3 
!radioline: 
1 = gar nicht; 11= sehr stark; 11; 
   
Wie alt sind Sie? alter  
Welches ist Ihr Geschlecht? geschlecht !radioline: 1=weiblich; 2=männlich; 2; 
 LXXXIX 
In welchem Semester studieren Sie? (0 = Ich studiere nicht.) Semester  
Welches ist Ihr Studienfach? Studienfach 
!radio: 
6="BWL"; 
5="VWL"; 
4="Wirtschaftspädagogik"; 
3="Mathematik"; 
2="Informatik"; 
1="Sonstige"; 
0="Ich studiere nicht."; 
Können Sie sich vorstellen, sich selbständig zu machen oder ein Unternehmen 
zu gründen? selbst 
!radioline: 1 = "Überhaupt nicht"; 11 = "Sehr gut"; 
11 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, sich in den nächsten 5 Jahren selbständig 
zu machen? selbst2 
!radioline: 1 = "extrem unwahrscheinlich"; 11 = 
"extrem wahrscheinlich"; 11 
Wie sind Ihre Kenntnisse im Bereich der Entscheidungstheorie? entsch 
!radioline: 
1 = gar  keine Kenntnisse; 11 = sehr gute 
Kenntnisse; 11; 
Wie sind Ihre Kenntnisse im Bereich der Spieltheorie? spieltheo 
!radioline: 
1 = gar  keine Kenntnisse; 11 = sehr gute 
Kenntnisse; 11; 
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C.3  Additional tables and figures 
Figure VII-4: Pure Nash equlibria 
 
    P3 
    s3=1 s3=0 
P1
 
s1=1 
P2
 s2=1 -6  -6  -6 0  0  0 
  s2=0 0  0  0 6  0  0 
s1=0 
P2
 s2=1 0  0  0 0  6  0 
  s2=0 0  0  6 0  0  0 
 
 
Figure VII-5: Histogram of dependent variable el 
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Figure VII-6: Histogram of dependent variable el (male students) 
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Figure VII-7: Histogram of dependent variable el (female students) 
 
 
Figure VII-8: Histogram of dependent variable el (entrepreneurs) 
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C.4  Output tables 
ANOVAS chapter IV.2  
Oneway 
Descriptives 
el   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
male student 54 54,65 25,950 3,531 47,56 61,73 0 100 
female 
student 
90 42,58 23,490 2,476 37,66 47,50 0 100 
entrepreneur 24 55,63 25,446 5,194 44,89 66,38 0 100 
Total 168 48,32 25,206 1,945 44,48 52,16 0 100 
 
ANOVA 
el   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6411,378 2 3205,689 5,306 ,006 
Within Groups 99691,809 165 604,193   
Total 106103,187 167    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   el   
Bonferroni   
(I) type (J) type 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
male student female student 12,067* 4,231 ,015 1,83 22,30 
entrepreneur -,987 6,030 1,000 -15,57 13,60 
female student male student -12,067* 4,231 ,015 -22,30 -1,83 
entrepreneur -13,055 5,647 ,066 -26,71 ,60 
entrepreneur male student ,987 6,030 1,000 -13,60 15,57 
female student 13,055 5,647 ,066 -,60 26,71 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Descriptives 
el   
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NEUT 56 49,34 28,676 3,832 41,66 57,02 0 100 
ANX 56 43,10 23,842 3,186 36,72 49,49 0 100 
HAPP 56 52,53 22,172 2,963 46,59 58,47 0 100 
Total 168 48,32 25,206 1,945 44,48 52,16 0 100 
 
ANOVA 
el   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2573,752 2 1286,876 2,051 ,132 
Within Groups 103529,435 165 627,451   
Total 106103,187 167    
 
 XCV 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   el   
Bonferroni   
(I) Own emotion (J) Own emotion 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
NEUT ANX 6,232 4,734 ,569 -5,22 17,68 
HAPP -3,193 4,734 1,000 -14,64 8,26 
ANX NEUT -6,232 4,734 ,569 -17,68 5,22 
HAPP -9,426 4,734 ,144 -20,87 2,02 
HAPP NEUT 3,193 4,734 1,000 -8,26 14,64 
ANX 9,426 4,734 ,144 -2,02 20,87 
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General Linear Model: Repeated-measures ANOVA 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
emo_opp Dependent 
 1 NN 
2 NA 
3 AA 
4 NH 
5 AH 
6 HH 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Own emotion 1 NEUT 56 
2 ANX 56 
3 HAPP 56 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Own emotion Mean Std. Deviation N 
NN NEUT 46,36 33,926 56 
ANX 46,77 35,598 56 
HAPP 58,48 31,699 56 
Total 50,54 34,046 168 
NA NEUT 58,30 31,920 56 
ANX 49,79 29,808 56 
HAPP 62,95 25,897 56 
Total 57,01 29,647 168 
NH NEUT 68,48 36,184 56 
ANX 54,43 31,583 56 
HAPP 77,48 26,390 56 
Total 66,80 32,857 168 
AA NEUT 41,70 32,898 56 
ANX 32,43 32,205 56 
HAPP 40,82 25,527 56 
Total 38,32 30,499 168 
NEUT 49,48 35,260 56 
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AH ANX 41,80 28,294 56 
HAPP 54,57 27,323 56 
Total 48,62 30,768 168 
HH NEUT 32,38 37,463 56 
ANX 28,18 33,104 56 
HAPP 34,59 27,827 56 
Total 31,71 32,943 168 
 
Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa 
Box's M 69,819 
F 1,576 
df1 42 
df2 80825,260 
Sig. ,010 
Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent 
variables are equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ownemo  
     
 
Multivariate Testsa 
Effect Value F Hypothesis 
 
Error df Sig. 
emo_opp Pillai's Trace ,514 34,072b 5,000 161,000 ,000 
Wilks' Lambda ,486 34,072b 5,000 161,000 ,000 
Hotelling's 
 
1,058 34,072b 5,000 161,000 ,000 
Roy's Largest 
 
1,058 34,072b 5,000 161,000 ,000 
emo_opp * 
ownemo 
Pillai's Trace ,085 1,445 10,000 324,000 ,159 
Wilks' Lambda ,916 1,437b 10,000 322,000 ,163 
Hotelling's 
 
,089 1,428 10,000 320,000 ,166 
Roy's Largest 
 
,051 1,659c 5,000 162,000 ,147 
a. Design: Intercept + ownemo  
     
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance 
level. 
 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericitya 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
df Sig. Epsilonb 
 XCVIII 
Within 
Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
Huynh-
Feldt 
Lower-
bound 
emo_opp ,390 153,390 14 ,000 ,697 ,723 ,200 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized 
transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. Design: Intercept + ownemo  
 Within Subjects Design: emo_opp 
b. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of 
significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
table. 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III 
  
 
df Mean 
 
F Sig. 
emo_opp Sphericity 
 
133767,600 5 26753,520 61,044 ,000 
Greenhouse-
 
133767,600 3,485 38379,042 61,044 ,000 
Huynh-Feldt 133767,600 3,613 37023,924 61,044 ,000 
Lower-bound 133767,600 1,000 133767,600 61,044 ,000 
emo_opp * 
ownemo 
Sphericity 
 
7372,188 10 737,219 1,682 ,080 
Greenhouse-
 
7372,188 6,971 1057,571 1,682 ,111 
Huynh-Feldt 7372,188 7,226 1020,230 1,682 ,108 
Lower-bound 7372,188 2,000 3686,094 1,682 ,189 
Error(emo_opp) Sphericity 
 
361569,711 825 438,266   
Greenhouse-
 
361569,711 575,097 628,711   
Huynh-Feldt 361569,711 596,146 606,512   
Lower-bound 361569,711 165,000 2191,332   
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source emo_opp Type III 
  
 
df Mean 
 
F Sig. 
emo_opp Level 1 vs. 
  
59513,357 1 59513,357 65,324 ,000 
Level 2 vs. 
  
107514,881 1 107514,881 83,765 ,000 
Level 3 vs. 
  
206781,167 1 206781,167 132,212 ,000 
 XCIX 
Level 4 vs. 
  
7320,720 1 7320,720 10,195 ,002 
Level 5 vs. 
  
48009,524 1 48009,524 44,063 ,000 
emo_opp * 
ownemo 
Level 1 vs. 
  
2754,750 2 1377,375 1,512 ,224 
Level 2 vs. 
  
1309,190 2 654,595 ,510 ,601 
Level 3 vs. 
  
7843,619 2 3921,810 2,508 ,085 
Level 4 vs. 
  
731,583 2 365,792 ,509 ,602 
Level 5 vs. 
  
1135,012 2 567,506 ,521 ,595 
Error(emo_opp) Level 1 vs. 
  
150323,893 165 911,054   
Level 2 vs. 
  
211781,929 165 1283,527   
Level 3 vs. 
  
258061,214 165 1564,007   
Level 4 vs. 
  
118482,696 165 718,077   
Level 5 vs. 
  
179779,464 165 1089,573   
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
NN ,876 2 165 ,418 
NA 2,333 2 165 ,100 
NH 3,840 2 165 ,023 
AA 3,796 2 165 ,024 
AH 4,364 2 165 ,014 
HH 4,221 2 165 ,016 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal 
across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + ownemo  
 Within Subjects Design: emo_opp 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 400612,389 1 400612,389 640,113 ,000 
ownemo 4465,512 2 2232,756 3,568 ,030 
 C 
Error 103264,682 165 625,847   
 
Custom Hypothesis Tests 
Contrast Results (K Matrix) 
Own emotion Simple Contrasta 
Averaged 
Variable 
MEASURE_1 
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -7,217 
Hypothesized Value 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -7,217 
Std. Error 4,728 
Sig. ,129 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -16,552 
Upper Bound 2,117 
Level 3 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate 5,366 
Hypothesized Value 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) 5,366 
Std. Error 4,728 
Sig. ,258 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -3,969 
Upper Bound 14,701 
a. Reference category = 1 
 
Test Results 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   AVERAGE   
 CI 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 4465,512 2 2232,756 3,568 ,030 
Error 103264,682 165 625,847   
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Own emotion 
Multiple Comparisons 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Bonferroni   
(I) Own 
emotion 
(J) Own 
emotion 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
NEUT ANX 7,22 4,728 ,386 -4,22 18,65 
HAPP -5,37 4,728 ,774 -16,80 6,07 
ANX NEUT -7,22 4,728 ,386 -18,65 4,22 
HAPP -12,58* 4,728 ,026 -24,02 -1,15 
HAPP  NEUT 5,37 4,728 ,774 -6,07 16,80 
ANX 12,58* 4,728 ,026 1,15 24,02 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 625,847. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
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